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5 1.  General Introduction. 
The nineteenth  century  has  witnessed  great changes  in 
the  field  of matrimonial  property relations.  Old  systems 
have been subjected to profound  modifications by the intro- 
duction  of  new  principles,  while,  in  some instances, local 
customs and statutes have given place to a common system, 
thereby reducing  the great diversity in  the rules of family 
law.  This  consolidation  of  the systems was influenced  by 
the  general  codification  movement  in  continental Europe, 
but the change in the case of  matrimonial property rights is 
of especial significance because of  the great lack of  uniform- 
ity that had previously existed in this field of  private law. 
The changes in the property relations of  husband and wife 
have not, however, been due exclusively to the combination 
of the systems.  The development of  new conceptions of  the 
individual and of  the family has led to a modification of  the 
old  systems and  the  appearance of  new regulations  in  the 
field  of family relations.  With  this development there has 
appeared a tendency to make the new rules general  in their 
character.  Universality, however, is not as  yet a character- 
istic of the rules of  fanlily law.  The interests  involved  are 
not as general as those which are affected by the law of  obli- 
gations and other branches  of  property law.  The peculiar 
social and religious vlews and customs of  a community deter- 
mine  the  family  organization  and  regulate  the  system  of 
Property relations between the married parties.  In the earlier 
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stages only family property exists and there are no true mat- 
rimonial property relations.  With social development disin- 
tegration  arises  within  the  family.  The religious  unity  is 
weakened, and, ultimately, with increased industrial develop- 
ment the economic unity is also impaired.  Institutions which 
have  been  based  upon  such  unity  must  likewise  become 
modified, a process illustrated by the history of  matrimonial 
property rights  in  Roman  law.  Modern codes are  passing 
through  a  similar  development,  as  is  evidenced  by  the 
results of  the legislative activity of  the nineteenth century. 
In England and the  United  States the legal economic re- 
lations  of  married  parties  have  been  revolutionized.  The 
fundamental  rules of  the common  law respecting the prop- 
erty and capacity of  married women have been abrogated or 
greatly modified.  The changes in the industrial system had 
affected the economic organization of  the family, and it was 
inevitable that the legal relations should accommodate them- 
selves to the new conditions.  At a time when women were 
acquiring an independent activity it was natural that particu- 
lar attention  should  be  called  to the  inequalities  to which 
the law subjected  them.  Among the  arguments advanced 
against the old system was the charge that that it was based 
upon  the principle of  natural  inequality of  the sexes and of 
masculine  superiority.  The reformers  demanded  not  only 
the restriction of  the husband's extensive rights in his wife's 
property, but also the removal of  the disabilities which were 
imposed upon married women.  In  general, no account was 
taken of  the fact  that  some of  these  disabilities  had  their 
historical justification  in  the desire  to preserve the unity of 
the family, and  had not necessarily been influenced  by con- 
siderations of  the natural  incapacity of  the woman.  More- 
over, the fact that the same motive had led to the imposition 
of  duties  and disabilities upon  the husband was  frequently 
disregarded.  The  personality  of  the  woman  and  not  the 
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relation  into which she had entered was considered  the true 
source of her disabilities. 
111 the early acts np attempt was made  at a general revi- 
,ion  and codification of  the  law governing the economic re- 
lations  of  married  parties.  The legislatures  were  without 
models by which  to form the new measures, and the full ef- 
fects of the modifications were  not appreciated.  The mar- 
ried women's acts confined themselves to the removal of  the 
disabilities  of  the wife.  They did  not, in  general, deprive 
her of the exemptions and privileges which she had enjoyed 
on account of  these disabilities, nor was the husband relieved 
of his previous duties and  burdens.  As a result, the matri- 
monial property systems  became characterized  by gross in- 
equalities and inconsistencies.  The husband, though he re- 
ceived  no property from  the wife, might be held  liable for 
her ante-nuptial debts.  His creditors could  not obtain  sat- 
isfaction out of  the wife's property, even though, as a matter 
of  fact, the debts had been contracted for the support of  the 
wife.  Under the new conditions it was possible for a woman 
possessing considerable property in  her own right to obtain 
a  divorce on the  ground  of  lack  of  support.  A  married 
woman who had been accorded full capacity for carrying on 
legal proceedings might still be able to plead the fact of  cov- 
erture as a bar to the running of  the period of  the limitation 
of actions.  Moreover, while the husband had been deprived 
of rights in  the property of  his wife, the latter retained  the 
privileges which she had possessed in his real property. 
In undertaking to grant equal  rights to the wife the legis- 
lature had  produced a new inequality, which  threatened  to 
destroy the  ethical  unity of  the  family.  The Roman  law, 
under  the influence  of  similar  conditions of  economic and 
social development, came to recognize  the equality of  mar- 
ried  parties in respect to property rights.  The regulation of 
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logically in  accordance with such principle of  equality.  The 
later  legislation in  the  United  States has removed many of 
the inconsistencies of  the earlier statutes.  In general, there 
is exhibited a marked  tendency to carry out the strict prin- 
ciple of  equality in defining  the  legal economic relations of 
the married parties. 
The legislations of  continental  Europe have felt the influ- 
ence of  the new  ideas and conditions.  The modifications of 
matrimonial property law have not, however, been as radical 
as in the case of  England and  the  United  States.  The ex- 
planation is to be found in the  fact  that the property rights 
of  the wife in continental countries were, in general, superior 
to  those  recognized  by  the  English  common  law.  Some 
modifications  have  been made in  connection with the adop- 
tion of  the modern codes which have taken the place of  the 
particular  laws  of  local  communities.  This  is  particularly 
true of  the civil code of  the German Empire, which received 
legislative approval in  1896 and went into effect on January 
I, 1900.  A draft code which has been prepared for Switzer- 
land  will, if  enacted, produce  similar  results.  In some of 
the older codes important modifications of  matrimonial prop- 
erty  rights  have  been  made  by  subsequent  statutes,  and 
movements directed  to like ends are in active operation in a 
number of  states. 
The writer proposes  to consider  the  general principles of 
the matrimonial property systems which  obtain at present in 
the United  States and  in  the chief  states of  Europe.  Par- 
ticular attention will  be given  to recent  legislative changes. 
All of  the systems have certain common aims, and there ap- 
pears  an  increasing  tendency  towards  the  development  of 
common regulations  for  the realization of  these ends.  The 
extent to which  this  tendency has been realized will appear 
in this comparison of  existing legislation. 
The consideration  of this  subject  falls  under  three  divi- 
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,ions  In the  first will  be presented  the  general  effects of 
marriage upon the capacities and relations of  the parties, in- 
dependent of the particular system of  property rights which 
may obtain.  In the second, the chief forms which have been 
developed  for  the  regulation  of matrimonial  property rela- 
tions  will  be  considered.  And,  finally,  the  relations  of 
succession between  married  parties, as essential to an ade- 
quate  appreciation  of  matrimonial  property  rights, will  be 
discussed. I 71 
EFFECTS  OF  MARM  GE UPON  LE  GAL CAPACITY  I 7 
PART  I. 
EFFECTS OF MARRIAGE UPON  LEGAL 
CAPACITY. 
2. General Legal Capacity of  Acting. 
THE personal status of  married parties in their relation to 
each other and to third parties is closely connected with the 
system  of matrimonial property rights.  Thus, the capacity 
for performing  legal  acts is affected  by the character of  the 
property  relations  existing  between  the  married  parties. 
For example, where the law accords the husband extensive 
privileges in his wife's property, provisions will generally be 
found  by which  the married  woman's  capacity of  acting  is 
so restricted as to preserve  the  rights  of  the husband.  In 
like  manner, the rules  governing the property relations  of 
husband  and wife may be influenced  by the prevailing con- 
ception of personal capacity of  the parties. 
The marriage is not regarded as imposing any general in- 
capacity of  acting  upon the man.  On the other hand, all 
legislations have, at some time, recognized the general legal 
incapacity of the married  woman.  The early Roman and 
Teutonic laws take this position and consider the incapacity 
as flowing from  the husband's power over the wife.  Force 
is a cardinal element in all  primitive  legislation, and affects 
family as well  as economic relations.  This is illustrated by 
16 
the  fact that the  marriage  is  regarded  as resting  upon  a 
forcible seizure Or  sale.' 
The incapacity of  the married woman was similar to that 
which  affected her as a child.  At Roman law  she  passed 
from the patvia  potestas to the manus maviti.  Under  Teu- 
tonic law the Mund of  her father or guardian was exchanged 
for that of her husband.  The former emphasized the power 
and right of  the man, the latter  placed stress upon the ele- 
ment of guardianship.  In both systems, however, the com- 
plete  unity  of  the  family, under  the authority  of  its  head, 
excluded  any  general  independent  activity  of  the  other 
members. 
The  Roman  law  developed  an  informal  free  marriage 
without manus and, by the last century of  the Republic, this 
had become the normal system.  As a result of  the absence 
of  mauus  mariti, the legal  personality  of  the  wife  was  no 
longer merged  in  that of  the  husband.  Personal  relations 
arose  between  the  husband  and  wife.  The  marriage,  as 
such,  was  not  regarded  as  affecting  the  woman's  general 
capacity of  performing  legal  acts.'  This is  the position of 
the modern Roman law.3 
Primitive Teutonic law developed into a number of  differ- 
ent systems.  As a rule, however, the general  incapacity  of 
the married  woman  was  continued.  The reception  of  the 
Roman law was limited  in  the field  of  family  relations  and 
the principle of  the general legal  capacity of  the wife found 
but slight application.  The guardianship of unmarried  wo- 
men  gradually  disappeared.  In  the  case  of  the  married 
woman, however, the husband appeared  as a sort of  perma- 
nent natural  guardian  and  the  existing  matrimonial  pro- 
perty relations strengthened this conception. 
I  Sohm, Inst.,  92; Schriider, Lehvbuch, p. 67 seq.; Heusler, Inst., vol. ii,  130. 
Sob,  hr., 93.  * W~ndscheid,  Pandekfen,  vol. ii, $$490,491. I 8  PROPERTY RELA TIONS OF MARRlED PAR TIES  [  I 8 
In the present century there has been a tendency to regard 
the general capacity of  the woman as remaining  unaffected 
by the  marriage.  This principle,  which  is  at the  basis  of 
the Austrian and  Russian  codes, has  been accepted  by the 
new  code of  Germany4 and  by the Norwegian  statute of 
r888 which  regulates  the property relations  between  mar- 
ried  parties.5  The  other  continental  countries  have,  in 
general,  preserved  the  principle  that  the wife,  as such, is 
under a general disability in respect to her legal  capacity of 
acting.  It must not be assumed, however, that the married 
woman's  activity is  entirely unrestricted  in  the one case or 
that it is completely subject to control  in  the  other.  The 
two classes are distinguished  by the fact  that in  the former 
the wife has perfect freedom of  activity in so far as she is not 
limited by positive provisions, while  in  the latter  class  she 
has legal capacity of  acting only  to the extent  that  this  is 
specifically accorded to her. 
England  and  many  of  the American  states have  practi- 
cally  taken  the  former position.  In so far, however, as the 
common law disabilities of  coverture have not been expressly 
abrogated, it  is  the  rule  of  interpretation  to  regard  the 
married  woman  as restricted  in her legal activity to the ex- 
tent that the  law  has not accorded  her  positive  privileges. 
Accordingly, most of  the legislations contain specific grants 
of power to the married woman.6 
The disabilities to which married women are subjected are 
explained  on  various  grounds.  Some consider  the control 
as the survival of  the guardianship of  the family or the clan. 
According to this view it is exercised on account of  the weak- 
ness and inexperience of  the sex.  Others reject the assump- 
AJotiue, vol. iv, pp.  112, "3;  Denkschrzyt, p. 268. 
5 Stat. June 29, 1888, arts. 11, 19, An. L'tran., vol, 18, p. 766. 
Tor  examples of total  abrogation of  common law, see in  Appendix, note A, 
Miss. Const., $ 94, An. Code, $2289. 
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tion of natural incapacity and regard the legal disabilities of 
the wife  as justified  by considerations of  the unity of the fam- 
ily.  The legislations have not logically followed either of the 
above  It is true that in some states some one 
principle may have exercised  a predominant influence.  At 
the same time disabilities exist which can be explained .only 
by reference to other considerations.  Thus the prevailing 
system  of matrimonial  property relations, including the lia- 
bility  of  the  husband  for the  obligations  of  the wife, has 
generally exercised considerable influence upon the concep- 
tion  of  the legal  capacity of the  married  woman.  Recent 
legislation, however, clearly indicates  a tendency to impose 
restrictions upon the legal activity of  married parties only so 
far as these may be necessary to promote  the  ethical unity 
of  the marriage.  Specific limitations will then arise accord- 
ing to the particular system which the  parties select for the 
determination of  their property relations. 
3.  General Contractual Capacity of  the Married  Woman. 
The absence  of  any single, uniform principle as the basis 
of the legal incapacity of the married woman  is clearly indi- 
cated  by  the  provisions  of  the  French  Civil  Code which 
limit the wife's  general contractual  capacity.  The married 
woman  cannot  give, alienate, pledge  or acquire  unless  the 
husband joins in the act or accords his written authorization 
of the same:  Upon the refusal of the husband to grant the 
necessary consent, the  wife may be authorized by the court 
to perform the act.z  These provisions may be justified from 
considerations  of  conjugal  unity,  though  the  power  of  the 
wife to appeal from the decision of  the head of  the family is 
a departure from the strict principle. 
It is  provided,  however, that the  husband  cannot  grant 
the wife any general  authority  to act  in  these matters.  A 
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special authorization is essential for each act.3  Moreover, if 
the  husband  is  incapacitated  by reason  of  disappearance, 
minority,  interdiction  or  criminal  punishment,  the  wife 
requires  a  judicial  authorization  before  she can enter into 
contracts.'  These requirements cannot be explained  upon 
the principle of  unity of  family administration.  Under such 
a principle, where the husband  is disqualified  the wife must 
appear as  the proper  administrator  if  she  is  recognized  as 
possessing  the  natural  capacity to  fulfil1  these  functions. 
Upon the same assumption  the husband would not be pre- 
vented from granting the wife a general power of  acting with 
respect to certain matters.  Having satisfied himself respect- 
ing  the wife's  ability, he would  delegate the administration 
to her in  the same manner  as a  party  might  authorize  an 
agent to represent him generally in certain relations. 
On the other hand, the inexperience and  natural  incapa- 
city of  the woman cannot be accepted  as the uniform  prin- 
ciple, since the code does not impose any general restrictions 
upon dispositions between the husband and wife.  Marriage 
agreements cannot be contracted  or altered  after  the cele- 
bration  of  the  marriage, but  it  does  not  appear  that  this 
restriction  limits ordinary dispositions  between  the parties, 
and, in  any event, the wife, with  the  marital  authorization, 
may make contracts with  third  parties, from  which  benefits 
will accrue to the husband. 
The  combination  of  different  principles  is  manifested 
finally  in  the  recognition  of  acts  of  the  wife,  performed 
without  the  marital  authorization,  as  negotia  claudicantia 
and hence voidable and not void.  Third parties cannot take 
advantage of  the defect of  authority, but such  plea  may  be 
advanced  not  only  by  the  husband and  his heirs, but also 
by the wife  and her representatives.5 
a C.  C.,  223.  Ibid., 221, 222, 224.  Ibid., 225. 
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lt is  worthy  of  note  that  the French  legislature  has in 
recent  years  enacted  statutes similar  in  nature  to  those 
which marked  the  beginning of  the contractual capacity of 
married  women  in  English  and  American  law.6  Thus, a 
married woman  has been  given  the right  to make deposits 
in savings banks, etc., though she cannot withdraw the same 
if the husband objects to such disposition.7  An act of  1899 
provides  that a married  woman may become  a  member  of 
mutual benefit associations, but she must obtain the marital 
authorization  before she can participate in the administration 
of such societie~.~ 
Reference to the prevailing matrimonial  property system 
is essential to a due appreciation of  the regulations concern- 
ing  marital  authorization.  The system  of  community  of 
property which obtains in France has had great influence in 
determining the general contractual  capacity of  the married 
woman.  Where  the wife  has separate property  a  more or 
less  extensive  power  of  contracting  with  reference  to the 
same  is  accorded  her  by  the  French,  as  well  as  other 
systems that require the marital authorization.9 
The European legislations which have been most  directly 
influenced by the French code have, in general, retained the 
principle of  marital authorization, but have defined  it more 
consistently and  have introduced modifications in the direc- 
tion of a greater freedom of  activity  for  the wife.  This is 
pa*icularly  true  of  the  Italian  and  Spanish  codes.  The 
draft code of  Italy, submitted  in  1862, proposed to accord 
general  legal  capacity to the married woman.IO  While this 
principle was not accepted, the marital authorization was con- 
#  post, § 37. 
Stat., Apl.  g,  1881,  art. 6, Bull. des  his, xii  S&., vol. 22, p. 666;  Stat. Ju19 
'0,  1886,  art. 13,  ibid., vol.  33,  p.  279. 
'Stat.,  Apl. I, 1899, art. 3, Sirey, Rcruril, 1899,  p.  729. 
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siderably limited.  Thus, the husband may grant the wife a 
general authorization to enter into contracts."  Moreover, if 
the husband is incapacitated by reason of minority, judicially 
declared disappearance, etc., the marital  authorization is not 
required."  As in the French  code, the  court  may  always 
supply the consent of  the husband.'3 
The Italian code protects the wife against the undue influ- 
ence of  her husband by requiring the authorization of  the court 
for acts of the wife in cases where her interests are opposed to 
those of  her husband."  The Spanish code, on the contrary, 
does not  regard the married  woman as subject to undue in- 
fluence or any natural incapacity.  No particular provisions 
are made for her protection  in  ordinary  contracts  with  her 
husband.  Moreover,  the  wife  cannot  plead  incapacity  or 
defect of  authority, such privilege  being  accorded  only  to 
the husband and his heirs, and existing solely in the interests 
of the marital administration.IS 
The code of  Louisianax6  has followed the provisions of  the 
French legislation, but has given a clearer recognition to the 
natural incapacity of  the woman by the  requirement  for  ju- 
dicial  authorization  of  acts by which the wife undertakes to 
bind  her individual  property.'7  It is  considered  necessary 
to protect the wife  against the husband  as well  as  against 
third parties.  On the other hand, the influence of  the legis- 
lation in other American states is to be seen  in  recent  stat- 
utes according the married woman the right to subscribe for 
stock in building and  loan associations, to make deposits  in 
"Italy,  C. C., 134;  the Spanish code does not prohibit such grants of authority 
l2 Italy, C. C., 135;  Spain, C.  C., 188.  Cf.  ibid., 1441. 
lsltaly, C. C., 136;  Spain, C. C.,  60, 61. 
l4 C. C.,  136.  l5 C.  C., 65. 
'=c.  C.,  122, 125, 132-134. 
11 C. C., 126-128. Cf. ibid., 129. 
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banks and to withdraw and to transfer  the same, without the 
intervention of her husband, as if  she were a femme  sole.18 
The Swiss  cantons, in  general,  limit  the contractual  ca- 
pacity  of married  women.  Some of  the cantons still retain 
the guardianship of women, and  others, in providing for the 
of women in  general, except the married  wo- 
man  from  the benefit  of  such  acts.  The interests of the 
family administration have been the chief  cause for the con- 
tinuation  of  such  disability.  Separate  property  of  the 
married  woman  is  recognized  in  a  number of  the cantons, 
and, where this exists the wife is  accorded  a  certain  power 
of  contracting in reference to such property.Ig  Most of the 
leeislations, however, do not relieve the wife from her  disa- 
c, 
bilities  in  case  the  husband  is  incapacitated  from  acting. 
She continues  under  guardianship,  her  acts requiring  the 
consent of  the husband's curator or of  some other authorized 
party.  In the majority of  the cantons it is  likewise consid- 
ered necessary to protect the wife against the undue influence 
of  the  husband.  Accordingly it  is  required  that she shall 
be assisted by a guardian ad hoc in order to conclude certain 
kinds  of  contracts, particularly those in  which the  husband 
has  an  interest  in  the  matter  concerning  which the agree- 
ment is made.20 
The draft Swiss code represents an attempt to harmonize 
and combine the conflicting rules.  The modern principle is 
followed in that the contractual capacity of  the married  wo- 
''Acts,  1894,  no. 74;  ibid., 1896,  no. 63. 
lg Basle,  Stat.  Mch. 10,  1884,  art. 30 srq.,  An. ttran., vol. 14, p. 552; Glaris, 
L. B., ii, 174,  175,  ibid., vol. 4, p. 518;  Lucerne, Stat. Nov.  26, 1880,  arts. 11, 16, 
22, iJzd., vol.  10,  pp.  487, 488; Ziirich,  P. R. G., 8 597; Lardy,  figi~latjons 
S*isses,  pp. 65,125,  160,  239,263.  Cf. post,  5 42. 
20 Lucerne, Stat. Eiov. 26, 1880,  art. 16;  Zurich, P. R. G., $5  599, 600;  Lardy, 
-%ifl~fions Suisses, pp. 28, 67, 125, 126,  190, 225, 278, 303,  333,  348; confra, 
Basle9 Stat. Oct. 16,  1876,  art. 5, An. Ltran., vol. 6, p. 571, where the  old rule  is 
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man is made to depend upon the particular system of  matri- 
monial property relations which obtains between the parties. 
Following the majority of  the cantonal legislations, however, 
the draft code starts with the principle of  general incapacity. 
The wife, aside from her functions of  household  administra- 
tration,"  has  contractual  capacity  only  to the extent  that 
this is recognized by the system which governs the economic 
relations of  the married  parties.°°  An exception arises with 
respect to the separate property of  the wife.  Under  all  of 
the systems she possesses the power of  contracting generally 
with reference to such pr~perty.~s  Under the draft code the 
wife possesses the right of  exercising an industry or occupa- 
tion, but the husband in the interest of  the conjugal  unity is 
given  the right of  forbidding the same.  The prohibition of 
the husband may be rescinded by the court if  the wife shows 
that just  cause does not exist for such action.l+  The possi- 
bility of  undue influence by the husband  is  also recognized, 
and hence the authorization of  the court is required  for cer- 
tain acts of  the  wife.'^ 
The  Prussian  and  Saxon  codesz6 require  the  marital 
authorization for the contracts of  the wife which  may affect 
the unity of  the family or the matrimonial property.'7  Such 
authorization, however,  is  not  necessary  for  ordinary  con- 
tracts respecting the separate property of  married  women.28 
Moreover, the wife is recognized  as having  the first right to 
the  matrimonial administration in case the husband is inca- 
'l  Posf, 5 8. 
Switz, Vovmtwurf; 212.  2V(6id.,  215,  269.  44 Ibid., 186.  Zhid, 214. 
16These codes, as well as the  other legislations  obtaining among the members 
of the German federal union, were displaced by the national code on Jan. I,  1900. 
For the purposes of the present comparison they will  be treated as existing legis- 
lation~. 
"Prussia, A. L. R., ii, I,  $5 196,320,377;  Saxony, B. G., $1638. 
Prussia, A. L. R., ii, I,  $5 221,  222, 31 8; Saxony, B. G., $5 I 640,  1693. 
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pacitated  from acting.9  The Prussian  legislation, however, 
laces particular limitations upon contracts between married 
P  parties  These must be executed before a judge whose duty 
it is to see that advantage is not taken  of  the wife.  If  this 
requirement is not observed, the wife may acquire rights but 
will not become subject to any obligation as a result  of  the 
agreement with the husband.3" 
The new code of  Germany  starts with  the  principle  that 
the  contractual  capacity of  a woman is not affected  by her 
This  general  principle  is  modified  in  the  in- 
terests of  the conjugal unity  by the provision that the hus- 
band, unless  he has consented to the same, may secure the 
for  the  future,  of  such  agreements  as  require 
personal  service  on  the  part of  the wife.3'  Before the  act 
will  be  abrogated  the  authorization  of  the  court must be 
obtained.  Such authorization  must be accorded if  the act 
injuriously affects the marital interests.  The  same authority 
may  supply  the  consent  of  the  husband  if  the  latter, by 
reason of illness or absence, is unable to assent to the act or 
if  his  refusal  appears  unwarranted.  The  fact  that  this 
control  over  the contracts of  the married  woman  is  based 
upon  the  desire  to  preserve  the  conjugal  unity  is  further 
indicated  by the provision  that it may  be  exercised  by a 
husband  who  has not  attained  his majority, but cannot  be 
employed by the latter's guardian or representative.33 
An interesting  development may be noted  by comparing 
the provisions  of  the  three  preliminary  drafts of  the code 
with those  indicated  above.  The first  draft made all con- 
tracts whereby the wife obligated herself  for personal service 
Prussia,  A. L. R., ii,  I, $5 202-204, 261,  325-327; Saxony, B. G., 55 1684, 
1700. 
MA.  1,.  R., li, I,  $5 198-201. 
See ante, 5 2, note 4. 
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absolutely dependent  upon the consent of  the husband, but 
provided  that the  husband  alone  could  attack  the validity 
of  agreements  that  lacked  the proper authorization.34  The 
second and third drafts recognized the principle, established 
in the code as adopted, that such  acts of  the wife are valid 
without marital authorization, and  that the court could sup- 
ply the  husband's  consent under  the circumstances  above 
noted.  But  the  husband  was  given  the  unrestricted  right 
of  abrogating such acts for  the future, even if  he had  con- 
sented  to  the same or if  his consent  had  been  supplied by 
the proper authority.35  Starting with  such  acts of  the wife 
dependent upon  the will  of  the  husband,  the  close of  the 
development  finds  the  married  woman  free  to enter  into 
such contracts.  The husband, with the previous authoriza- 
tion of  the  court, is  enabled  to revoke  the agreements for 
the future, provided  his consent to the same  has  not  been 
accorded directly or through the agency of  the judge. 
Aside from  this  limitation, the  general contractual capa- 
city of  the married  woman  is  limited  only  as regards  her 
power of affecting the matrimonial pr0perty.3~ Acts of  the 
wife affecting her separate property are subject to no  par- 
ticular limitations, and the same is true of contracts between 
the husband and wife.37 
The compilers of  the German code were influenced by the 
Roman conception of  the wife's contractual  capacity.  The 
Roman law contains no particular provisions respecting the 
"I. Enhuur-  1277. 
11. Enhuurf;  1258;  111. Enhuurl;  1341. 
See post,  20, 21,  27,  42. 
371n  case  of the  bankruptcy of  a married party, the  contracts made with his 
spouse in the preceding year, whether before or after  the marriage, are attackable 
by the creditors so far as they are damaged thereby and the other  party does not 
prove that he did not know of the intention of  the common debtor to damage his 
creditor's interests.  Germany,  Konkursordnung,  31,  R. G. Bl., 1898,  pp. 618, 
619. 
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ordinary  contracts  of  married  women.  It was  not  found 
to limit  her capacity of  affecting  the matrimonial 
The husband's  rights  in  the dowry were origin- 
ally those of  an owner, and  even after the legislation of  the 
 ire he  continued  to be  regarded as the formal owner 
during the  marriage.3'  The Roman law  likewise  imposed 
no limitations upon ordinary contracts between the husband 
and wife.39 
The Austrian'"  and  Russian41  codes  accept  the  general 
of  the  Roman  law  respecting  the  contracts  of 
women, and in Norway, practically the same condi- 
tion  obtains, the  power  of  the wife  to conclude  ordinary 
contracts  being  unrestricted  except  with  reference  to her 
capacity of  binding the matrimonial pr0perty.4~ 
Under the English common law system marriage destroys 
the general contractual capacity of  the woman.  She cannot 
contract  even with  the consent  or joinder  of  her  husband. 
Different  explanations of  the  origin  and  basis of  this  rule 
have been advanced.  The conception that marriage  unites 
the  man  and  woman  in  one  person  has  exercised a great 
influence upon  the development  of  the law  governing  the 
relations of  husband and wife.43  This legal fiction, however, 
will  not serve to explain the  disabilities of  married  women. 
Recent  investigations tend  to prove  that the early law did 
not  regard  the  contractual  capacity  of  the  woman  as de- 
stroyed by the marriage, but that such incapacity developed 
as a  result of the  fact that she ceased  to possess  property 
See post,  g 32. 
"Sohm,  Inst., 5  94; Windscheid, Pandehtm, vol. ii,  491. 
"Certain  contracts between  husband  and  wife  must  be  concluded  before a 
notary.  Stat. July 25, 1871,  R. G. B].,  no. 76. 
"  Leuthold, R. R., pp. 59,  60. 
'=See post,  SS m, 21. 
UBlack, Comm., vol. i, p. 442; Kent, Comm., vol. ii, p. 129. 2  8  PROPERTY RELR  TZONS OF MARRZED PR  R TIES 
L2g 
which  could  be  bound  by  her  contracts.44  The general 
principle  governing the incapacity  of  the  married  woman 
appears to  be the desire to preserve the unity of  the family 
and the administration of  the matrimonial property.  Hence, 
if  the husband is banished or is regarded as dead in the eyes 
of the law, as in the case of  imprisonment  for  life, the wife 
possesses  general  contractual  capacity.45  There are, how- 
ever,  exceptions  to  the  general  principle.  For example, 
abandonment of  the  wife  by the husband, which  is not ac- 
companied  by his departure from  and loss of  residence  in 
the state, does not  have the effect of  removing  her disabili- 
This constituted one of  the greatest hardships of  the 
common  law,  and  was  largely  instrumental  in  bringing 
about the statutory modifications.  The fact that the married 
woman  cannot  contract  with  her  husband  nor  enter  into 
engagements with third parties, even if  the marital authoriza- 
tion  has  been  obtained, represents  another  departure  from 
the general principle.  Such limitations cannot be explained 
from considerations of  family unity.  On the contrary, they 
develop serious obstacles to the efficient administration of  the 
matrimonial property, and cumbrous processes were invented 
in order to evade their provisions. 
The rules established under the equitable jurisdiction of  the 
courts are, however, based  upon the general  principle  indi- 
cated above.  Contracts, affecting the wife  personally, which 
might impair the conjugal unity, are not valid  in equity any 
more than at common law.  But the English chancery courts 
recognized  the  power  of  the married woman  to  possess  a 
separate  estate,  free  from  the  common  law  rights  of  the 
Pol. and  Mait.,  Hist.,  vol.  ii,  p.  432;  Florence  G. Buckstaff,  "  Married 
Women's  Property in Anglo-Saxon  Law " An. Amer. Acad., vol. iv, p. 247  srq.; 
Ernest Young, "The Anglo-Saxon  Family Law," Essays  in Anglo-Saxon  Law, 
p. 176 seq. 
GKent, Comm., vol. ii, p. 155 srq.  '6 Ibzd. 
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husband.  With  respect  to  such  property  the  wife  could 
as if she were a fewwe  sole, subject to such limita- 
tions  her  capacity  as  were  contained  in  the act of 
settlement.47  The fear of undue influence on the part of the 
husband led  to the recognition of certain  limitations which 
would not bind the unmarried woman.  The  most famous of 
these limitations is the restraint  upon  anticipation, intended 
to prevent the woman, under marital influence, from destroy- 
ing or disposing of the capital of her separate estate.48 
The effect of  the married women's property acts has been to 
extend the general contractual capacity of  the wife.  In Eng- 
land, as early as 1856, an attempt was made to accord to the 
married woman a general power of  making contracts, but it 
was not until  1868 that a bill passed the House  of Commons 
granting  her  the general right to contract as  if  unmarried, 
subject  to limitations  with  respect  to  particular  matters.49 
The bill encountered severe opposition in the House of Lords, 
as a result of  which important modifications were made.  As 
finally enacted the wife was not accorded general contractual 
capacity.  The married woman was given a limited statutory 
separate estate  with  power  of  disposition  over  the same.s0 
The  Married  Woman's  Property Act of  1S82 extended the 
scope of  the separate estate of  the wife and  accorded  her a 
general power of  contracting in respect of  and  to the extent 
of the same, as if she were a femme  sole.sr  It was provided 
that every contract  of a married woman should be deemed 
to  have  been  entered  into  with  reference  to  her  separate 
Property unless  the contrary be shown.sz  Finally, an act of 
"Ibld.,  p. 163 sep.  This is  the  vlew  generally accepted  in  England  and  the 
United States.  An opposing view 1s  that she has only such capacity as is granted 
under the terms upon which the estate was settled. 
"  Schouler, H 6.. W.,  202; rf.  post,  note 53. 
Bull. Leg. conrp., 1871,  p. 15.  b" Act 33 & 34 Vict., c. 93. 
Act 45  46 Vict ,  C.  75,s  I  (I),  (2).  5a Ibrd.,  I  (3). 30  PROPERTY  RELA TlOM OF  MARRIED PARTIES 
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1893 completed  the  development  by  repealing  the  above 
clause  and  raising  an  absolute presumption  that the con- 
tracts  of  the  married  woman  are  made  in  respect  to  her 
separate property, whether she is  or is  not  entitled  to any 
such estate at the time when she enters into the agreement.53 
Such  contracts,  moreover,  bind  all  of  her  property  after 
discoverture.54 
In the United States the movement to give validity to the 
contracts of  married  women  commenced  at an earlier date 
than in England.  In the first part of  the nineteenth century 
acts  were  passed  conferring  contractual  capacity  upon 
married  women  who  were  abandoned  by  their  husbands. 
Later,  married  women  in  general  were  granted  power  to 
contract  in  relation  to certain property  to which was given 
the character of  a statutory separate estate.55  These specific 
grants  have  been  gradually enlarged, until  the close of  the 
century  finds many  of  the states  recognizing  that  married 
women  have general contractual capacity, while  those  that 
still maintain the general common law rule have nullified  it, 
to a great extent, by  numerotis exceptions.  The legislation 
has been so extensive and, at times, so inconsistent and con- 
tradictory, that it  becomes a difficult matter  to indicate the 
exact position of  each state.  A general classification will  be 
sufficient  to  indicate  the  prevailing  tendency.  The  indi- 
vidual legislations will  fall  into one of  two divisions accord- 
ing  as they  have or have not  accorded  general  contractual 
capacity  to the  married  woman.  In the first class, limita- 
tions may  be  placed  upon certain  kinds of  contracts, while 
in  the  second  class  more or less  extensive  specific grants 
"'Act  56  & 57 Vict., c.  63,  $5 I (a), 4.  It was  expressly provided,  however, 
that no such contract should  be binding upon  separate  property which  the wife 
is restrained from anticipating, though such property may be bound  by  the costs 
of  judicial proceedings which she institutes (abzd., $8  I (c), 2). 
Ibid.,  5  I (c):  55 See post,  5  37. 




of capacity are  made.  In  the  following states  and  terri- 
tories  the  married  woman  is  recognized  as  possessing 
general contractual capacity :56  Alabama.~  Arizona,s8 Calif- 
ornia,~  ~olorado,~  C~nnecticut.'~  Delaware:  IdahoP3  Illi- 
nois,64  ~ndiana.'~  Iowa,l  Kan~as,~'  Kentucky?  Maine,% 
Maryland,'  Massa~husetts,7~  Minnesota,7l  Mississippi,73 Mis- 
souri,74 M~ntana,~~  Nebraska,T6 Nevada,77 New  Hampshire,78 
v For limitations upon  capacity to make particular  contmcts, see post, $8  4, 5, 
W,  21, 42- 
Code,  1896,  $ 2526.  The Code  of 1886  limited this  capacity to contracts in 
writing entered into with the written consent of the husband. 
is R. S.,  1887,  $$zIo3,  2104. 
U subject  contracts with  husband to general rules respecting  contracts be- 
tween persons occupying confidential relations.  C. C.,  158.  C$  Stat. & Amend., 
1891,  p.  137;  ibid.,  1895,  P.  53. 
An.  St., 1891,  $ 3021. 
m So far as regards third persons.  G.  S.,  1888,  8  2796. 
d2 Laws, vol.  14,  c.  550,  $5  2-4, in R. C., 1  893,  p.  600. 
R.  S.,  1887,  $8  2504,  2508. 
"  An.  St.,  1885,  c.  68,  7 6.  But  transfers  between  husband  and wife  to be 
valid as against third persons must be publlcly recorded (ibid.,  7 g). 
65 An. St.,  1894,  5  6960. 
"  Code, 1897,  5  3164. 
"  G.  S.,  1889,  53759. 
"  Stat.,  1894,  f 2128.  Same qualification as in Illinois.  See ante, note 64. 
69R.S., 1883,c.61,  $8 I,  2,4. 
Laws, 1898,  c.  457,  $5  4,  5. 
"  But she is not authorized to contract with  husband.  P. S.,  1882,  C.  147, 8  2. 
G'  1'3941 $8 5530, 5532. 
"  An. Code,  1892,  5  2289.  Limitations  exist  upon  certain  contracts between 
husband and wife.  hd.,  $8  2293,  2294. 
l'  R. 5.3  1899,  8  4335. 
'jC.  C.,  1895,  §$214,  256.  Same qualification as in Cal.  See ante, note 59.  '' 
Same extent as a married  man.  C.  S., 1891,  8  1412. 
"  G. S.,  1885,  8  517.  same qual~fication  as in Cal.  See ante, note 59. 
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New  Jersey,79  New  York,& North  Dak~ta,~'  Ohio,8a Okla- 
homa,Q  Penns~lvania,~S  Rhode  Island,86 South 
Car0lina,~7  South Dak~ta,~'  Utah,89 Vermont,gO  Washington,gx 
Wy0ming9~  and Hawaii.93 
The following  legislations have not entirely abrogated the 
general  incapacity of  the married  woman to enter into con- 
79 Act Mch.  27,  1874, § 5, Rev.,  1877, p.  637;  but  not  authorized  thereby  to 
contract with husband (tbzd.,  5 14), though she may assign policies  of  life lnsur- 
ance to him  (rbzd.,  19). 
Laws, 1896, c. 272, S 21. 
*L  R. C.,  1895, § 2767. 
R.  S.,  1891,  3112, 4107.  Same  qualification  as  in  Cal.  See  ante, 
note 59. 
l'  R. S.,  1893, 5 2968.  Same qualification as in Cal.  See ante, note 59. 
An. St.,  1887,  2997. 
"Laws,  1893, P.  344, §§ I, 2. 
"An  act of 1893 provided  that a married woman could  make any contract the 
same  as if  she were  single  (Acts,  1892-93,  c.  1204).  The Revision of  1896 re- 
turned  to the  common  law rule  of incapacity with  numerous positlve  grants of 
capacity (G. L., 1896, c. 194, $8 3,4).  In  the same year an act of  the legislature 
repealed the positive grants of  power to contract and restored  the general  prin- 
ciple of  act of  1893 (Acts, 1896-97, c. 335). 
The new constitution of  1895, art. xvii,  g, introduces  this  rule.  Before its 
enactment the married  woman  could  make  contracts with reference to her sep- 
arate estate as if  unmarried.  C.  S.  L.,  1893, ij 2167. 
@C. L.,  1887,  2590.  Same qualification as in Cal.  See ante, note 59. 
wR.  S., 1898, $5 1199, 1200. 
gOExcept  in agreements with her husband.  Stat.,  1894,  2644. 
G. S.,  1891, 5 1409. 
g" Laws, 1888, c.  59,  I.  Before this act her capacity was  limited to contracts 
entered into with reference to her property.  R. S.,  1887, 5 1559. 
Except that contracts for personal services require the written consent of  her 
husband  and she is  not  authorized to contract  with her husband.  Laws,  1888, 
c.  xi, 5 2. 
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tracts :  Arkansas?  Florida?'  Georgia,o  Michigan)'  New 
M~~~~~;J~  North Carolina.99 Tennessee,lm Tenar,~~~  Virginia,l0z 
9, she may make contracts respecting her separate estate and services, and may 
efiect insurance policies upon the life of  her husband.  Dig. Stat., 1894, SS 4944- 
4946. 
92she may charge  her  estate in equity for  purchase  price  and far  agreements 
made for its benefit (Const.,  art. xi, 5 2) ;  dispose of  her  earnings (R. S.,  1892, 
5 2075);  control  her  deposits in  banks (zbzd.,  5 2119); and subscribe for stock 
in bullcling and loan assoclations  (ibid.,  8 2208). 
96 She may contract with reference to her separate estate (Code,  1895, 5 2488). 
but the consent of  the court is essential to the validity of  contracts that she may 
make with her husband or trustee (ibid., 5 2490). 
97 She may contract respecting her separate property.  An. St., 1882,  6295. 
98 With consent of  husband she may make any contract which she might make 
if unmarried  (C. L.,  1897, 5  1510).  She may contract with her husband as ~f  un- 
married (zbzd.,  1511). 
"Husband's  written authorization is essential to validity of  all contracts affect- 
ing her property except those made for personal expenses, support of  family or to 
pay  ante-nuptial  debts  (Code, 1883,  1826).  Contracts  between  husband  and 
wife  which  affect  latter's  property for a longer  period  than  three years, require 
special  form (ibzd.,  1835)~  but  other  contracts  between  them, not contrary to 
good morals, are valid (zbzd.,  5 1836). 
l"  KO  statutory separate estate exists.  The married woman may freely dispose 
of  such property as is settled upon her for her separate use (Code, 1884, 5 3350). 
She may  contract in  writing  so  as to bind  her  property  wlth  mechanics'  lien 
(ibtd.,  2741) ;  may effect  insurance on husband's  hfe (ibid., 5 3336) ;  may make 
deposits in hanks (ibtd.,  1729) ; and may hold stock in building and loan asso- 
ciations (zbid.,  g 1757). 
l''  She may contract  for  necessaries  for  herself  and  children and for expenses 
for  beneht of her  separate property (R. S., 1895, art. 2970).  She may contract 
so as to  bind  benevolent  associations of  which she is a member  (ibid.,  art. 644), 
and where appointed executrix, ek., may give bond which shall bind her separate 
Property   bid., arts. 1947, 26~4). 
lo2 She may make contracts with respect to her lahor or separate estate as if  she 
were afernnrt sole.  Code,  1887, $9 2286, 2288. 34  PROPERTYRELATIONSOFMANRIEDPARTIES  [34 
West  Virginia,1°3  Wis~onsin'~4  and  the  District  of  Col- 
umbia.1°5 
$  4. Power of  the  Married  Woman to  become  Surety  for 
another Person. 
Some states, while according the married  woman  a  gen- 
eral capacity  of  contracting, limit  her  power  to enter into 
specific  kinds  of  agreements.  This  is  particularly  true of 
contracts whereby she undertakes  to answer for  the debt or 
liability of  another person.  Many of  those legislations, also, 
which  make  the marital  authorization requisite  to the vali- 
dity of the wife's contracts, place additional restrictions upon 
her contracts of  surety. 
Here, feminine weakness  is  the determining  factor.  The 
inexperience of  the woman and the probability that her con- 
fidence, which  she so freely accords, may  be  taken advan- 
tage of,  are the chief considerations at the basis of such pro- 
visions.  Thus,  the  famous  senatus  consultum  Velleinnum, 
passed  in  the  reign  of  Claudius, applied  to unmarried  as 
well  as married  women.'  The intercessio  of  a  woman was 
prohibited.  It was  necessary,  however,  for  the woman  to 
appeal to the  praetor  for  an  exceptio  where  it was  sought 
to enforce such acts against her.'  This equitable relief  was 
1O'She  may dispose of  her separate estate as if  single (Acts, 1893, c. iii,  2, 3) ; 
may make deposits in banks and witkdraw same (tbzd.,  8) ; may become stock- 
holder in any company, except mutual life insurance companies (tbtd.,  § g) ; and 
may insure husband's life for her own benefit (zbzd.,  5). 
1O'She  may dispose  of  her  separate  estate as if  single (An. St.,  1889, S 2342; 
Laws, 1895, c. 86);  may  make  deposits in  banhs  and  withdraw same (An. St., 
1889, 5 2020;  CJ Laws, 1895, c. 160, 5 I) and may contract policies of  life insur- 
ance (Laws, 1891, c. 376). 
105 She may contract in reference  to her  property in the same manner as if  un- 
married  (Act,  June  I, 1896,  4, U.  S. Stat.  at Large, vol. 29, p.  193)~  and  may 
perform any labor or services for her sole and separate zccount (tbzd.,  3). 
1  Dig., 16, 1 ; Cod., 4, 29.  '  Sohm, Inst.,  53, p. 269. 
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not accorded in cases where  the conduct of  the woman had 
been such as to prejudice the rights of  innocent parties.  In 
this  way, as  well  as through  legislation, exceptions to  the 
rule were established.3  In the legislation of  Justinian a dis- 
tinction is made between the intercession of  a woman for her 
husband  and  her  intercession  for  third  parties.  Thus,  a 
woman's  contract of  surety may be valid if  it has been made 
in  a  formal  manner, but  if  it  has  been  entered  into  by  a 
married woman  for  the benefit of  her husband, it is invalid, 
notwithstanding  the  observance  of  such  form, unless  it  is 
clearly  shown  that  the  money  has  been  applied  to  the 
benefit of  the wife.4 
In  those  legislations which  subject  the  contracts of  the 
wife  to  marital  authorization, no  particular  provisions  are 
necessary  respecting  her  intercession  in  behalf  of  third 
parties.  She is, in general, prevented from engaging hcrself 
without the consent of  her husband  Rut, aside from specific 
limitations, there  is  no  security against the undertaking  of 
such liability  for the  benefit  of  her husband, and, in  states 
recognizing the general contractual capacity of  the wife, the 
same  is  true of her engagements for third  parties as well of 
those which she undertakes for her husband. 
Some of  the states contain  positive prohibitions upon the 
intercession  of  married  women.  The  restriction  in  some 
legislations applies only to  her undertakings  for  the benefit 
of  her husband,s while in others it extends to the assumption 
of  liability for  any per~on.~  A number of  states recognize 
U'indsche~d,  Pandekten, v01  ii, §$485-487.  Cf:  Di,o.,  16, I ; Cod., 4, 29. 
Nov.,  1-34,  C.  8;  Windscheid, Pandekten, vol. ii,  458, 489. 
5Ala. Code, 1896,  2529;  La., C. C.,  126-128,1750,  2398;  N.  IT., P. h.,  1591, 
c. 176,  2;  Vt.,  but  a  mortgage  given  for such  purpose  is  valid,  Stat.,  1894, 
3 2646. 
Geo., Code, 1885,s 2488: Ind., An. St., 1894,  6964; Icy.,  unless estate is set 
aside for that purpose by  deed or  mortgage, Stat., 1894,  2127;  N. J., Act  llch. 
27, 1874,  5, Rev.,  1877, p. 637, but ~f  married woman obtains anything of  value 36  PROPERTY RELA  TIOIZrS OF MARRIED PARZ'lLS  [  36 
the probability of  undue influence, but consider  that suffi- 
cient  protection  will  be accorded  the wife  if  she is  given a 
special  guardian  in such cases,7 or if  these acts are required 
to be executed before the court or are made dependent upon 
judicial  authorizati~n.~  The  majority  of  the  legislations, 
however, contain no particular limitations upon the capacity 
of  the  married  woman to contract  such  obligations.9  The 
principle followed is that in the normal  marriage mutual love 
and confidence will  be sufficient  protection for the wife, and 
that where  this  condition does  not exist, a  legal  limitation 
will  not  furnish  adequate  security.  Under  such  circum- 
stances  means  will  be  found  for  disposing  of  the  wife's 
property  or  obliging  her  in  a  different  manner  for  the 
husband's benefit. 
5  5.  Donatiotzs between Married Parties. 
Donations between  married  parties have been the subject 
of  particular restrictions in  most  legal  systems.  Such limi- 
tations may be imposed  in the  interests of  third parties, or 
may  be intended  to regulate  gifts  as between  the  parties 
themselves.  It is  a  principle, universally  recognized, that 
on the faith of  the contract she will be llable thereon, Act, June 13, 1895, Laws, 
p.  821; S. C.,  C.  S.  L.,  2167;  Argovie,  Stat. Apl.  29,  1877, art.  I,  An.  Ptran., 
vol. 7, p.  619;  Lucerne, Stat. Nov. 26, 1880, art.  16. 
'  Cf: references to Swiss cantons, ante,  3, note 20. 
Geneva,  Lardy,  LP&sls(ntions Suisses, p.  105;  Norway,  Stat. June  29,  1888, 
art. 13; Saxony,B.G.,§165oseg.  CJltaly,C.C.,  136. 
L7 anfe,  3.  The Prussian Landrtchf originally contained  the requirement 
for judicial execution  of  contracts whereby a wife engages herself  for the benefit 
of  her  husband.  This provision  was  abrogated  by  a  statute of  Dec.  I, 1889. 
which repealed as well the provisions  of  the common law znd provincial statutes 
concerning the  intercession  of  women.  G.  S.  S.,  p.  1169.  In the  Canton  of 
Basle  City, a  statute of  Oct.  16, 1876 (art.  5, A*.  Ptr-an., vol. 6, p.  571)~  abol- 
ished  the rule which  required that  the wife  should  be  assisted  by  a  third  party 
where  she becomes surety for  her  husband.  In Russia, a wife  cannot draw or 
assign bills of  exchange without husband's consent.  Leuthold, R. R.,  24. 
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transactions made for the purpose of  defrauding creditors or 
purchasers are attackable  by such parties.  Many systems, 
however, go further and impute fraud where a debtor makes 
gratuitous transfers of  his property to his spouse or to other 
members of  his  family.  This  principle  was  introduced  in 
English  law  by the statute of  13 Elizabeth, c. 5, which has 
been  generally  followed  in the United  States.  Such trans- 
actions  will  be  invalid  as  regards  existing  creditors who 
show that their  debtor's  financial  condition was such as to 
justify the presumption  that the donation would  contribute 
to his insolvency.~ 
The statutory introduction of  separate property rights for 
married women  had  a tendency to promote acts in fraud of 
creditors.  Accordingly,  in  some  cases,  all  dispositions 
between  husband  and  wife  have  been  subjected  to special 
limitations.'  Some  statutes  have  also  enacted  positive 
restrictions  upon  gifts  of  the  husband  to  the  wife.  The 
general  provision  is  that such  gifts  shall  not  become  the 
separate  property  of  the  wife.3  Statutes,  also,  that  have 
granted the married woman the right to hold  the proceeds 
of  insurance policies, drawn in her favor, upon the life of  her 
husband, free  from  the claims of  the latter's creditors, have 
frequently provided a maximum premium that may be paid 
l Schouler, H. & W.,  372-374. 
Cf:  references ante,  3. 
Col.,  An.  St.,  1891,  3007;  Kans.,  G.  S., 1889,  3752;  Neb.,  C.  S.,  1891, 
1411  ; N. H., P.  S., 1891,  C.  176,  I; Vt.,  Stat., 1894,  2647;  W.  Va., Code, 
c. 66, g 3, as enacted  by  Acts,  1893, c.  iii;  Wy., R.  S.,  1887, 5 1558.  Cf:  Del., 
Laws, vol.  15, c.  165,  I, in  R. C.,  1893, p.  600;  Md.,  Laws,  1898, c.  457,  I. 
In hlassachusetts, efts between  husband  and wife  are  forbidden  except  that 
former may give latter articles of  personal use not to exceed $2,000 in value.  P. 
S.,  1882,  C.  147,  3  as amended  by  Acts,  1884,  c.  132.  In the District  of 
Columbia  they become  her separate property but are liable for the debts of  the 
husband existing at the time the gift is  made (Act, June  I, 1896,  I,  U. S.  Stat. 
at Large, vol. 29, p. 193).  Under former  rule such gift did not become her sep- 
arate property  (Dist.  of  Col.,  R. S.,  1873-74,  727). 38  PROPERTY RELATIOA'S  OF MARRIED PARTIES  [38 
upon  such  policies.  If  the  annual  premium  exceeds  this 
amount the excess may be taken to satisfy the obligations of 
the husband.+ 
The European  bankruptcy  laws  have  followed  the same 
principle in  enabling  creditors to attack  gratuitous disposi- 
tions of  the debtor  in  favor of  his spouse where such trans- 
actions  have  been made within a limited  period  before  the 
opening of  the bankruptcy proceedings.5  Moreover, by an 
application of  the praesulntio Mz~ciana,  it is the general rule 
that  the  wife  of  the  bankrupt  must  prove  that  property 
which  she  has acquired  during  the marriage, has not  been 
purchased with her husband's  money.6 
A similar provision, primarily intended  for the protection 
of  creditors, raises the presumption  that movables found  in 
the possession of  the husband7 or, in some cases, of  either of 
the married  par tie^,^ belong to the husband.  In  case  com- 
munity of  property obtains, a general presumption is raised 
that  existing  goods  belong  to  the  common  mass.9  An 
Cjpost,  38, note  27.  N.  Y.,  Laws,  1896, c.  272, 8 22;  Ohio,  R.  S.,  1891, 
3628; Vt., Stat., 1894,  $8 2653-2657;  W. Va., Code, 1891, c.  66,  5, as amended 
by Acts, 1893, c. iii;  Wis., An. St., 1889,  2347 as amended by Laws, 1891, c. 376; 
Hawaii, C.  L.,  1884, p.  429;  cf:  Oklah.,  R.  S,  1893, 8 3080;  Act 33 & 34 Vict., 
C.  93, 5 10;  Act 43 & 44 Vict., c. 26,  2;  Act 45 & 46 Vict., c. 75, 5 I I. 
Germany,  Kon. Ord.,  32, R.  G.  El.,  1898, p.  619;  Lehr, Drozt  Russe, pp. 
42, 43;  Leuthold,  R.  h'.,  p.  357;  Alexander,  Konkursgesetze, pp. 36,  127, 254, 
492;  CJ France, Code de Corn., 564. 
Dig., 24,  I, 51 ; Germany, Kon. Ord.,  45, R.  G.  Bl.,  1898, p.  621 ; France, 
Code de Com., 557-562;  Leuthold, R. R., p.  357;  Alexander, Konkursgesetze, p. 
185;  Dunscomb, Bankruptcy, p.  78. 
Saxony, B.  G.,  8 1656;  Norway, only as regards  third  partles, Stat. June 29, 
1888, art. 21. 
B Germany, only in favor  of  creditors,  B.  G.,  1362;  Prussia,  A.  I..  R., ii,  I, 
g 544;  Russia, belong  to the hankrupt, Lehr, Drozt  Rztsse, p  43.  Cf:  Austria, 
B.  G.,  1237;  Kevada, G.  S.,  1885, 5%501-503. 
Germany, B. G.,  1528;  Prussia,  A.  L.  R.,  ii,  I,  400, 401.  Cl. France, 
C. C.,  1499;  Italy, C. C.,  1437;  Spain, C. C.,  1407;  La., C. C.,  2405. 
39]  EFFECTS  OFMARRIAGE UPONLEGAL CAPACITY  39 
exception arises respecting  things intended  for the personal 
use of  the wife.I0  For such objects  the German code raises 
the presumption of  the wife's ownership, not only as between 
the parties, but also as regards ~reditors.~~ 
Donations, which do not affect  the rights of  third parties, 
may, nevertheless, be restricted as between the parties them- 
selves.  The chief cause for such limitations has been the con- 
sideration that one of  the parties, under the strong influences 
arising  from the  conjugal  relation,  may  be  led  to  make 
extravagant and unreasonable  benefits  for  the other  party. 
Another motive has been the principle that in  the true mar- 
riage  everything  should  be  for  the  common  benefit.  To 
permit  gifts  would  be  to  introduce a selfish element which 
would  injuriously  affect  the  ideal  unity established  by the 
marriage. 
The Roman law prohibited  gifts between married  parties. 
It was probably influenced by considerations of  the commu- 
nity of  interests established  by the union of  the parties, but 
the chief  basis of  the rule, as it is recognized  in  the law of 
Justinian, is the desire to protect married parties against the 
undue  influences connected  with  the  intimate  relation  into 
which  they  have  entered."  This  consideration  receives 
additional  force as a result  of  the existence  of  the Roman 
institution  of  free  divorce.  In the absence  of  restrictions 
upon  donations, it  would  have been possible for an unscru- 
pulous spouse to  obtain  benefits as a result of  the affection 
and  confidence  of  the  other, and  then,  by  exercising  the 
right of  divorce, leave such party despoiled and helpless. 
There were many exceptions to the general rule of  Roman 
law  that  donations  between  husband  and  wife  are  invalid. 
Thus, it was recognized  that gifts of  articles for personal use 
IoGermany, B.  G.,  5 1362;  Saxony,  B.  G.,  1656;  Korway,  Stat. June  29, 
1888, art. 22;  Russia, Lehr, Drozf Russe, p.  43. 
B.  G.,  1362.  l2  Dig., 24,  I, I scp. 40  PROPERTY RELA TIONS OF MARRIED  PAR TIES  [40 
or those  made on customary occasions  are valid.13  More- 
over,  the  act  of  donation  is  not  void, but voidable at the 
option of  the donor, and if  he dies without having demanded 
the  return  of  the  gift  the  title of  the donee cannot be  im- 
peached.~+ 
The  early  German  law  imposed  no  restrictions  upon 
gifts  between  married  parties,  but  such  transactions  were 
effective only to the extent that the wife's individual  title to 
property was recognized.'s  Some of  the modern legislations, 
however,  have  recognized  the  rule  of  Roman law.16  The 
French civil  code reaches  the same end  in a slightly differ- 
ent manner.  Donations between husband and wife  are per- 
mitted, under  certain  restrictions  as to amount,'7  but  they 
are always revocable by the donor, and, for such revocation, 
the married woman does  not  require  the marital  authoriza- 
tion.18  In  some  of  the  states  the  general  regulations 
governing  contracts  between  married  parties  will  restrict 
acts of  donation between them.Ig 
The rule of  German law has been followed in other states, 
and  gifts  between  husband and  wife are determined by the 
same  principles  as  obtain  for  donations  between  stran- 
gers.'"  The fiction  of  unity  in  the  English  common  law 
prevented gifts as well as other transactions between married 
lY  Windscheid, Pandekfen,  vol. ii, $ 509.  "Ibid. 
'5  Schroder, Lchrbud, pp. 728, 729. 
lGItaly,  C.  C., 1054;  Spain,  C.  C.,  1334,  1335;  Saxony, B.G., $5 1647, 1649, 
1694: Finland,  Stat. Apl.  15, 1889, c. iii, art.  6.  In Norway  donations  to  be 
valid  must be  made by marriage  contract, unless they consist in objects forper- 
sonal use or life insurance policies or annuities.  Stat. June 29, 1888, art. 24. 
l7  France, C. C., 1094, 1098.  l8  Ibza'., I 096. 
l9 Cj: references, ante, 5  3. 
1°Austria, B. G., $1246; Prussia, A. L. K.,ii, I,  $$ 310, 311;  Russia, Leuthold, 
R. R., pp. 59, b.  No particular restrictions are placed  upon donations between 
married parties in the code of  Germany, and hence the above rule obtains in this 
411 
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parties.  In equity, however, where this fiction is not recog- 
nized, such acts will be sustained if  the gift  has passed from 
one into the possession  of  the other."  Executed  gifts can- 
not generally  be revoked except under circumstances which 
would  justify a revocation  between strangers, but the  court 
will  more readily  impute fraud or mistake in  gifts from wife 
to husband  than in ordinary cases."'  The provisions of  the 
married  women's  acts, that  gifts  from  the husband  to the 
wife shall not  become her separate property,"3 while primar- 
ily established in the interests of  third parties, will affect the 
transactions  as between  the  parties  themselves.  The hus- 
band's common law  rights attach to the objects, and, if  the 
latter consist of  personal property, the husband  may regain 
full ownership in the same. 
4  6. The Married  Woman as a  Trader. 
The legal capacity of  the married woman  has  been influ- 
enced  also by the increased  activity of  women  in  industrial 
and  commercial  spheres.  The majority of  the  legislations 
provide means whereby she can undertake a trade or business 
in her own name and on her own account.  But in some Euro- 
pean countries, the interests of  the conjugal society as well as 
the system of  matrimonial  property relations have led to the 
requirement that the consent of  the husband shall be neces- 
sary to the  exercise of  such functions.'  In Germany, the 
principle of  the general capacity of  married women  enables 
them to carry on business even  if  the husband  refuses his 
a1 Schouler, H. & W., $383.  Ibid., $ 390. 
a3 See references, ante, note 3. 
'France, Code deCom.,4;  Prussia, A. L. R.,ii, I,  $195; Saxony, B. G., $ 1638. 
Tacit consent is sufficient :  Germany, B. G., S$ 1405,1452, 1519,1549; Switzerland, 
Federal  Law of  Obligations, art. 35, An. itran., vol.  I I,  p. 525.  In Austria  this 
consent will be supplied by the court if  such activity will not endanger the rights 
of  the husband;  Stat. Dec. 17, 1862, R. G. B1,  1863, pp. I, 2;  cj: general  power 
of court to supply marital authorization, ante, 5 3. 42  PROPERTY RELA TIOIZ-S  OF MARRIED PAR TIES  [42 
consent, but, in case his objections have been publicly made 
kno~n,~  the acts of  the wife will bind only her separate prop- 
erty.  If  the business requires personal service upon the part 
of  the wife, the husband will be able to cause its cessation by 
appeal to the court.3 
Even before the passage of  the married women's statutes, 
the English and American courts had  recognized  the wife's 
right, under certain conditions, to carry on a trade or busi- 
ness.  The husband was entitled to his wife's services, but he 
could make her a gift of  the same so far as such act did  not 
violate  the  rules  against  donations  in  fraud  of  creditors.' 
Where the married  woman  possessed  a  separate estate she 
could contract with reference to the same, and was entitled to 
the profits accruing  therefrom.5  This did not include, how- 
ever, the proceeds  arising  from  the  personal  management 
of  a trade or business.  The latter were connected with  the 
personal  industry of  the wife, and  hence the consent of  the 
husband  was  an  essential  element,  though  such  consent 
might  be  implied,  at  least  as  between  the  parties  them- 
~elves.~ 
Under  the  married  women's  acts, the  wife, so  far as she 
has  been  granted  general  contractual  capacity, may  carry 
on  a  trade  or business.  This  right  has  been  limited  in 
certain  systems.  In  some  of  the states  it  is  restricted  to 
undertakings  carried  on  for  the  support  of  the  married 
woman and  those dependent upon  her, where  the  husband 
fails  to  provide  such  support.7  The authorization  of  the 
court or public notice or both are sometimes req~ired.~ 
B. G., $5 1405, 1435.  Zdzd.  $1358; Cf. ante, 9 3.  'See  anfc,  9 5. 
See atzte, 9 3, note 48.  Schouler, H. & W.,  Q 302 scq. 
Idaho, R. S.,  1887, 9 5850 seq.;  Mont., C. C. P.,  1895, 9:  2290 seq.;  Nev. G. S., 
1885, 9 534 sq.;  Wis.,  An. St., 1889, 9 2344;  cl:  W. Va.,  Acts, 1893, c. iii, 9  14. 
SIdaho,  see preceding  note;  Mont., tdzd; Nev.,  zdzd.;  Fla., R. S.,  1885, $1505 
sq.;  Mass., Acts, 1898, c.  416; in  North  Carolina,  the  written  consent  of  the 
husband is required, Code, 1883, 8 1827 seq. 
43]  EFFECTS  OF MARRIAGd  UPON LEGAL  CAPACITY  43 
While the legislations differ with respect to the conditions 
under which  the married  woman  may  acquire the  right  to 
carry on a trade or business, there is general agreement that 
the  capacity, when  once  acquired, is  as extensive  as  that 
possessed  by  an  unmarried  woman.  The disabilities  and 
privileges  of  the  wife  do  not  apply  to  married  women 
traders.9 
4  7.  Thc iklayried  PVoman's  Capacity to Sue and be  Sued. 
The circumstances which  produced  restrictions  upon  the 
contractual capacity of  the married woman led to limitations 
upon  her  power  to  conduct  a  judicial  proceeding.  The 
Roman law and modern legislations, in the practical elimina- 
tion  of  sex as a  basis  of  private  legal  capacity,  and  the 
creation of  separate property rights for the married woman, 
have removed the  chief  conditions which  gave  occasion for 
such  restrictions.  Hence, the  tendency has been  to  grant 
the married woman the general capacity to sue and be sued, 
subject to qualifications with respect to particular matters. 
The  limitations  which  continue  to  exist are justified,  in 
general, by  considerations  of  domestic  unity and  harmony 
and  of the preservation  of  the  matrimonial  property  rela- 
tions.  These  considerations, as well  as  a  survival  of  the 
conception  of  the  natural  incapacity  of  the  sex, affect  the 
provisions  of  the  French  code  and  of  those  statutes  that 
have been largely influenced  by it.  The married woman  is 
subjected  in  this  capacity to the  same  general  restrictions 
that are imposed upon her power of  contracting obligations. 
The marital authorization  must  be  obtained before the wife 
Germany, B.  G.,  9:  1405; France, Code de Corn.,  5, but a married woman, even 
if a trader, cannot plead  in her  own  name without  marital  authorization, C.  C., 
215; Switzerland, Federal Law of  Obligations, art. 35, An. etran., vol.  1 I, p. 525; 
Louisiana,  C. C.,  1786; Leuthold,  R.  R., p.  199;  C/  Wlndscheld,  I'andekten, 
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can become a party to a  civil proceeding.=  In all cases she 
may appeal to the court from the husband's refusal to grant 
his  consent.=  Moreover,  the  marital  authorization  is  not 
required for legal proceedings which  the wife undertakes for 
the protection of  her property against the husband.3 
The states which  accept  the  principle  that  the  general 
capacity  of  the  woman  is  not  affected  by the  marriage, 
recognize the  right of  the wife to carry on judicial  proceed- 
ings.  The interests of  the  husband are safeguarded by the 
provision  that  such  acts  will  not  be  binding  upon  the 
matrimonial property unless his consent or joinder  has been 
obtained.4 
At English common law  the  married  woman  cannot un- 
dertake  an  independent  suit  at law.  In  all  cases,  except 
where  she has  acquired  the  position  of  a  femme  sole  by 
reason of  the civil disabilities of  her husband, she must join 
with  the  latter  in  such  a  proceeding.  In courts of  equity 
the opposition of  interests  between  husband  and wife is re- 
cognized.  This does not  invest the latter with the capacity 
of  conducting legal proceedings, and hence she must always 
be represented by a trustee or next friend. 
The acts creating a  statutory separate estate for married 
women  generally carried  with  them  an  express or implied 
grant  of  capacity to carry on  legal proceedings  with  refer- 
'  France, C. C.,  215;  Italy, C. C.,  134;  Spain, C. C., 60;  La., C. C.,  125. 
France, C.  C.,  218, 219,222, C.  C. P., 861,862; Italy, C. C.,  136;  Spain, C. C., 
60;  La., C. C.,  124, 132. 
$France,  C. C., 143,  1563;  Italy, C. C.,  1418, 1442; Spain, C. C., 60; La., C.  C., 
239132425. 
'  Germany, C~vzlprozessoudnunp,  52, R. G. Bl.,  1898,  p. 419, B. G.,  1400.  In 
the interests of  domestic  harmony, the wife is not permitted to proceed  against 
the husband for clalms arising out of  his administration of  the matrimonial prop- 
erty until after the end of  such administration.  This does not  prevent  her from 
taking measures  for the security  of  her property,  B.  G.,  1394; Austria,  Czvsl- 
$~OZCSSOY~?JU?~~,  S  I, R. G. Bl.,  1895,  p. 365; CJ Prussia, A. L. R.,  ii, I,  1Sg,230; 
Saxony,B. G.,  1638;  Finland, Stat. Apl. 15, 1889,  c. ii, arts. 3,5. 
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ence to the same.  The legislation  upon  the  subject  is  not 
uniform and its scope has not been fully determined.  Some 
of  the  states  limit  the  capacity  to  matters  affecting  the 
separate estate of  the married woman, while others extend it 
to  proceedings affecting  her person  or character.  In a few 
legislations, positive enactments  require  the  joinder  of  the 
husband  in  suits to which  the wife  is  a  party, while  some 
permit and  others prohibit such joinder.  Despite  the  par- 
ticular  differences, a  general  tendency  nlay  be  noted  to 
accord  the  married  woman  full  capacity  in  this  respect, 
wherever it  will  not  affect  the  matrimonial property r~ghts 
accorded  to the husband.  Most  of  the  states have  estab- 
lished  the  system  of  separate  property  between  married 
parties, and in  these states the wife is generally permitted to 
sue  and  be  sued  in  all  matters  as  a femnze  soZe.5  A few 
states  recognize  the desirability of  preserving the domestic 
unity from contentious  proceedings  by prohibiting suits bc- 
tween  husband  and  wife, while  others, in  permitting  such 
suits  as  regards  property,  forbid  either  party  to  sue  the 
other for a tort. 
A  feature of  interest  in  this  connection  is  the  fact that 
special  privileges  which  were  accorded  to  the  wife  on 
account of  her incapacity to sue, have  not  always  been  re- 
pealed  with  the  removal of  such disability.  Following  an 
old  English statute, most of  the states granted  the  married 
woman  an immunity from  the effects  of  statutes providing 
for the limitations of  actions.  The running of  the period of 
limitation was suspended during coverture.  The acts grant- 
ing the married  woman  capacity to  carry on legal proceed- 
ings did  not generally provide for the  repeal of  such  privi- 
leges.  Where the statute provided that the  running of  the 
period of  limitations should be suspended until after the dis- 
5 See references to English and American statutes, ante,  3. 46  PROPERTY RELATIONS  OF  MARRIED PARTIES  C46 
abilities  of  coverture were  removed, it would  seem  that its 
provisions  could  not be  taken  advantage  of  by a  married 
woman  who  has  complete  capacity  for  carrying on  legal 
actions.  The later revisions oi statutes  show a tendency to 
eliminate the provisions granting these privileges to married 
women. 
8.  Right and  Duty  of  Household Administration. 
All countries recognize the marriage as establishing a com- 
munity of  life  between  the  married  parties.  It  is  also the 
rule that the husband is the  head of  the family and  has  the 
right  of  determining  respecting  the  affairs  of  the  family 
household,  the  wife  being  under  a  general  obligation  to 
assist  him  in  such  administration.  The  question  arises 
respecting the extent to which the wife has a right as well as 
a duty of  acting within the field of  household  affairs.  The 
question is affected by the distribution  of  the burden of  the 
family expenses.  Where these are primarily or exclusively 
supported by the husband, the wife's  right of  administration 
is  subjected  to  marital  authorization  or entirely  excluded. 
If  the  wife  assists  in  bearing  these expenses she is gener- 
ally recognized as having a certain right of  administration. 
Some  European  legislations  recognize  the  right  of  the 
wife to act in matters  pertaining to  the  ordinary support of 
the  family.  This  is  based  upon  the  principle  that she is 
acting as  the  agent  of  the  husband, and  hence,  where  the 
latter manifests  a  contrary desire, this  capacity of  the  wife 
will be exc1uded.l 
The English  commcn law  followed  a  similar principle  in 
permitting  the  married  woman  to  contract  for  necessities 
Where this principle is not  recognized in positive statutes, it will  generally be 
supplied  by the courts.  In Spain it does not appear that the husband can deprive 
the wife  of  such.right.  See also,  Basle,  Stat. Mch. 10, 1884, arts.  7,  34;  Fin- 
land, Stat. Apl.  15, 1889, c. iv, art. z. 
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upon  the credit  of  her  husband.'  If  the  presumption  of 
agency is contradicted by positive statements of  the husband 
or by the fact that he has furnished sufficient necessaries for 
the support of  the family, he will not be liable for such  con- 
tracts of  his wife.  A  tendency has  appeared  to  make  the 
rule more  favorable for the wife.  If  the  husband  does  not 
provide  the  necessities, third  parties  may  furnish  them  to 
the wife despite the prohibition of  the husband.3 
In Germany and  some of  the  Swiss  cantons the  married 
woman  is  accorded  a  more  extensive  right  of  household 
administration.  Thus, the  wife's  acts  of  customary house- 
hold  management, even though concluded without the mari- 
tal  authorization,  will  be  binding  upon  the  husband.  In 
some of  the older legislations it is recognized  that the hus- 
band can relieve  himself  from  this  obligation for the future 
by a  public  declaration, before the court, that the wife shall 
not possess  such  authority.4  The new  German  code  and 
the draft code of  Switzerland give  the wife  a  positive  right 
of  household administration.5  The former permits the hus- 
band to limit or  exclude  this  function  of  the  wife, but the 
court may reinstate her in such  capacity if  it considers that 
the  husband  has  abused  his  power.  The  draft  code  of 
Switzerland, following the Lucerne  statute of  November 26, 
1880, goes  a  step  further than  the  German  code.  It con- 
siders the married woman as  having full capacity of  house- 
hold administration until she has been deprived of  the same 
by judicial  de~ree.~  This  position  meets  the  demands  of 
'  Blackstone,  (bmm., vol. i, p. 442;  Pol. 6: Malt., Hzst., vol. ii, p. 402. 
"Cent,  Conzm.,  vol. ~i,  p. 149; cf:  La., C. C., 1786; Hawail, Laws, 1888, c. xi, Q  7. 
'  Prussia, A.  L. R., ii, I,  Q 323; Glaris, L. B., ii, art. 175; Z~irich,  P. R. G.,  Q  623; 
in Saxony the declaration must be known to the third party, E. G.,  $$S  1645,1699. 
"Germany, B.  G.,  QQ  1356, 1357;  Switz.,  Vot-entwurf; 160, 182; a statute  of 
November  26,  1880,  art.  15, established  the  same  principle  in  the  canton  of 
Lucerne (492.  Piran, vol. 10, p. 488). 
"witz.,  ?'orenhuurf,  183;  Lucerne, Stat. Nov. 26, 1880, art. 15. 48  PROPERTY RELATIONS  OF MARRIED PAR TIES  C48 
the representatives  of  the  German  society "  Frauenwohl."  7 
The "  Rechtsschutzverein  fur  Frauen,"  in  Dresden,  insists, 
however, that each party shall have equal capacity of  house- 
hold administration, and shall  bind the  other to the  extent 
that the  latter  has  not  renounced  such  liability by public 
declaration before the court. 
7 Sera Proelsz und Marie Raschke :  Dze Fyau zm neuen 6irrp-e~ltche~z  Gestfzbuch. 
8 See Das  deutsclze h'eclrt und dte deutschen Frauen, p. 7. 
PART 11. 
MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY SYSTEMS. 
CHAPTER I. 
CLASSIFICATION. 
4  g. In General. 
AT first  glance the different classes of  matrimonial  prop- 
erty systems appear innumerable.  The local customs which 
continued to govern the family relations in Europe after the 
reception of  Roman law, were developed into a multitude of 
particular systems.  But the modern codification movement 
has brought about a greater degree of  uniformity.  It is clear, 
moreover, that underneath the differences occasioned by the 
accidental  circumstances  attending their  growth,  many  of 
the systems have essential features in common. 
The  question  of  title  or  ownership,  which  is  the  most 
essential element in any kind of  property relations, furnishes 
the most fundamental basis for a classification of  matrimonial 
property systems.  Accepting this as a principle, the num- 
berless  particular  regimes  may  be  grouped  under  the two 
general divisions of  communal and individual systems.  The 
first class  includes all  the systems which recognize common 
ownership of  any general part of  the property of  the married 
parties,  while  all  other  systems  fall  under  the  second 
division. 
The value of  the above classification is not affected by the 
fr91  49 50  PROPERTY  RELA TIOSS OF AIARRIED PARTIES  [so 
fact  that under an individual  system the husband and wife 
may  hold  property  in  common.  Particular  instances  of 
common ownership do not  determine the general character 
of  the  system.  If,  however,  the  communal  principle  is 
applied to any general part of  the property of  either of  the 
parties, the system must be distinguished  from those falling 
under  the individual class, notwithstanding  that  the  parties 
may hold property by individual title. 
The systems  grouped  under  one of  these two  divisions, 
possess  in  common  the characteristic  feature  which  distin- 
guishes  them  from  those  falling  under  the  other  class. 
Within  each  division,  however,  fundamental  differences 
among  the  systems  furnish  the  basis  for  further  classi- 
fication. 
5  10. Communal Systems. 
The most natural  basis for classifying  communal systems 
is to be found in the extent or scope of  the principle of  com- 
munity.  Upon  such  basis  two  divisions  may  be  formed. 
The  general  com~nunity  of  property  (allgemeine  Giikr- 
gcmcinschaft;  communautP  universelle)  embraces  all  sys- 
tems in which the principle of  common ownership is applied 
to the entire fortune  of  each of  the married parties.  Limited 
or particular community includes  those communal  systems 
in  which  a  general class of  property is excluded  from  the 
common ownership. 
The number  of  forms of  limited  community is restricted 
only  by  the capacity  to  develop  new  modifications of the 
communal principle;  but, as they have been defined  in  the 
important  legislations, they fall  under  the  classes  of  com- 
munity of  acquisitions (  Errungenschaftsgemeinschaft ;  conz- 
mz~nauti  riduite  aux acquits)  or  community  of  movables 
ant1 acquisitions (Fnhmissgemeil;tschaft).  Under the fornier 
.the ownership of  the individual property which either party 
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possesses at the beginning of  the community is not affected, 
but the income and profits of  such property and, in  general, 
everything that is acquired by either party during the exist- 
ence  of  the  community, becomes common  property.  The 
systeni  of  community  of  movables  and  acquisitions is  the 
same  as the above, except that the  ownership of  the mova- 
bles  which  either  party possesses,  at the  beginning  of  .the 
community, becomes common. 
Some of  the other  principal  types of  limited  community 
are indicated in the civil code of  France.'  They are charac- 
terized  by the  provisions for  partial  or complete exclusion 
of  movables;  inclusion of  immovables  by fictitiously treat- 
ing  them  as  movables;  exclusion  of  ante-nuptial  debts; 
exclusion  of  objects  gratuitously  acquired;  a  privilege  for 
the  wife  of  resuming  her contributions without  loss  at the 
close of  the community;  special privileges  for the survivor, 
and for unequal shares in the community. 
Q  I  I. Indiz!idual Systems. 
These systenls do not differ among themselves with refer- 
ence to the application of  the principle of  individual owner- 
ship.  The property, in general, under all  of  such systems, 
continues  to  be  held  by  individual  title.  The individual 
property systems, however, differ among themselves respect- 
ing the nature and extent of  the interest which either party, 
by  virtue of  the marriage, acquires  in  the property of  the 
other.  In accordance with this test four subdivisions of  this 
group may be obtained : 
I.  System of  Exclusive Rights of  the Husband ; 
The husband is entitled to the complete control and, aside 
from exceptions arising  from  peculiar circumstances, to the 
ownership of  the property of  the wife.  The individual title 
of  the wife is transferred to the husband. 
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11.  System of  Marital Administration and Usufruct ; 
The husband has the administration and is entitled  to the 
fruits and  profits  of  the property  of  the  wife.  The latter, 
however, retains the individual ownership of  her property. 
111.  System of  Dowry; 
The marriage does not  affect  the property of  the parties, 
but it is customary for the husband to receive a contribution 
to  assist  him  in  supporting the  expenses  of  the  common 
household.  He does not  acquire  an absolute  title, but  he 
has  the  right of  administration over the  dowry, and  is  en- 
titled to the proceeds arising from the same. 
IV.  System of  Separate Property; 
Neither  party  acquires,  by  virtue  of  the  marriage,  any 
right or interest in the property of  the other.  The title and 
the  use  and  administration  of  the  fortune  of  each  party 
remains unaffected by the marriage. 
CHAPTER  11. 
REGULATION  BY  MARRIAGE  AGREEMENTS. 
I  2. General Freedom to  co?ztract suck Agreements. 
The capacity  of  the  parties  to  determine  the  property 
relations that shall exist between  them is a  consideration of 
fundamental importance,  Two  opposing principles  appear 
in this connection.  On one hand  there is the desirability of 
uniformity, particularly in the interests of  third parties.  On 
the other hand, there is  presented the great value  of  allow- 
ing free scope to individual traits and wishes in this field  of 
human relationships.  Any determination which  is  made of 
this question will be influenced by both  of  these considera- 
tions. 
In  considering  the  attitude  of  the  states  respecting 
marriage agreements, it will  be necessary to distinguish  be- 
tween those  which  are co~lcluded  before  the marriage  and 
those  which  are  entered  into  after  the  relation  has  been 
established.  All of  the important  states permit the regula- 
tion of  matrimonial property relations by ante-nuptial agree- 
ments between the  parties1  The legal disabilities resulting 
from the marriage do not attach  until the relation  has been 
'Many  of  the  Swiss cantons do not permit the matrimonial  property relations 
to be regulated  by agreement of  the parties.  Alterations of  the statutory system 
can obta~n  only to the extent that they have the effect of  contracts of  inheritance. 
In  certaln cases the court is authorized to approve alterations for specific reasons. 
For chart showing att~tude  of  cantons  respecting  marriage  contracts  see  Lardy, 
Ltgtslatto~ts  Sutsses,  Appendix;  see  ah0, Lucerne,  Stat. Nov. 26, 1880, art. 27; 
Zurich, P. R. G.,  $5 615-619.  The draft code of  Switzerland permits the parties 
to determine their legal property relat~ons  by contract,  Vorenhurj; 195. 
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entered  upon.  Prior  to  that time  the  parties  may  make 
any contract respecting property that may be made between 
strangers.  This general rule  is subject to particular excep- 
tions which will be considered in a subsequent secti~n.~ 
The widespread  acceptance  of  the  above  principle  indi- 
cates its essential value,  It is at once  an indication  of  the 
difficulty of  defining a perfect system, and  a  recognition  of 
the  necessity  of  affording  considerable  freedom  to  the 
influence  of  local customs  and  individual characteristics in 
the field of  matrimonial relations. 
These general considerations  have  not, however, received 
full application in  all cases.  A distinction is  made in  some 
systems between  ante-nuptial and  post-nuptial  agreements. 
Particular  considerations  are  involved  in  the  case  of  con- 
tracts  concluded  after  marriage,  hence  such  agreements 
may be  subjected  to  restrictions  or  absolutely  prohibited. 
The grounds for such  departure from  the general principle 
are for  the  most  part  the  same  as  those  previously  con- 
sidered as the basis for restrictions upon general transactions 
between  husband  and  wife.3  Fear exists  that  one  of  the 
parties  will  use  his  influence  over  the  other  for  selfish 
advantage, or it is  desired  to  protect  third  parties  against 
collusive acts of  married parties. 
The Civil Code  of  France  and  those  systems  that  have 
adopted its  provisions or have  been  strongly influenced  by 
it,4 generally provide  that after  the  marriage ceremony has 
been performed, a contract regulating the property relations 
of  the  parties  cannot  be  entered  into,  and  that  an  ante- 
nuptial contract cannot  be altered  or modified  by any sub- 
'  Post, § 14. 
S See ante,  3-5. 
'France,  C.  C.,  1395, 1543;  Italy, C.  C.,  1385, 1391;  Spain, C. C.,  1320;  Fin- 
land, Stat. Apl. 15, 1889, c. iii, art. 6;  Basle,  Stat. Mch. 10, 1884, art. 17;  Ariz.9 
R. S.,  1887, § 2099;  La., C. C.,  2329;  Texas, R. S., 1895, art. 2965. 
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sequent agreement.5  To the extent that the American  sys- 
tems  have  retained  the  common  law  prohibition  upon 
contracts between husband  and wife, the same rule  obtain^.^ 
On the other hand, those  systems that impose no general 
limitations upon contracts between husband and wife permit 
the regulation or modification of  matrimonial property rela- 
tions by post-nuptial agreements between the parties.7 
$  r 3. Statutory and Contractual Systems. 
As a rule the states of  continental  Europe, in addition to 
determining the property relations that shall obtain between 
the husband and  wife, where they have failed to enter into a 
marriage agreement (gesetzZickes  Giite~reckt;  rbgime  l>gaZ), 
make  provision  in  the codes for  one or more systems  that 
may become operative as a result of  a contract  between the 
parties  (vertragsmassiges  Gziterreckt ;  vbgime  convention- 
neZ).  The  immediate  occasion  for  the  existence  of  such 
provisions  was  the  condition  of  the  law  regulating matri- 
monial property relations before the adoption of  the modern 
codes.  Within  a  single state, a  large  number  of  different 
systems  obtained  by  force  of  local  customs  or  statutes. 
This condition may  be explained  on one hand as the result 
of  feudal  decentralization, and  on  the other by the greater 
resistance  to the  reception  of  Roman  law  in  the  field  of 
A general exception permits the parties to re-establish community of  property 
which  may  have been  dissolved  by  separation of  goods.  France, C.  C., 1451; 
Italy, C.  C., 1443;  Spain, C.  C.,  1320;  Finland, Stat. Apl.  15, 1889, c. v, art.  17. 
Cf:  references ante,  3. 
Austria, B.  G.,  § 1217; Germany, B. G., 1432; Prussia, A. L. R., ii,  I, $5 215, 
251, 355, 412, 419, 439, but exceptions arise where the contract  estabhshes  com- 
munity of  goods or where it provides for the exclusion of  such community in dis- 
tricts where the latter exists by force of  local statutes, though community existing 
as a result of  contract  may be dissolved  or  mod~fied  by  post-nuptial  agreement, 
ibzd., ii, I,  $$ 354 seq.,  412 seq.;  Saxony, B.  G., $ 1691;  Norway,  Stat. June  29, 
1888, arts. 3, 4; Leuthold, R. R.,  pp. 59,60;  cf: references to English and Amer- 
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family relations.  In  Germany, before  the  adoption  of  the 
present code, more than one hundred  matrimonial  property 
systems were  given  statutory recognition.'  Similar condi- 
tions  had  existed  in  other  European  states  before  the 
nationalization  of  the  law  was  accomplished.  While  the 
variations  in  some cases were of slight importance, in other 
cases  the differences among the systems were  fundamental. 
It was recognized that a sharp break with the old customs 
and  legislations  would  produce  hardships,  and  that  mere 
freedom of  contract would not be sufficient to overcome this 
condition  so  far  as the  mass  of  the  population  was  con- 
cerned.  Individuals,  who  desired  a  system  differing  from 
that established  by  the code, would  be obliged  to set  forth 
in detail the  terms under which  they desired  to have  their 
property  relations  regulated.  A  fa~lure  to  express  them- 
selves clearly might frequently lead  to results the reverse of 
those desired.  The German code commissioners considered 
various plans for the solution of  this difficulty.  One proposal 
was that the local customs and statutes should be continued 
in the field of  matrimonial  property relations.  This policy 
had  been  followed by  Prussia and  other  German  states as 
they absorbed neighboring communities, and by Russia with 
respect to Finland and other Swedish and  Polish provin~es.~ 
Another  plan  proposed  to  divide  Germany  into  districts 
and  establish  for  each  district,  as  a  statutory  system, 
that  which  obtained  among  the  majority  of  the  people 
within such territory.  It was also proposed  that the legis- 
lative authority of  each commonwealth should  be permitted 
to determine which  of  several systems defined by the federal 
code, should obtain within its jurisdiction.3 
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These  proposals  met  with  serious  objections  on  the 
ground of  the practical difficulties as well as from considera- 
tions of  the interests of  national unity.4  They have not been 
accepted  in  the  more  modern  codes  which  undertake  to 
remove the inconveniences arising from the establishment of 
a  single  statutory  system  by  giving  legal  definition  to 
several systems.  One of  these, probably that which obtains 
among the  greater number of  people or which  corresponds 
most  closely to their social ideas  and institutions, is  estab- 
lished  as  the  statutory system.  It  comes  into  operation, 
however, only in so far as the married  parties have failed to 
indicate  a different  desire.5  Any one of  the other systems 
may  be  introduced  by  marriage  contract.  The  simple 
indication of  the title of  the system will be sufficient to bring 
its  provisions  into  operation.  In  this way the  freedom  of 
contract is made much more effective. 
The beneficial  character  of  this  policy is  manifested  by 
the widespread  acceptance  which it  has received.  The fol- 
lowihg table indicates the statutory and contractual systems 
that have been  defined  in the legislations which  have  been 
brought under consideration in the present study  :6 
'Motive, vol. iv,  p.  133; Denksclrrz~,  pp.  270, 271; Mitteis, "  Bemerkungen 
zum ehelichen Guterrecht,"  2eit.J d. privat. u. Zf.  Rechts., vol.  16, p. 562. 
In a certain sense two statutory systems  exist  in  legislations which recognize 
a legal or judicial separation of  property in case of  community of  goods, marital 
administration and usufruct or dowry.  Where such separation occurs, the regime 
of  separate  property becomes the  matrimonial  property  system by  operation  of 
law.  Post, $3 24, 31,  36. 
"The codes which recognize the system  of  dowry  practically  define the system 
of separate property in  providing  for  the constitution and administration of  the 
paraphernalia.  Post, $32. 
'  Denksdrzyt, p. 450.  CJ  Neubauer, Deutsclrland. 
a Neubauer, Dcutschland, pp. I seq., 66, 209 seq., 228,  231,  233,240;  Neubauer, 
Ausland, pp. 22-24. 
"ierke,  Entwurj; p. I I I seq.; BBhr, "  Das eheliche Giiterrecht des biirgerlichen 
Gesetzbuchs,"  Arch.f. 6urg; Recfzt., vol. i, p.  237. 5 8  PROPERTY RELA TIONS  OF MARRIED PARTIES  [S  8 
Code or  Statute.  Statutory Systcm.  Contractual Systems. 
France,  C. C." ................  .Community  of  Movables  General Community, Community 
and  Acquisitions  (art.  of  Acquis~tions,  and six other 
1393).  forms  of  Limited  Community 
(art.  1497  seq.);  Marital  Ad- 
ministration  and Usufmct (art. 
1529  rcq.);  Dowry  (art.  1540 
scq.) ; Separate property  (art. 
1536 seq.).' 
Spain, C. C.  .................. Community of  Acquisitions  Dowry (art. 1336). 
(art. 1315). 
...................  Italy, C.  C..  Dowry (art. 1388 scq.).  Community of  Acquisitions (art. 
1438).  ..............  Austria, B. G.  ..Dowry  (51218).~  General and Limited Community 
Basle City (Stat. Mch. xo,  18%) .General  Community  (art. 
1). 
Geneva,  C.  C.. ..............  ..Same  as France, C. C. 
Glaris, L.  B  .................. Marital Administration  and 
LTsufmct (ii,  arts.  172, 
173).  ...  Lucerne, Stat. Nov. 16, 1%.  Marital Administration  and 
Usufruct (art. 4 seq.). 
Ziirich, P. R.  G.1° .............  Marital Administration  and 
Usufruct (8 589 scq.). 
Switzerland, Vorentwurf "  .....  Marital Administration  and 
Usufmct (art. 196). 
of  Property (P 1233 seq.!. 
Separate Property (arts. I, 28). 
Same as France, C. C. 
General  Community  (art.  244 
scq.) ;  Community of Movables 
and  Acquisitions  (arts.  264, 
265) : Community  of  Acquisi- 
tions (arts. 266,267);  Separate 
Property (art. 268 seg.). 
'The  provisions of the French Civil Code, or their substantial equivalent, obtain 
in  Belgium  and Geneva  and  before  the adoption of  the German code, were  in 
force in Baden, Elsass.Lothringen and in districts of  Prussia, Bavaria, Hesse, etc. 
During the Middle Ages  the community of  acquisitions was  in  some places 
comb~ned  with the system of  dowry, the profits of  the dowry falling into the com- 
munity  (Viollet, Pricis, p.  689).  This composite system  is  recognized as a con- 
tractual system  in France (C. C., 1581) and Italy (C.C.,  1433), and will  arise in 
Spain  (C. C.,  1315) and Louisiana (C. C., 2399) whenever  dowry  is  established 
and no contrary provision is made. 
9Before the adoption of  the German code, the system of  dowry obtained in the 
territory of  the common or Roman law to the extent  that the latter had not been 
altered  by statute.  C$  Denkschvift, p. 450. 
l0 Among the other Swiss cantons are to be  found, in  addition to those above 
indicated, the systems of  community of  acquisitions and of  dowry.  CJ  Neubauer, 
AusZand, pp.  1-7. 
l' The central government has been given the power to establish a uniform code 
of  private law.  So far as concerns family law and  the law of  persons, the action 
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Germany,  B.  G.. ............  ..Marital  Administration and 
Usufruct  (P 1363 seq.). 
Pmssia, A.  L. R. ..............  Marital Administration  and 
Usufmct (ii, I, 5 205) 
Saxony,  B.  G.. ...............  .Marital Administration and 
Usufmct (5 1655). 
Norway, Stat. June 29, 1888 '=..General  Community, 
Finland, Stat. Apl. 15, 1889.. ...  Community  of  Movables 
and  Acquisitions  (C. i, 
art. I seq.). 
Russia l'. ...................  ..Separate  Property. 
England  ....................  Separate Property. 
United Statesof America."  All 
legislations  except those indi- 
cated below.'s  ............  .Separate  Property. 
Arizona, R. S., 1887 ...........  Community of  Acquisitions 
(g 2102). 
California,  C. C.. .............. Community of Acquisitions 
(P 164). 
Idaho, R. S ,1887.. ............  Community of  Acquisitions 
(5 2497). 
Louisiana,  C.  C.  ..............  Community of  Acquisitions 
(art. 2332). 
Nevada, G. S., 1888... .........  Community of  Acquisitions 
(5 500). 
New Mexico, C.  L.,  1897 l" ....  Community of  Acquisitions 
(5 2030 seq.) . 
Texas, R. S.,  1895 ........... ..Community  of  Acquisitions 
(art. 2968). 
Washington,  G. S., 1891.. ......  Community of  Acquisitions 
(P '399). 
General  Community  (g  143, 
seq.) :  Community of Movables 
and Acquisitions  (B 1549 seq.) : 
Community  of  Acquisitions 
(5 1437  scq.) ; Separate prop- 
erty  ($8 1436,  1426 seq.). 
General Community (ii, I,$ 360); 
Community  of  Acquisitions 
(ii,  1, 8 396); Separate Prop- 
erty (ii, I, $5 208,221 seg.). 
General  Community  (P  1695) ; 
Limited  Community  (g 1703); 
Separate Property (g 1693). 
Separate Property. 
l2 Where prorincial  statutes established community as  the statutory system the 
system of  marital administration and usufruct became a contractual system. 
lY  Denmark recognizes general community, while in Sweden community is limited 
to movables and acquisitions.  Neubauer, Ausland, p. 22. 
l4 Within the jurisdiction of  the civil code.  Lehr, Droit Russr, p. 42; Leuthold 
R.  K., p. 59. 
l5 For English and American statutes, see references post,  5 38. 
l6 For particular exceptions in Florida and Tennessee, see post,  5 38. 
l7 CJpost, 5 17 (b), note 6. 
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The parties  in  accepting  the  statutory system  or any of 
the  contractual  systems  may,  in  general,  introduce  such 
modifications  as they  desire.^^  It will  thus be a  relatively 
easy matter to transform general community into a  limited 
community, and either of  these, as well  as marital  adminis- 
tration and usufruct, into a  condition  of  separate  property, 
even if  such forms are not given statutory definition as con- 
tractual systems. 
To guard against confusion and indefiniteness  the  parties 
are forbidden to provide  in general terms for the regulation 
of  their  property relations by local customs or foreign laws. 
They must accept one of  the systems defined in the code, or 
set forth in detail  the  rules  according to which they desire 
their economic interests to be governed.'g 
4  I 4. Particular Provisiotzs Respecting Marriage Contracts. 
The exercise of  the general right of  determining matrimon- 
ial property relations by contract is subject to certain condi- 
tions imposed in the interest of  the family or of  third parties. 
A common provision  is the requirement of  special forms in 
marriage agreements.  It is very generally the rule that the 
agreement  shall  be  reduced  to writing  and  signed  by  the 
parties.  This principle  was  established  in  English  law, so 
far as regards executory agreements, by  the fourth  section 
181n Finland the system of separate property cannot be introduced by  contract. 
Stat. Apl.  15, 1889, c.  i, art. 4; in Germany the provisions  respecting the cont~n- 
uation of  the community  between the survivor and the common children may be 
excluded, but cannot  be otherwise altered in any manner.  B.  G., $5 1508, 1518; 
in Italy the part~es  are forbidden to contract for any community other than that of 
acquisitions.  C. C., 1433, cf:  ibid., 1434-1436;  for limitations in Swiss cantons, 
see ante, $ 12, note I. 
19France,  C.  C.,  1390; Italy, C. C., 1381; Spain, C. C.,  1317; Germany, an ex- 
ception arises in case the husband is residing in a foreign country at the time the 
contract is concluded.  B. G., $ 1433. 
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of  the famous Statute of  Frauds.l  It obtains in practically 
all of  the states of  the American union. 
Most of  the continental European legislations and some of 
the American statutes go further and  require  that the con- 
tract  shall  be  drawn  up  before  a  notary or judge.'  Wit- 
nesses  are  generally  necessary  and, in  some  cases, the act 
must receive judicial  confirmation. 
In addition, it is  provided  in  many states that marriage 
agreements shall receive official  publication or registration.3 
The code of  Germany has established a special  matrimonial 
property register for such  publication, and the draft code of 
Switzerland proposes a similar record.'  These requirements 
exist in the interest of  third parties, and a failure to observe 
then) will  not  generally  affect  the  rights of  the  parties  as 
between themselves. 
A limitation upon the right of  the  parties  to  affect  their 
mutual  property  relations  sometimes  occurs  in  connection 
with dispositions to take effect upon the death of  one of  the 
parties.  Some legislations  provide  that marriage contracts 
l Act 29 Car. ii, c. 3. 
ZFrance, C.  C.,  1394 sq.; Italy,  C.  C.,  1382 srq.;  Spain,  C.  C., I321  seq.; 
Austria, Stat. July 25, 1871, R. G. Bl., no. 76;  Germany, B.  G.,  1434;  Prussia, 
A.  L.  R., li,  I, $S 198, 209,  356;  Basle,  Stat.  Mch.  10,  1884, art.  17;  Switz., 
Ibrenfwurf;  219, 220;  Ariz.,  R. S.,  1887,  2098;  La.,  C.  C., 2328 sq.; Texas, 
R. S.,  1895, art. 2964;  Wash.,  G.  S., 1891,  1401. 
Italy, C.  C.,  1384;  Germany, B.  G.,  1435 ; Prussia, in case  of  exclusion  of 
community, A. L.  R.,  ii, I,  $422; Saxony, B. G.,  1695;  Norway, Stat. June 29, 
1888, art. 2 seq.;  Finland, Stat. Apl.  15, IS~Q,  c.  iil, art. 1  sq.; Switz.,  P"renf- 
zuurl;  222  seq.;  Ala., Code, 1896, $ roI1;  Ark., Dig.  Stat. 1894, $$4898-qgo1; 
Cal.,  C. C., $5 178-180;  Geo., Code, 1895,  2483;  Idaho, R. S.,  1887, $8 2508- 
2511; Ill.,  An.  St., 1885, c. 68, 79; Ky.,  Stat.  1894,  2128;  Mass.,  P. S.,  1882, 
c.  147, $ 2;  Miss., An.  Code,  1892,  $ 2294;  MO., R.  S.,  1889,  $S 6853,  6854; 
Mont, C.  C.,  1885, S$ 24%--250; Nev.,  G.  S.,  1885, $8 524-528;  N.  C.,  Code, 
1b83, $$ 1270,  1820,  1821  ; S. C.,  C.  S.  L.,  1893, $ 2168; Tenn.,  Code,  I 584, 
$8 2837, 2846;  Hawaii, C. L., 1884, $ 1263; so far  as either  party is  a  trade1 : 
Austria, R. G. Bl.,  1863, pp.  3,4;  France, Code de Com.,  67 scg. 
'Germany, B.  G.,  $5 1558-1563;  Switz,  Vorelztwurf,  222-225. 64  PROPERTY RELATIONS  OF MARRIED PARTIES  [6, 
reserved from community ( Vorbehaltsgut;  biens  r6servi.s). 
The first draft of  the  German  code  used  the  terms, "Son 
dergut"  and  "  Vorbehaltsgut,"  to  distinguish  the  twc 
classes.3  The later drafts omitted  the  former  term, and  no 
particular expression  was  adopted  for the  characterization 
of  such  property under the system of  general community,4 
though  the  term,  "  eingebrachtes  Gut"  is  applied  to  it 
under the systems of  limited community.5 
Dotal and separate property agree in that each is held by 
an individual  title, but  they differ with  respect  to  adminis- 
tration  and  usufruct.  Dotal  property  is  administered  for 
the benefit of  both parties, and the profits and proceeds be- 
come common  pr~perty.~  It differs from  the latter only in 
the fact  that the exclusive title of  the individual owner is re- 
tained, and hence the capital of  the property does not form 
a part of  the common mass.' 
Separate  property, on  the  other hand, continues  subject 
to individual administration  and  usufruct  according  to the 
general  principles  obtaining  for  the  system  of  separate 
property. 
4 16. Conzposition of  the  General Community. 
The  general  communit~l  of  all  property has  been  advo- 
cated as the only system  that realizes the ideal of  the mar- 
= ITnder the systems of marital administration and usufruct as well  as of  dowry, 
the two classes are clearly distinguished by the terms, "  dotal property"  and "  re- 
served property ''  or "  paraphernalia." 
I. Enhuurf; $6 1351, 141 1 seq., 1432. 
'  Germany, B. G., 5 1439. 
Vbzd.,  8s  1520  sey.,  1550 seq. 
6 Under individual systems, the  proceeds of  dotal  property go to the  husband 
alone. 
7 France, C. C., 1428; Gerniany, B. G., 5 1439; Prussia, A.  L.  R., ii, I,  370. 
?France, C. C., 1526; Gemany, B. G., 5 1441; Saxony, B. G., 3 1693;  Switz., 
Vorr>ttwurj,  21 5 ; c/.  Prussia, A. L. R., ii, I, 5 221. 
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riage as a union of  all of  the material and  spiritual interests 
of  the  parties.  By  virtue  of  the  establishment  of  this 
system, all  of  the  property  which  the  parties  possess  is 
united  into a  common  mass, to which  is  also  added  all  of 
the  property  which  either  of  the  parties  later  acquires.' 
The joint  title  is  substituted  for the  individual title without 
the necessity of  a formal transfer. 
The general rule has been  subjected to numerous  excep- 
tions  and  modifications,  and  the  perfect  form  of  general 
community  is  not  defined  to-day in  any important  legisla- 
tion.  The  legislations  generally  recognize  that  property 
may be  excluded  from the community by operation  of  law, 
by act of  a third  party or as a result of  agreement between 
the parties. 
The property of  either party, which, by reason  of  entail 
or any limited  title, cannot be  alienated, is  under statutory 
provision  excluded  from  the  common  ownership.  It falls 
under  the  class of  dotal  property and  is  administered  for 
the benefit of  the community.'  Another example  of  prop- 
erty excluded from  the  community by operation  of  law, is 
wearing apparel and property intended for the exclusive per- 
sonal use of  one of  the parties.3  Most of  the codes, however, 
do not establish this exception for systems of  community.  It 
is significant that the draft code of  Switzerland provides that 
certain things shall become separate property, by operation 
of  law, under  all  forms  of  matrimonial  property relations. 
They include objects for exclusive  personal use, the savings 
'France, C. C., 1526;  Germany, B. G., 5 1438;  Prussia, A. L. R.. ii, I, 5s  363, 
371, 372;  Saxony, B. G.,  1695; Switz., k'orentwurf; 244;  Basle, Stat. hlch. ro, 
1884, art. 2.  In Austria the  presumption  is against  the  inclusion  of  future and 
inherited property, except it is expressly stipulated for each.  B. G., 5 1177. 
Germany, B. G., $5 1439, 1525;  Prussia, A. L. R., ii,  I,  363, 370. 
For  the  wife:  Prussia, A.  L. R., ii,  I, 5 364.  For  either  party:  Basle, Stat. 
Mch. 10, 1884, art. 3;  Switz.,  Vorenfwurf; 217. 66  PROPERTY RELA TZONS OF  MARRIED PARTIES  166 
of  the  wife,  goods  used  by the  latter  in  an  independent 
industry or profession, and  that which  she acquires by her 
labor.4  In Norway, also, where  the general community has 
been greatly modified  under the influence of  modern condi- 
tions, it is the rule that a life insurance policy or annuity for 
the benefit of  one of  the  parties, is  his  separate  property 
unless express provisions exist to the contrary.5 
Property is excluded  from the joint  ownership when it is 
acquired  by  gratuitous  title,  as  a  donation  or  succession, 
and  the  donor  or testator  has provided  that  it  shall  not 
become comm0n.b  The codes are not  in  harmony respect- 
ing the character of  such property.  According to the older 
codes, which emphasize  the  community of  acquisitions, the 
property becomes dotal and  the profits and  income  of  the 
same accrue to the common mass as in the case of  property 
excluded  from  community  by  operation  of  law.7  On  the 
other hand, the more recent legislations regard such property 
as separate in character.* 
The principle of  community may be profoundly modified 
as a  result  of  agreement between  the  parties.  They may 
exclude property from the common ownership and establish 
it as dotal or separate in character.  Where there is a simple 
declaration  that certain objects shall be excluded  from the 
common mass, it would  appear that  the dotal  features will 
be impressed  upon such property  If, however, the  parties 
'  Switz.,  Voren~urf;  217. 
5Stat. June 29,  1888, art.  20;  rf: France, Stat.  July  20,  1886, post,  J 18, note 
10;  Basle, Stat. XIch.  10, 1884, art. 21. 
SFrance, C. C.,  1401; Germany, B.  G.,  §J 1440, 1369;  Prussia,  A. L. R., ii, I, 
$373;  Saxony,  B.  G., J 1693;  Switz.,  P%rcntzuurf; 216;  Norway,  Stat.  June 29, 
1889, arts. 20,  5;  cf.  Austria, B.  G., J "77. 
'France,  C. C.,  1401, 1428;  Prussia, A. L.  R., ii, I, $5 371, 373, 405;  Suony, 
B.  G.,  JJ 1693, 1695. 
a Gernlany, B.  G., 5 J 1440, 1441, 1369;  Switz.,  Yorenhuurj; 215,216;  Norway, 
Stat. June 29, 1888, art. 20. 
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clearly  indicate  an  intention  that  the  administration  and 
enjoyment, as  well  as the title, shall  be  reserved  from  the 
matrimonial  property, the  goods become  separate  in  char- 
acter? 
By  these  means  the composition of  the community  may 
be so materially modified  as to be practically identical with 
that of  one of  the types of  limited community or even of  an 
individual system.  The general  regulations governing gen- 
eral  community  would  nevertheless  continue  to  apply  as 
respects obligations, etc., so far as they had not  been modi- 
fied by agreement between the parties. 
I 7.  Composition of Limited Community. 
(a)  CommuniCy of Movoblts and drqurszfions. 
The community of  movables and acquisitions is the statu- 
tory  system of  the  Civil  Code of  France, and  has received 
acceptance  in  other  states  as  a  statutory  or contractual 
system.=  The general principles at the basis of  this system 
are much the same as those which obtain in connection with 
general  community:  Its  fundamental  point  of  departure 
from  the  latter  is  to  be  found  in  the  modification  of  the 
composition  of  the  comn~unity. Not  only  those  objects 
which  fall  under  the class of  dotal or separate property  in 
general  community,3 but  also  the  immovables which  either 
party possesses when the community arises, or subsequently 
'  Germany, B.G.,  J 1440; Prussia, A.  L. R., ii, I, 5 360; Saxony, B. G.,  5 1693; 
Austria, B.  G., J 1233;  Norway, Stat.  June  29,  1888, arts.  I, 8;  France,  C.  C., 
1536.  The French Clvil Code makes a clear  distinction  between mere exclusion 
of  community and the  establishment  of separate property.  Ibid.,  1529- 1539; 
Viollet, Er.'cis, p. 677 sq. 
l See ante, J 13. 
=The  German  code  provides  that this  system shall be  governed  by the rules 
regulating  general  con~munity  so far as it is  not otherw~se  expressly provided. 
B.  G.,  5 '549. 
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acquires  by title  of  donation  or succession, are  excluded 
from  the common mass and do not constitute a  part of  the 
community  property.4  This exclusion results  by operation 
of law  and, in accordance  with  the general  principle, such 
immovables  become dotal and not separate property.  The 
income  and  profits  of  such  property,  as  acquisitions,  not 
proceeding from donation or succession, accrue to the com- 
munity.5 
(b)  Community of Acquisitions. 
Under the system of  community of  acquisitions the com- 
mon  ownership  is  confined  to  such  property  as  shall  be 
acquired by either of  the  married  parties during the exist- 
ence of  the comm~nity.~  Acquisitions generally include the 
profits  and  proceeds of  property owned  by either  party  at 
the  time  the  community  commences.  Such  property  is 
considered dotal though it may be reserved for separate use 
by agreement between the parties. 
On  the  other  hand,  acquisitions  do  not  embrace  all 
property accruing to the parties during the existence  of  the 
'France,  C. C.,  1402; Germany, B.  G.,  8 1551;  Switz.,  Vbrentwurf; 264;  Fin- 
land, the exclusion applies  only to agricultural lands.  In other respects this sys- 
tem agrees with general community, Stat. Apl.  15, 1889, c. i, arts. 2, 3. 
:France,  C.  C.,  1401; Germany, B.  G.,  $8 1550, 1551; Finland,  Stat. Apl.  15, 
1889, c.  i,  art. 6;  conha, Switz.,  Vormhuurf; 264, which  makes  such  property 
separate in  character.  The parties  may  stipulate, however, that  such  property 
shall be subject to marital administration and  usufruct, in which case the acquisi- 
tions  accrue  to  the husband, and, under  the rules  of  community, will  become 
common.  Ibid., 265. 
@France,  C.  C.,  1498; Spain, C. C.,  1392;  Italy, C. C.,  1436;  Germany, B.  G., 
5 1519; Prussia,  A.  L.  R.,  ii,  I, 8 396;  Switz.,  Vorrtztwurf; 266;  Ariz.,  R. S., 
1887, $8 2100, 2102;  Cal.,  C. C., $8 162,164; Idaho, R. S.,  1887, $8 2495,2497; 
La., C.,C.,  1402; Nev.,  G.  S.,  1885, $8 499,  5";  Texas, R. S.,  1895, arts. 2967, 
2968;  Wash., G. S.,  1891,  $8 1397, 1399;  in New  Mexico, the community  ap- 
pears to he primarily intended as a provision for the survivor and to begin only 
at the dissolution  of  the marriage.  Before  that time it is a simple account be-. 
tween the parties,  each remaining owner of  his acquisitions.  C.  L.,  1897, 5 2030 
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community.  That  property  which,  under  general  com- 
munity, is excluded  from  common  ownership  by operation 
of  law, will likewise retain  its individual character under the 
community  of  acquisitions  and  will  be  considered  dotal 
property.7  The  same  rule  generally  obtains  respecting 
property falling to either party by donation of  succession so 
far as the donor or testator has not indicated a desire that it 
shall become common  or separate  9  in character. 
Some  of  the  American  states  that  have  established  a 
community of  acquisitions have limited it to the products of 
the personal industry of  both  parties.  All  property owned 
by  either  party  at the  time  of  the  marriage, or  acquired 
afterwards by donation or succession  is  declared  to  be  the 
separate property of  such  party, and  the increase and  pro- 
ceeds of  the same have a like character.lo 
Dotal  property will  also  inc!ude  all  objects  acquired  as 
compensation  for  damages  to or by way of  exchange  for 
property which has the dotal character.lX 
Separate  property  is  determined  by  the  same  general 
principles as were indicated in  connection with general com- 
munity,"  but particular exceptions arise.  Thus, the code of 
Germany excludes separate property of  the  husband  under 
both forms of  limited  community.'3  The  individual title of 
Germany, B. G., $ 1522;  Spain, C. C.,  1403, 1404;  CJ arzfe,  $ 16. 
SFrance,  C. C., 1498, 1401,  1402; Italy,  C.  C., 1435: Spain, C.  C., 1396; Ger- 
many, 6. G.,  $1521; Prussia,  A. L.  R.,  ii,  I,  $$402, 405;  Suitz.,  Vormh~urf, 
266, 226;  Itlaho, K. S., 1887, $5 2495, 2497;  La., C.  C.,  2402;  Texas, if  real pro- 
perty it becomes separate in character, but  the  husbancl has the administration of 
the same.  R. S.,  1895, art. 2967;  c/;posf,  $42, note I. 
"ermany,  B. G.,  SS: 1526, 1369;  Switz.,  Vorefzfwur/,  215,216. 
'"Ariz.,  R. S., 1887, $ 2100; Cal., C.  C., S$ 162, 163; Iqev., G.S.,  1885, $ 499; 
Wash., G. S., 1891,  $S 1397, 1398 
11 France, C  C.,  1407, 1408;  Spain, C.  C.,  I 396, 1402;  Germany, B. G., $1524; 
Switz.,  P?renfiuu~%  206. 
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each  party  is  preserved  in  a  part  of  his  property  which 
regularly becomes dotal by operation of  the statute, whereas 
under  general  community  the  entire  property, as  a  rule, 
becomes common.  As the husband  has the administration 
of the dotal property, a special separate estate was not con- 
sidered necessary in  his case.  It also  appears that in Italy, 
separate  property cannot  be  established for either party by 
contract or otherwise.  If  the parties elect to live under the 
community  system, all  of  their  acquisitions, which  do  not 
become communal, will be treated as dotal property.'4 
Under the community of  acquisitions  uncertainty will fre- 
quently arise as to  whether the title  to  certain  property is 
common or individual.  In order to  protect  the interests of 
innocent third  parties and to simplify the property relations 
between  the  married  parties,  a  presumption  is  raised, 
analogous  to  that  which  obtains  in  favor  of  creditors, 
respecting the ownership  of  movables  found  in the posses- 
sion of the married parties.'S  It will  be presumed  that  thc 
existing property belongs to both parties jointly.  This pre- 
sumption  may  be  rebutted  by  the  production  of  public 
titles, inventories, etc.16 
$  I 8. Products of the Personal Industry of the Wife. 
Determined  efforts have  been  made in  many  states  still 
further to restrict  the community  by  excluding therefrom 
the products  of  the  personal industry of  the wife  so far  as 
such  activity  does  not  pertain  to  the  household  or  the 
business  of  the husband.  The movement has  received the 
support of those who advocate the emancipation of  the mar- 
ried woman from  the  disabilities  imposed  upon  her by the 
l4  C. C., 1434-1436. 
15Anfe,  5 5, notes 15, 16. 
'EFrance,  C.  C.,  1499: Italy, C.  C., 1437;  Germany,  B.  G.,  $5 1527,  1528; 
Prussia, A. L. R., 11,  1, $5 397, 401- 
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law.  They  insist  that  such  property  shall  become  the 
separate property of  the married woman, and  that she shall 
be  permitted  to exercise such  powers over  the same as the 
married man exercises over the products of  his industry. 
On  the  other  hand, many who  oppose  the  principle  of 
separation  of  property  interests  of  married  parties,  have 
supported  the  demand  for  a  reform  in  the  law governing 
acquisitions  which  proceed  from the personal labor  of the 
wife.  One  of  the  greatest  hardships. connected  with  the 
system of  community, as well as with  the  English common 
law,  is  the  fact  that  property  which  is  the  result  of  the 
arduous  labor  of  the  woman, and  probably  the  sole  de- 
pendence of  the family, may be taken and  dissipated by an 
idle, drunken  and  vicious  husband.  The only recourse  of 
the wife  is  a judicial  proceeding for separation  of  property 
or divorce.  If  she has  a  natural  hesitancy  to expose her 
dornestic affairs by taking public legal proceedings, or, as is 
often the case where  the evil  is  greatest, if  the  expense  of 
the  process proves an obstacle, her  economic  interests  are 
wholly  at  the  mercy  of  the  husband.  Even  where  the 
extreme cases do not  exist, economic principles justify the 
reform.  The  energy and  economy of the  woman  will  be 
increased to the extent that she  is  accorded  a  control over 
the results of  her activity. 
The  systems  of  individual  property  have  generally 
accorded  the  married  woman  adequate  protection  in  this 
respect.'  Among  the  community  systems  the  movement 
has been successful  to a certain extent in  the  Scandinavian 
countries,  Geneva  and  the  American  states,  but  in  the 
French and Spanish civil codes, as well as in the legislations 
which recognize community as a contractual system, the old 
principles have not, as yet, been modified.' 
'  post,  S§ 26, 32, 39- 
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The proposition to secure the reform  by making the pro- 
ducts  of  the  industry  of  the  wife  her  separate  property, 
encountered  severe  opposition  on  the ground  that such a 
system would not correspond to the social customs and con- 
ceptions  which  are  at the  basis  of  the  marriage  and  the 
family.3  Moreover, it was argued that it  would  be inequit- 
able to permit  the wife to retain exclusive ownership of  the 
proceeds of her  industry while  all  of  the  husband's  acqui- 
sitions  were  brought  into  the common mass  in  which  the 
wife  takes an equal  share.  The interests of  creditors  have 
also been advanced as an objection to the proposed plan. 
As  a  result  of  these  considerations  the  Scandinavian 
countries do not exclude  the wife's earnings from  the joint 
ownership, but  give  her an exclusive  right  of  disposing of 
the same,4 and exempt such property, during  the life of  the 
wife,  from  execution  for  the  husband's  debts  unless  they 
have been contracted  with her consent.5  If  the industry of 
the wife is carried  on for  the most  part with  the capital of 
the husband, these provisions will not apply.6 
B. G.,  1524; Prussia, A. L. R.,  ii,  I,  363, 396;  Saxony, B. G.,  1695;  Aus- 
tria, B. G.,  1177. 
Pascaud, "  Le Droit de Femme mariee aux Produits de son Travail,"  Rev.  Pol. 
tf  ParLe., vol. ix, p.  571 seg.;  Guntzberger,  p.  225 srq. 
'Denmark,  Stat.  May  7,  1880, art.  I, An.  Ptran., vol. 10, p.  533;  Norway, 
Stat. June zg, 1888, art. 31; Finland, Stat. Apl.  15, 1889, c. ii, art. 3.  In Sweden 
a statute of  Dec. I I,  1874, amending the  law  governing  matrimonial relations, 
provides that a married  woman may stipulate  in  the  marriage contract  that  she 
shall have the free administration of  her individual property and of  the things that 
she acquires by  her  labor, F =S.,  1874, no.  109, pp.  1-3;  cf:  An. Plran., vol. 4, 
PP. 566, 567. 
Confra  in Finland, where such property may br taken after the other common 
property and the individual property of  the husband has been exhausted.  Stat. 
Apl. 15, 1889, c. iv, art. 2. 
6 Norway, Stat. June 29, 1888, art. 31 ; in Denmark the same is true if  the cap- 
ital belongs to the community.  Stat. May 7, 1880, art.  I, An. ifran.,  vol. 10, p. 
533. 
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A  recent  statute of  Geneva  takes a more advanced  posi- 
tion.  It accords the wife under all  systems the same  right 
over the proceeds of  her personal  industry  as  is  possessed 
by  the  married  woman  under  the  system  of  separate 
property.7  A qualification  has been  made, however, under 
the  influence of  the considerations indicated  above.  All of 
such  property  must  be added  to the common  mass at the 
dissolution  of  the community, unless  the wife  or her heirs 
renounce her share in the joint  pr~perty.~  She will  not  be 
permitted  to share  in  the  results  of  her  husband's  activity 
unless she is willing  to contribute her earnings  to the com- 
mon partnership. 
Attempts are being  made  to bring  about similar reforms 
in other  European states.  The Belgian  Chamber, in  I 899, 
considered a measure granting married women  the right  to 
make small  deposits in savings banks and  to dispose of  the 
same for l~ousehold  necessities?  Such deposits were  to  be 
exempt  from  execution  by  the  creditors  of  the husband. 
Similar  statutes have  been  enacted  in  France,  but  so  far 
as the  system  of  community  obtains  between  the parties, 
the sums deposited continue to be held  in common and  the 
wife  has  simply  a  right  of  limited  administration over the 
same." 
In  France,  also,  the  movement  to  accord  the  married 
woman similar rights over her earnings, independent of  their 
deposit in  a bank, has achieved some success, and it appears 
'  Stat. Nov. 7,1894, art. I,  An. Ptran, vol. 24, p. 634. 
Ibtd., art. 4. 
German newspapers of September 13, 1899. 
l0 Stat. Apl. 9,1881,  art. 6, Bull. des lozs, xii, S&., vol. 22, p. 666;  Stat. July  20, 
1886,  art. 13,  zbrd.,vol. 33,p. 279. The  statute of  July 20,1886, provides for the pur- 
chase of  an annuity by  a certain number of  deposits.  If the deposits are made by 
a married  party, the  annuity  will be held  as  individual  property, but  an  equal 
amount will  be purchased  for  each  spouse.  Cj: recent acts of  Louisiana,  ante, 
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that  its  purpose  is  on  the  point  of  being  accomplished. 
Two distinct reforms are proposed.  One is  directed  to the 
evil which exists where  the  husband's conduct jeopards the 
interests of  the wife  and the expense of  the proceeding pre- 
cludes  the  relief  afforded  by  the  judicial  separation  of 
property.  It is  proposed  that where  the  husband  by  his 
misconduct  injuriously affects  the welfare of  the household, 
his  wife,  without  demanding separation of  goods, may  be 
authorized  by a justice  of  the peace to collect  the products 
of  her  labor and  to  freely dispose of  the same.  Moreover, 
if  abandoned  by  her  husband, she  may  demand  a  certain 
portion of  his income.  Under the other proposition married 
women, in  general, are given  the  right  of  free  disposition 
over the products of  their personal industry, but such acqui- 
sitions  continue  to  belong  to  the common  mass,  and,  as 
such, are  subject to the claims of  the creditors of  the  hus- 
band."  These measures  were considered  by the Chamber 
of  Deputies, and, in  1895, referred  to  a  committee  which 
harmonized  and  combined  the same.  Following the latter 
proposition,  the  wife,  without  any special  authorization, is 
entitled  to dispose of  the products of  her labor.  Incorpo  - 
rated with this  is  the provision  that a wife  deserted  by her 
husband  may be authorized  to collect a share of  his income. 
Upon  the favorable report of  the committee the bill  passed 
the  Chamber  of Deputies  in  1896, but  it  has  not  as yet 
received the approval of  the Senate." 
The American  states  which  recognize  a  community  of 
acquisitions,  regard  the  earnings  of  the  wife  as  common 
property, but generally  give  her a right of  disposition over 
the same which  is  as extensive as that obtained  under  the 
l1  An.fran., vol. 14, p. 16, notes 5,6;  Guntzberger, pp. 205,206,218. 
lL  An.  fran., vols.  15, p. I I, note 8, 16, p.  9, note  6;  Pascaud, "  Le Droit de la 
Femme mariee aux Produits de son Travail," Rev. Pol. rt Park., vol. ix, p.  579. 
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Geneva  statute.13  Moreover, if  the wife  is  living  separate 
from  her  husband,  her  earnings  become  her  separate 
property  .l4 
Finally, it is worthy of  note that the draft code of  Switzer- 
land proposes to go further than any of  the existing legisla- 
tion~,  except  those  recognizing  separate  property  as  the 
statutory  system, by  providing  that  under  all  systems  of 
matrimonial  property the acquisitions  proceeding  from  the 
labor of  the wife shall be her separate property.I5 
4  19. Obligations of the  Commzdnity. 
(a) Grnrral Comrnuni<v. 
According  to  the  ideal  principle  at  the  basis  of  the 
system  of  general  community,  the  obligations  of  each  of 
the parties, whether incurred before or during the existence 
of  the  community, should become common.  This  theory, 
however, fails of  realization  to  an  even greater degree  than 
is true with respect  to the composition  of  the  community. 
Considerations  of  equity have led  to a  nlodification  of  the 
general principle. 
The legislation.  recognize  in  general, that  the  common 
property is liable for the obligations of  each of  the  married 
parties.'  This  liability,  however,  does  not  extend  to 
"There  is a general exemption of  such property from liability for the husband's 
debts.  Cal.,C.C.,§  168;  Nev.,G.S.,  1885,s 5";  N.M.,C.L.,  1897,s 1509; 
Wash., G. S., 1891,  1402;  cf:  recent acts of  Louisiana, ante,  3, note 18. 
"Ariz.,  K.  S.,  1887,  2101;  Cal.,  C. C.,  169;  Idaho, R. S.,  1887,  2502; 
Nev.,  G. S.,  1885,  512;  Wash., G. S.,  1891,  1403. 
l5 Switz.,  Vormtwurf, 217. 
France,  C.  C.,  1409;  Austria, B.  G.,  1235;  Norway, Stat.  June  29,  1888, 
arts. 17, 23;  Germany,  B.  G.,  1459;  Saxony, B.  G.,  1696;  Prussia, A. L. R., 
ii, I, $5 391, 394, but if  the ante-nuptial debts of  one party exceed  his contrihu- 
tion to the common  fund, the other  may move for separation of  property within 
two years after marriage, in which case only the individual property of the debtor 
can be held for such debts.  Zbtd., $S 392, 393. 76  PROPERTY RELA  TIONS OF MARRIED PAR  TIES  r  76 
obligations  arising from  post-nuptial  contracts entered  into 
by the wife  without  the  authorization  of  her  husband, ex- 
cept where she has  an  independent  right  of  administration 
over the common  property.'  The same  is  true  of  obliga- 
tions arising in connection with property which  is  excluded 
from the joint  ownership  and  subjected  to  the  administra- 
tion  of  the wife.3  Aside from these exceptions, the obliga- 
tions of  each of  the parties, whether arising out  of  contract 
or tort, and including the  expenses  of  judicial  proceedings, 
bind  the  community.'  This  is  true,  however,  only  as 
regards third parties. 
There is another departure from the principle of  ideal com- 
munity  in  the recognition  of  certain  obligations, which, as 
between  the parties  themselves, do  not  bind  the  common 
property, but  fall  to  the  charge  of  the  individual  debtor. 
These,  include  obligations  arising from the criminal acts of 
either  party,s  and  those  incurred  in  connection  with  the 
administration of  the separate property of  either party.6 
It must also be noted that even  as  regards  third  parties, 
the obligations that bind the  common  property are not true 
communal obligations.  As such, they would  bind not only 
'France,  C. C.,  1409, 1419;  Germany, B. G., 5 1460;  Prussia, A. L,  R., ii, I, 
389; Norway, Stat. June 29, 1888,  art. 17; Switz.,  J'orenhuurf, 249,250. 
Germany,  B.  G.,  $5 1461,  1462;  Prussia, A. L. R.,  li,  I,  389; Norway, Stat. 
June  29, 1888,  art. 17. 
In France the common property is  not liable for  fines imposed as a result of 
criminal acts of  the wife, C. C.,  1424. 
France, C.  C.,  1424;  Germany, B. G.,  5 1463;  Prussia, A. L. R.,  ii, I,  $5 385, 
390; Norway, extends to any obligation resulting from the wrongful act of  either 
party, Stat. June 29, 1888,  arts. 17,  18. 
France, C. C.,  1409,  1412,1437;  Germany,B. G.,  5 1463;  Prussia, A. L.  R.,  ii, 
I,  $5 385,  390; Norway, Stat. June 29, 1888, arts. 17, 18.  For  other particular 
provisions respecting compensation due  from  one  party to the other  for  obliga- 
tions satisfied out of  the common property,  see France, C. C., $5 1438,1439;  Ger- 
many, B. G.,  $5 1464-1467;  Norway, Stat. June 29, 1888,  art. 23; Switz.,  Vorent- 
wurf; 252. 
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the  common  property  but  each  party  individually.  The 
legislations agree, however, in exempting the  wife from any 
personal  liability  for  such  obligations,  except where  they 
fall to her charge as between  the parties  themselves.'  On 
the other hand, this  privilege  is  not  extended  to the  hus- 
band, who is generally personally responsible  for all  obliga- 
tions that bind the common pr~perty.~ 
The  explanation  of  these  departures  from  the  strict 
principle  of  community  is  to  be  found  partially  in  the 
exceptions  arising  respecting  the  composition  of  general 
community,9 but chiefly in the  extensive exclusive rights  of 
administration  which  are  enjoyed  by the  husband."  This 
power might  seriously endanger the interests  of  the  wife if 
she were to be held liable for the obligations which bind the 
common property. 
(b)  Communiq of  Afovables and Acquisitions. 
The obligations  of  the  common  association  under  the 
system  of  community  of  movables  and  acquisitions  are 
determined  by  the  same  general  rules  as  regulate  the 
obligations  of  the  general  community."  As between  the 
parties, also, the same principles are at the basis of  the com- 
pensation  and  contribution  due  for  the  individual  debts 
which are discharged out of  the common funds." 
Denkschrifi, p. 295; see, also,posl, 5 24. 
France, only for a moiety of those which are personal to his wife, C. C.,  1485; 
Germany, for obligations personal to hts wife such  liabil~ty  expires at the dissolu- 
tion of the community, B. G.,  5 1459;  Switz.,  Vormhuurf; 251. 
g Ante,  16. 
l0  Post, 5 20. 
'l  Germany, B.  G.,  5 1549; Finland,  Stat.  Apl.  15,  1889,  c. iv, arts.  2, 4; see 
notes, ante, (a). 
"  But in Finland, ante-nuptial obligations  are separate  as between the parties, 
and  the Norwegian  statute is  followed  in  applying the same rule to obligations 
arising from wrongful  acts, Stat. Apl.  15,  1889,  c. iv, arts. I,  5; cJ: Norway, Stat 
June 29,  18S8,  arts. 23, 17,  18. 78  PROPERTY REI.ATfONS  OF MARRIED PAR Y7ES  [78 
Finland  has  departed  from  the  general  rule  respecting 
personal liability for the debts  which  are  binding  upon  the 
common property.  It exempts the  husband as well as  the 
wife from liability for those debts of  the other party, which, 
as between  the  parties,  do  not  fall  to  the  charge  of  the 
community."  Where the  parties  have  obliged  themselves 
equally, or  where  the  wife, with  the  authorization  of  the 
husband, has  contracted  obligations  in  the  interest  of  the 
household,  both  parties  are bound;  and  if  the  individual 
property of  one  fails  to  liquidate  his  share, the deficiency 
will be satisfied out of the property of  the other."  In other 
respects the general rule is followed.16 
(c) Community of Acquisafions. 
The system of community of  acquisitions  does not  con- 
template  any general  blending  of  the  property interests of 
the married  parties.  The community does not embrace the 
capital stock of either party, and hence the principle that all 
obligations of  the parties should bind the common property 
does not obtain.  The common  property is  constituted  for 
the primary purpose of  sustaining the matrimonial charges, 
and is  liable  for the same whether they are incurred  by the 
husband or by the wife, if  within the sphere of  her adminis- 
tration.  As all of  the profits of  dotal  property fall  into the 
common mass, the latter must sustain the necessary charges 
binding upon such  property or connected with  its  adminis- 
tration or preser~ation.'~ 
With  respect  to  other  obligations,  the  principle  would 
seem to  require  that  they  shall  have  been created  for the 
benefit  of the common  property or connected  with  its  ad- 
llStat. Apl. 15,  1889,  c.iv, arts.  I, 5,  6. 
1'  fbzd., art. 2.  l5fb2d.,  art. 3. 
'SFrance, C. C.,  1498,  1409;  Spain, C. C.,  1408;  Italy, C.  C., 1434,  1435; Ger- 
many, B.  G.,  1531; Prussla, A.  L, R., ii, I, $8 407,  408; Saxony,B. G.,  1696; 
Switz.,  Vorenfwurl; 266,248,250;  Texas, R. S., 1895,  arts. 1201,  2970. 
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ministration, in  order to be  binding  upon  the  community. 
The  states  are  not  in  accord  upon  this  question.  The 
French  Civil  Code  and  the  legislations  that  have  felt  its 
influence, recognize the logical development of  the principle 
and  exclude  the  ante-nuptial  obligations  of  each  of  the 
parties."  A practical difficulty in the way of  the realization 
of  this principle is the fact  that the husband  is  the general 
administrator  of  the common  property and  can  freely  dis- 
pose  of  the  same.  He is  thereby enabled  to use the coin- 
man fund  in  the liquidation of  his ante-nuptial  obligations. 
It is  probable that most of  the legislations would  recognize 
the right of  the husband's ante-nuptial creditors  to seize the 
common property, at least after all of  the common creditors 
had  been satisfied, but  would  require the husband  to make 
compensation at the dissolution of  the community.  This is 
particularly  true among the German states, where  the  ten- 
dency  is  to  regard  the  husband,  who  is  the  head  of  the 
community, as occupying  much  the same position as under 
the system of  marital administration and usufruct.  Accord- 
ingly, the new German  code  makes  the  acquisitions  which 
constitute  the  common  property, responsible  for  the  ante- 
nuptial  debts of  the  husband, while  excluding liability  for 
such obligations of  the wife." 
So far as concerns post-nuptial  obligations, the rule ob- 
tains as under other systems of  community that the common 
l7 France, C. C.,  1498;  Italy, C.  C.,  1435;  Spain, if all communal obligations have 
been satisfied, the common property may be held for the ante-nuptial debts of either 
party, if the debtor has not sufficient ind~vidual  property, C. C., 1410;  La., C. C., 
240;;  cf: Austria, B.  G.,  1235; Texas, R.  S., 1Sg5,arts. 2973,2219;  Wash.,G.  S. 
1891,  S  1413. 
'5B.  G.,  1530; in  Prussia  (A.  L. R., ii, I,  S§ 407,  408), and  the  Swiss draft 
code ( Vorenl7uu?;l;  266,  248), the rule is the same  as under  general  colnmunity 
that the ante-nuptial obligations of  each  party bind  the community.  Cj: Ariz., 
R. S.,  1887,  2105; Cal., C.  C., 5  170; Idaho, l<.  S., 1887,  2503; Nev.,  G.  S., 
183;,  § 514. property  is  liable  for  the  debts and  obligations contracted 
by  the  husband  during  the existence of  the community." 
The case is different, however, as regards  post-nuptial  obli- 
gations incurred  by the wife.  The community  of  acquisi- 
tions is not  regularly liable for such obligations.  It is only 
in those cases where the wife  has undertaken  the same with 
the express or implied  authorization of  her husband or has 
an independent right  of communal administration  that her 
acts will  be binding upon the common property."  Accord- 
ingly, obligations arising  from her torts or unlawful  acts do 
not bind the common fund." 
Claims  for compensation by one party against the other 
on  account  of  personal  obligations  which  have  been  dis- 
charged out of  the common property, are determined in the 
same manner as under other systems of  community.  Inas- 
much, however, as the  ante-nuptial obligations  of  the wife 
are  not  supported  by  the  joint  property, the  husband  is 
required  to make compensation  where  his  obligations, aris- 
ing  before the  beginning  of  the  community, have  been 
liquidated out of  the common fund.'" 
The personal  liability for the common obligations  is like- 
wise regulated  by the same rules  as obtain for general com- 
munity."  The exemptions  of  the  wife  and  the  extensive 
Is France, C. C.,  1498, 1409;  Italy, C. C.,  1434, 1438;  Spain, C. C.,  1408;  Ger- 
many, B.  G., 5 1530;  Prussla, A. L. R.,  ii, i, 5 407;  Switz.,  Vorcnhurf, 249. 
20 France, C.  C.,  1498;  Spain, C. C.,  1408;  Italy, C. C.,  1436;  Germany, B. G., 
$8 1532-1534;  Pruss~a,  A.  L.  R.,  li,  I, 5 408;  Switz.,  VorrnCwurf, 250;  Ariz., 
R.  S., 1887, 5  2107;  Cal.,  C.  C., 5 167;  Idaho, R. S.,  1887, J  5860;  La., C.  C., 
2403,  1786;  Nev., G.  S.,  1885, J 538;  Texas, R.  S.,  1895, arts, 2973, 2219, 2970, 
2971. 
21 In Spain, this is true of  both parties, but if  the common debts have been sat- 
isfied,  the payment  of  such  obligations may be  demanded  out  of  the  common 
property if  the debtor has tnsufficient individual property, C. C.,  1410. 
z2 Germany, B.  G.,  5 1536;  Spain, C.  C.,  1410. 
2ldn~e  (a).  In Prussia, however, the  husband  as well  as the wife  does  not 
ncur any liability for the individual debts of  the other, A. L.  R., ii. I, 5 406;  rf; 
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liabilities of  the husband correspond to their respective fields 
of  administration, and  will  be  better  appreciated  after  the 
consideration of  such functions. 
5 20.  Administvation of  the Common Property. 
In  order  to carry  out the ideal  principle of  community, 
the administration of  the property should be entrusted to the 
married  parties jointly.  The management  and  disposition 
should represent the united action of  the two parties.  While 
this principle of  the "  gesammte Hand " has not failed to find 
advocates,'  the  legislations  have  modified  it  in  the  same 
degree  as  they have  abandoned other embodiments of  the 
broad cornmunal idea.  Thus, it is generally recognized that 
the husband has the administration of  the common property 
and  exercises  the  right  in  his own  name.Yhis power of 
administration  does  not,  however,  confer  an  unqualified 
power of  disposition over the common goods.  Considerations 
of  the  interests of  the  wife  have  led  to  limitations  upon 
certain  acts.  The principle  of  common  administration  is 
also retained  in  provisions  that the co-operation of the wife 
Ariz.,  R.  S.  1887, 5 2105;  Cal., C. C.,  5  J 170, 171;  Idaho, R. S.,  1887, 5s 2503, 
2504;  Nev., G.  S.,  1885, $5 514, 515;  Wash., G.  S.,  1891, 5 1413. 
'  Professor G~erke,  in his criticism of the first draft of the German Code, argues 
that if any single statutory system is to be created it should be general community, 
and  insists upon its establishment in accordance with the ideal principIe of  com- 
munity  (Gierke, Enlwurf; pp. 41 7,425 sq.) ;  cl;  Proelsz und Raschke, Die Frau 
rrn  nruen  diirge~/zclren Gesefzduclr,  p.  14.  In  the  first  drafts  of  the  Code 
Napoleon the system of  common administration was introduced, but this was later 
abandoned for the exclusive administration of  the husband, Guntzberger, pp. 39, 
40;  cl;  provisions of  Swiss draft code,post, note 6. 
'France,  C.  C.,  1421;  Italy, C. C.,  1438;  Spain, C. C.,  1412;  Germany, B.  G.. 
55 1443, 1519,1549;  Prussia, A. L. R., ii,  I, J 377,411;  Saxony, B.  G.,  1697; 
Norway, Stat.  June 29,  1888, art.  14;  Finland,  Stat. Apl.  15,  1889, c. ii, art. I; 
Basle, Stat. Mch.  10, 1884,  art.  2;  Switz.,  Yorcnfwurf;  245,  2665  Ariz.,  R.  S., 
1887, 5 2102;  Cal., C. C.,  J  172;  Idaho, R. S.,  1887. 5 2505;  La.,  C.  C.,  2404; 
Nev.,  G. S.,  1885, 5 504;  Texas,  R. S.,  1895, Art.  2968;  Wash.,  G.  S.,  $9 1399, 
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shall be necessary  to the validity of  particular dispositions. 
Finally,  an  independent  sphere  of  administration  of  the 
common property is given the married woman. 
The limitations upon the  power of  the husband rest upon 
considerations of  the  nature  of  the  act or the  character  of 
the  property to be  affected thereby.  His  donations  out of 
the common property, except where made in fulfilment of  a 
customary  duty,  are  dependent  upon  the  consent  of  the 
wife or are forbidden in general terms?  Under some legis- 
lation~,  acts whereby the husband  undertakes  to dispose of 
the whole  or a  general  part  of  the  common  property, are 
likewise  conditioned.'  The attitude of  legislations  towards 
real  property  has  generally led  to similar requirements for 
the  consent  of  the  wife, or the joint  action of  the  parties 
where common immovables are to be encumbered or alien- 
ated  .5 
'Italy,  C.  C.,  1438;  Spain, C.  C.,  1413-1415; Gemany, B.  G.,  Q 1446; Sor- 
way, where they exceed  one-tenth  in value of  the common goods, Stat. June 29, 
1888, art.  14; Switz.,  C'orenhuurf,  246;  in Prussia  the  husband has the general 
right  to make  donations, but  the wife  may contest  the  same  where  she would 
have such  right if  donation proceeded from  her, and is  entitled to compensation 
at the end of  the community, A. L. R., ii, I,  Q§ 380-383;  in France (C. C.,  1422), 
and Louisiana (C. C.,  2404), the prohlbition does not extend to particular dona- 
tions of  movables  except  th.  husband  has  retained  the usufruct  of  the  same. 
While most of  the American States have not limited  the husband's  power in this 
matter, except as regards testamentary dispositions, a California statute of  March 
31, 1891, makes all  donations of  common  properly dependent upon mitten con- 
sent of wife, Stat. and Amend.,  1891, p.  425. 
'Germany, B.  G.,  1444; Prussia, A. L. R., ii, I,  $8  378, 379;  Saxony, B. G., 
g 1698; Switz.,  Vorentwurf;  246.  The legislations that have followed the Code 
Napoleon do not distinguish between acts of  general and of partiGular disposition 
except as regards gifts (see preceding note), and in some cases dispositions affect- 
ing ~rnmovables.  It is  necessary to note that  the  general  community does not 
obtain as the statutory system in these legislations, and is absolutely prohibited in 
some (ante, Q 13,  note 18). 
5Germany, B.  G.,  1445; Prussia, A.  L. R., ii, I,  $S 378, 379;  Saxony,  E. G., 
Q 1698;  Norway, if brought by  wife into community, Stat. June 29, r888, art. 14; 
Fidand, Stat. Apl. 15, 1889,  c. ii, art. 2;  Casle, Stat. Mch. 10,1884,art.  4; Wash., 
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I  he draft  code  of  Switzerland preserves  the  principle of 
joint  action  to  a  greater degree  than  the  existing legisla- 
tion~. It  provides  that  all  dispositions  of  either  party, 
affecting  the  common  property,  which  exceed  acts  of 
ordinary  administration,  are  subject  to  the  consent  or 
joinder  of  the  other.  Such consent, however, will  be  pre- 
sumed  except where the third  party has knowledge  to  the 
contrary, or where  it is  clear  that  the  property belongs  to 
both parties jointly.@ 
In order to avoid the  damage  to the common  economic 
interests  which  may result  from disagreement between  the 
parties, it is  generally provided  that if  the wife  refuses  her 
consent,  or  for  other  reasons  it  cannot  be  obtained,  the 
court may supply the same if  the conditions of  the adminis- 
tration justify the act.l 
The married woman  is generally given  a limited  right of 
administration  of  the  common  property.  This  is  for  the 
most part restricted90 acts performed within  the  circle  of 
her domestic  activity;  or in an  independent  business which 
she  carries  on with  the  consent  of  her  husband.''  It  has 
been increased to the extent that she  has been given a con- 
G. S.,  1891,  §  1400.  The other legislations do not  limit the husband's  power in 
this respect  (c$  preceding  note), but, in  American  states, if  the  common  real 
estate is occupied as a homestead,  acts of disposit~on  of  the same will be subjecl 
to the joinder  of  the wife.  Seepost,  Q 41. 
@ Switz.,  Vorentwurf;  346;  c$  Prussia, A. L. R.,  ii,  I,  387. 
Germany, B.  G.,  1447;  Prussia,  A.  L.  R., ii,  I,  $5 387, 388;  Easle, Stat. 
Mch.  10,  1884, art. 4;  Swltz.,  Yorentwzrrf;  247, 199;  G Finland, Stat. Apl.  15, 
1889, c. ii, art. 2. 
a But in Norway any obligation  contracted  by  the wife  for  the  benefit  of  the 
community binds the common property, Stat. June 29, 1888, art. 17. 
Anfc,  8. 
1°Ante, 5 6;  France, C.  C.,  220;  Italy, C.  C.,  135;  Germany, B.  G.,  1452, 
1405;  Prussia, A.  L.  R.,  ii, I, Q§ 369, 335-337;  Basle, Stat.  Mch.  10, 1884, art. 
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trol  over  the  products  of  her  personal  industry."  With 
respect  to other  acts affecting  the  common  property, the 
wife  must, in  general, obtain  the  authorization of  her hus- 
band.ll  Where the circumstances do not justify a refusal of 
authorization by the  husband, his  consent may be  supplied 
by the  court.'"  The  French  code,  while  recognizing  the 
right of  the court to supply the consent  of  the husband  so 
as  to validate  an act  of  the  wife,"  does  not permit  her to 
bind  the common  property by such act.  Unless  the  hus- 
band  consents  to the  same it will  bind  only the  individual 
property of  the wife.I5 
The position of  the wife, as a partner in  the community, is 
recognized  by granting her the right of  temporary adminis- 
tration, in case of  the absence or disability of  the husband, 
where damage might result if  the matter were delayed.'-n 
systems  following  the  Code  Napolion,  however,  the  wife, 
even  in  such cases, must  receive  the authorization  of  the 
court in order to bind the common property." 
It is  the general rule  that  if  the husband  is under  guar- 
dianship,  he  will  be  represented  by  his  guardian  in  the 
administration  of  the common  property."  The  tendency, 
"  Ante, 8  18; in the Swiss draft code, such products, as well as the goods em- 
ployed  in  her  trade or  industry, are  the  separate  property of  the wife and are 
hence entirely excluded from common administration, Vorrnhurf, 217. 
lzThe  German  code  gives  the wife  the  sole  right  of  accepting or  rejecting 
donations, successions, etc., B. G., 5  1453; cf: aaho,  ibrd., $5 1449, 1454.  Ly acts 
in France and Louisiana giving wife  r~ght  of  administration over her deposits in 
savings hanks, ante, 8  3, notes 7, 18. 
'=Germany, B.  G., 5 1451;  Saxony,  B. G.,  8  1644;  C$  Switz.,  Vorentwurf; 
247; aflfc, 8  3- 
"C. C..  218, 219.  1s Ibid., 1426;  cf: Spain, C. C., 1416. 
I6Germany, B. G., 5  1450;  Prussia, A.  L.R., ii, I,  $8  202-204,327,389;  Saxony, 
B.  G.,  4  1643;  c-  Norway, Stat. June 29, 1888,  art. 17. 
17France,  C. C.,  124. 1427,  C. C. P., 863; Span, C.  C.,  188;  La., C.  C., 132. 
l8 Germany, B. G., 5  1457;  Motive, vol. iv, p. 364; but  see contra, Saxony, B. 
G.,  5 1700; Spain, C. C., 225, where the right of administration is accorded the wife. 
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however, is to give the wife the right and privilege of  being 
appointed guardian of  her husband.Ig 
Practical considerations have led to the substitution of  the 
individual for the common principle in  the administration of 
the joint  property.  The husband  is the head of  the family 
and, as such, is the natural administrator of  its economic in- 
terests.  The property of  the wife is safeguarded  by requir- 
ing  her consent  to certain acts, by constituting securities  in 
her favor,"' and  by enabling  her to take measures for with- 
drawing  the administration  from  the husband whenever his 
acts  imperil  her  interests.?]  The fact,  moreover,  that  the 
wife  incurs  no  personal  responsibility  for  such  acts  of 
administration  is  at once a cause and a result of  the exten- 
sive powers accorded to the husband.'" 
2 I. Administration of  the  DotaZ  and Separate Property. 
The dotal property of  the married parties is administered 
by the husband for their joint  benefit and profit.  The rules 
determining the scope and extent of  his powers are for  the 
most  part the  same as those  which  regulate  the  adminis- 
tration  of  dotal  property  under  the  system  of  marital 
administration and  usufruct, and will  be considered  in  con- 
nection with the discussion of  that system.' 
Separate property, under communal  systems, is governed 
by  the  general  regulations  obtaining  for  the  system  of 
separate property.' 
lgMOtrve,  vol.  iv,  p.  364; Spain, C.  C., 220, 230; La.,  Acts,  1894, No. 45; 
contra, France, C. C., 4qz. 
l@  Post, 8  22.  "  Post, $ 23, (b). 
Ante, 8  19, (a), note, 7. 
Post,  5 27.  The code of Germany and  the  draft code  of  Switzerland provide 
that dotal property, under communal systems, shall be administered according to 
the rules regulating the system of marital administration and usufmct.  Germany, 
B. G., $5 1439, 1525, 1550; Switz.,  Vorenhury, 266. 
'Ante,  5  15; Germany, B. G., $6 1444,  1526,  1549; Switz., Yorenfwurf,  264, 
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$ 22.  Protection of  thr  Wife's  Property. 
Under the general community, the property of the wife is 
united  with that of  the husband  to form a  common  mass. 
If  joint  administration  exists,  no  particular  provisions  are 
necessary  for  the  protection  of  the  wife's  interests.  But 
where the  husband  is  recognized  as having  an  individual 
right  of  administration,  the  rights  of  the  wife  may  be 
seriously  endangered.  Most  of  the  legislations  recognize 
this fact, and in according the  husband extensive  powers of 
disposition,  they  have  generally  furnished  the  wife  with 
certain means for the protection of  her property.  Particular 
qualifications upon the husband's power of  disposing of  the 
common property have been indicated,' and it has also been 
shown  that the  wife is  entirely relieved  from  any personal 
liability for the administration of  her husband.' 
The efficiency  of  the common  administration  would  be 
seriously  impaired  if  the  wife  could  hold  the  husband 
accountable  for  the  character  of  his  administration.  The 
communal idea  is  therefore  retained in  this  respect.  It is 
sometimes  recognized, however,  that  if  the  husband  dam- 
ages the common  property with the design  of  injuring the 
interests  of  the wife, he  may be  compelled  to  make  com- 
pensation.' 
The wife  has  not,  in  general,  any right  to a  particular 
security on  account of  her share in the  common  property.' 
l Ante, 5  20.  Ante, 5 19. 
Gennany, B.  G.,  5  1456;  cf. Pmssia, A. L. R.,  ii, I, 5383; Norway, Stat. June 
29, 1888,  art. 16. 
'In Basle City, the wife  in case  her  husband  becomes  bankrupt, has a  claim 
against the mass for the whole of  the fortune she has contrlbuted to the common 
property, and is carried  as a  privileged  creditor  for  the moiety of  such amount. 
Stat. Mch. 10,1884,  art. 11. Prior to this statute she had a privilege for the whole 
amount.  An. etran., vol.  14,  p. 545.  The federal  law of  bankruptcy  provides 
that the privileged  share cannot exceed  one-half.  Alexander, KonR.  G.,  p. 307. 
The draft Swiss code gives the wife  the right  to demand  security for the prop- 
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It appears reasonable that, in so far  as she possesses dotal 
property, it should be protected in the same degree as under 
other systems  of  matrimonial property.'  This is  the posi- 
tion  taken  by the  new  German  code.6  The title  of  dotal 
and  separate  property  may be  protected  against  the  pre- 
sumption that existing  goods belong to the husband, or are 
common in  character,? by means of  a properly authenticated 
inventory.' 
The code of  Saxony  g  gave the wife efficient  protection in 
her right  to demand that the administration of  the common 
property be given to her whenever her rights are endangered 
through  the  bad  administration  of  her  husband,  and  the 
same  is  true  in  Spain1° when  the  husband  is  declared  a 
spendthrift.  In  most  of  the  legislations,  however,  the 
married woman is limited  for the protection of  her interests 
in  the common property  to her right  to move for a dissolu 
tion of  the community." 
5  2 3. Dissolution  of  the Community.' 
(a) As  ike Legal Result of  Bankruptcy. 
Some of  the legislations recognize that the community is 
erty she contributes, but such claim will  justify the husband  in demanding a dis- 
solution of  the community.  Vorenhuuvj; 213, 199. 
post, $5 299  30, 34. 
'B.  G., $5  1439,  1525,  1550,  1391. 
'Ante, 5  5. 
qrance, C.  C.,  1499,  1504,  1510;  Italy, C.  C.,  1437;  Spain, C.  C., 1407;  Ger- 
many,  B. G.,  $ 1528;  Prussia, A.  L. R.,  ii,  I,  $5  374-376,397-401;  Norway, Stat. 
June 29, 1888,  art.  6; Finland,  Stat. Mch.  10,  1889,  c.  iii,  art.  4; Ariz.,  R. S., 
1887,  $1  2611-2616;  Cal., C. C.,  $5  165-166;  Idaho,  R. S., 1887,  $5  2500,  2501; 
La.,  C.C., 2405;  Nev.,G.  S., 1885,  $5  501-503;  Texas, R.  S., 1895,  arts. 4654-4659. 
B. G.,  $ 1700.  'O  C. C.,  225.  H Post, $23,  (b). 
The American legislations, with the exception of  Louisiana, do not recognize a 
dissolution  of  the community except as a result of  a dissolution of  the marriage, 
but a partial separation of  property results whenever the wife  is  living  separate 
from her husband.  See ante, 5 18,  note 14. 88  PROPERTY RELR TIONS 03 MARRIED PAR TIES  [g8 
dissolved  by operation of  law, as a result of  the opening of 
bankruptcy proceedings over the property of  either party.' 
This rule has been accepted, for the most part, only in those 
states where  the  bulk  of  the  wife's  property  is  dotal.  In 
general community or community of  movables and  acquisi- 
tions  the  common  property  constitutes  the major  portion, 
and  a  rule  by which  the dissolution of  the community fol- 
lowed  as  the  necessary  legal  result  of  the  bankruptcy of 
either party, would  involve a serious breach in the nature of 
the matrimonial property relations. 
(b)  Upon  Demand of  One of  the Parties. 
While most of  the legislations do not accept the principle 
that bankruptcy dissolves the community of  property, there 
is general agreement in recognizing  the  right  to move for a 
dissolution  in  cases  of  bankruptcy or insolvency, or when- 
ever  the irregular  administration or excessive obligations of 
one party are such as to endanger the rights of  the other in 
the common property.3 
An  important  ground  for  demanding  the dissolution  of 
the community, which has been introduced in recent legisla- 
tion, is the failure of  the  husband  to fulfil  his obligation to 
furnish support for his wife and children.4 
Austria, B.  G.,  1262; Basle, Stat. Mch. 10, 1884, arts. I, 12; Switzerland, if 
claims of  the creditors are not  satisfied,  Vorentwurf, 197;  Germany, limited  to 
the bankruptcy of  the husband,and obtains only under community of  acquisitions. 
B. G.,  1543. 
S Upon demand of  either party : Germany, B.  G., $5 1468, 1469, 1542;  Prussla, 
A.  L.  R.,  ii, I,  $421; Finland, Stat.  Apl.  15, 1889, c.  v.;  Switz.,  Vorentwurf; 
197, 198; upon  demand  of  the wife:  France,  C.  C.,  1443; Italy, C.  C.,  1442; 
Norway, Stat. June 29, 1888,  art. 38;  Basle, Stat. Mch. 10,1884, art.40;  La., C. C., 
2425;  for rule in Saxony (B.  G.,  5 1700), and  Spain (C. C.,  225), see ante,  22. 
'Germany,  B.  G.,  1468, 1542; Geneva, Stat. Nov.  7, 1894,  art. 5 (An.  Ptran., 
vol. 24, p.  635), extending provisions of  art. 1443 of  the French Civil Code, which 
is deficient  in  this respect;  Switz.,  Vorenhuurf, 198;  Norway,  if  husband  has 
abandoned  wife, Stat.  June  29,  1888, art. 34;  cj: ante,  18, notes  11, 12,  pro- 
posed statute in France  according wife, in case  of  misconduct of  her husband, a 
partial separation of property so far as regards her earnings. 
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Among the other  grounds recognized  as justifying  a de- 
mand  for  the dissolution of  common property relations are 
the  placing of  the  husband  under  guardianship,s his disap- 
pearance  or his disposition of  matters without the necessary 
consent of  the wife.7 
(c)  By  Mutual Agreement. 
In general, all  systems, except those  that prohibit  post- 
nuptial marriage contracts, permit the community to be dis- 
solved as a result of  agreement between the parties.  As re- 
gards innocent  third  parties, particular  formalities must be 
observed,  but  as  between  the  parties,  the  dissolution  is 
effective from the conclusion of  the agreement.8 
(d)  By  Divorce or Judicial  Separation of  the Parties. 
The dissolution  of  the  marriage by decree  of  divorce or 
nullity regularly produces  a  separation  of  the property in- 
terests  of  the  parties.9  The  same effect  generally  results 
from a judicial  separation of  the parties which  does  not in- 
volve  a  dissolution  of  the  matrimonial  relation.lo  Under 
some  of  the  systems,  however,  such  separation  does  not 
Germany, in case of community of  acquisitions, B. G., $5 1542, 1418; in other 
systems  of community, only when he  is  placed  under  guardianship as a  spend- 
thrift, ibid., §§ 1468, 1549. 
'Italy,  C.  C., 1441;  Spain,  C.  C.,  1433;  Germany, in  case  of  community  of 
acquisitions, B.  G., $8 1542, 1418; Norway,  Stat. June  29, 1888, art. 34. 
Germany, B.  G.,  $5 1468, 1542. 
Germany,  B.  G.,  8 1432; Saxony,  B.  G.,  1691; Austria, B.  G.,  $8 1217, 
1263; Norway, Stat. June  29, 1888, art.  34;  Switz.,  Vormtwurf; 195; for par- 
ticular  modifications in  Prussia (A.  L.  R.,  ii,  I, §§ 354 scq., 412 seq.), see ante, 
5  12, note 7. 
gFrance, C. C.,  1441;  Spain, C.  C.,  72;  Germany, B.  G.,  1564  sq.; Prussia, 
A. L. R., ii, I, 5 732;  Saxony, B.  G.,  S$ 1706,1712,1740; Austria, B. G.,  1266; 
Basle, Stat. Mch. 10, 1884, arts. 23, 26;  Switz., Vorenhu~;t;  173; Finland, Stat. 
Apl.  15, 1889, c. v, art. 19; La., C. C.,  159. 
l0France, C.  C.,  1441; Spain, C.  C.,  73;  Italy, C.  C.,  1441; Germany, B.  G., 
5  1586;  Saxony, if for life, B. G.,  5 1706;  La.,  C.  C.,  155. go  PROPERTY RELATIONS  OF MARRIED PARTIES  [go 
carry with  it  a dissolution  of  the community, but only the 
right to demand the same.'' 
(e)  As a ResuN  of  the  Death of  One of  the  Partits. 
The dissolution  of  the  marriage  by the  death of  either 
party has generally the effect of  dissolving the matrimonial 
property relationships.  This rule is subject to an exception 
in  the case of  general  community, where  issue of  the mar- 
riage  exists.  In  such event  the  community  is  continued 
(  fortgestzte  Giitergemeinscka  ft ;  communauth prolonghe)  be- 
tween  the  surviving  married  party  and  the  common  chil- 
dren.  This rule, which  had  its origin among the Westpha- 
lian  Saxons,"  seems  to be the logical  development of  the 
strict principle of  the general community.  It has not, how- 
ever, been  generally  accepted  in  modern  legislations.'3  It 
obtains  in  localities  in  Germany  and  Switzerland, and  the 
new code of Germany as well  as the  Swiss draft code have 
recognized  the  principle.  In the former, such  community 
arises  by operation of law, but  may be  renounced  by the 
surviving married party,'4 while  in  the latter the system must 
be the result  of  agreement between  the survivor  and  the 
' 
common children.'S 
In  general, the  continued  community  is  subject  to  the 
same regulations as the  general community of  property be- 
tween  the  married  parties.  The  survivor  possesses  the 
'l Saxony, if separation is not to continue during life, B. G.,  5 I  706; Austria, the 
innocent party  may resist such demand, B. G., 5 1264;  Basle, Stat. Mch. 10,1884, 
art. 22; Switzerland, if  separation is to continue for  one year or  longer,  Vorrnt- 
Wur/,  174. 
la Heusler, Inst., vol. ii, $5 151,  162. 
l3  France,  C.  C.,  1441  ;  Prussia, A. L.  R,, ii, I,  $5 634-636; Saxony, B. G., 
5 1702;  Austria,  B. G., 5 1234;  Basle, Stat. Mch.  10,  1884,  art.  13;  a  right  of 
usufruct is granted survivor in portions falling by succession to  share of  common 
minor children, ibid., art. 19. 
Germany, B. G., $5 1483,  1484. 
l5 Switz.,  VorrnCwurf; 256. 
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rights  and  obligations  of  the husband,  while  the  common 
children occupy the legal  position of  the wife.16  The indi- 
vidual property owned by the common children does not fall 
into the common mass.'7  In Germany, all property acquired 
by such  children  is  likewise  excluded, but  the  Swiss draft 
code regards  as their  separate property only such  acquisi- 
tions as come to  them  by gratuitous title.  The dissolution 
of  the community may be  brought  about  by the  act of  the 
survivor at any time.Is  It results  by  operation of  law  in 
case  of  the remarriage  or death  of  such  survivor,'9  and  it 
may be demanded  by the children  under  the same  general 
conditions which entitle the wife to move for a separation of 
property.20 
5  24. Efects of  the Dissolution of  the  Community. 
The dissolution  of  the  community  leads  regularly  to  a 
separation of  property between  the married  parties or their 
representatives.  The  liquidation  of  the  community  pro- 
ceeds in  accordance with  the  principles determining rights 
and  obligations  under  the  particular  communal  system. 
The common obligations  must  be satisfied out of  the joint 
property.  If  the  latter  does  not  suffice,  the  husband  is 
personally bound for all such obligations.' 
The privilege  which  the  wife  enjoys  of  being  relieved 
from  responsibility  for  all  common  debts,  except  those 
which as between  husband and wife fall to her charge,'  is not 
l6 Germany, B. G.,  5 1487;  Switz., Vormtwurf, 257, 258. 
"Germany, B. G., 5 1485;  Switz.,  Vorenfwurf,  257. 
ls Germany, B. G., Q  1492  : Switz., Vorentwurf, 259. 
'"ermany,  B. G., $5 1493, 1494; Switz., and also in case of  bankruptcy, Vw- 
rntwu%  260. 
"'Germany, B. G.,  4  1495; cf; Switz., Vorenfwurf,  259. 
'For particular exceptions in France and Germany, see ante, 5 rg, note 8. 
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always an absolute exemption.  She is  generally accorded 
the right of obtaining such exemption by means of  a renun- 
ciation or inventory, or both.  According to the former, she 
relieves herself  from all  liability by renouncing her share in 
the common property.3  The second method gives the wife 
or her representatives the benefit of  inventory which is gen- 
erally accorded  to  the  heirs  of  a  succession.  She is  per- 
mitted, in accepting  the community, to make  an  inventory 
of  the same, and in such case will be bound for the debts, as 
regards creditors, as well  as  the  husband or his representa- 
tives, only to the extent of  the common property which she 
receives.4 
The German  code  gives  the wife  an absolute exemption 
from personal liability for  the obligations resulting from the 
husband's  administration of  the community, and  hence the 
benefit of  renunciation or inventory is unnecessary.5  She  will 
be responsible, to the extent of  the common property which 
she receives, for such common debts as remain unsatisfied  at 
the time the separation of  property is made.6  The husband, 
however, is  subject to  a warranty that the wife will  not be 
called  upon to liquidate  obligations which, as  between  the 
parties, fall to his charge or to that of  the common property, 
and the wife is under similar obligation towards her husband 
respecting debts falling to her charge.' 
After the liquidation of  the common obligations, the prop- 
s France, C.  C.,  1453  seq., 1492 srq.;  Italy, C.  C., 1444; Switz.,  Vorrnt'Wurj; 
254;  La., C.C., 2410, 2411. 
'  France, C. C., 1483;  Italy,  C.  C., 1444;  Prussia, privilege  of  inventory exists 
for either party, A. L.  R., ii,  I,  5 661, i, g,  5 418 srq.;  Swltz., Vorc?ttwurf; 254; 
La-, C. C.,  2413,2414,2419,2423- 
5B. G., 5 1443;  Cf: Finland, Stat. Apl. 15,1889,~.  IV,  arts. 2, 3;  Basle, Stat. Mch. 
10, 1884, art. 6; references to American statutes, ante, 5 19,  note 23. 
B. G., 5 1480. 
7 Ibid.,  1481; 6  Norway, Stat. June 29,1888, art. 37. 
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erty is divided  between  the parties or their  representative^.^ 
Such amounts as have  been  paid  out of  the common  mass 
to  satisfy  debts  which  are  personal  to  either  party  are 
counted  in  the  share of  such  party, and  he is  entitled  to 
credit for such sums as have been paid  out of  his individual 
goods for the benefit of  the common property. 
Inasmuch  as the common  mass  may  contain  articles  of 
peculiar  personal value  to one of the parties, it is generally 
provided that such objects may be selected by the party be- 
fore division, the value of  the same being deducted from  his 
share.9 
If  the conjugal  association  is not dissolved or suspended, 
the  matrimonial  property  relations  for  the  future will  be 
regulated  by  the  system  of  separate  property.I0  On  the 
other hand, where  the community ceases  as a result of  the 
dissolution  of  the  marriage,  there is  no further  question 
of  matrimonial  property  rights,  and  the  parties  or  their 
representatives  take  their  shares  as  strangers,  subject  to 
such particular qualifications as may be connected with the 
circumstances  of  the  dissolution.  Thus, special  provisions 
exist for the case where the marriage is dissolved  by decree 
of  divorce.  Privileges  are generally accorded  the innocent 
party over and above the right  to receive support from the 
guilty party." 
France, C.  C., 1474; Spain,C.C., 1424,1426;  Germany, B. G., $5 1476, 1546, 
1549;  Prussia, A. L. R., ii, I,  $5 637,638;  Saxony, B. G., 5 1702; Austria,  B.  G., 
5 1234; Finland, Stat.Apl.15, 1889,  c. i. art. zscq.;  Switz., Vorenhurj; 253; La., 
C.  C., 2406;  for particular rule in some  of  the  Swiss  cantons, see post, notes. 13, 
15~16. 
Germany, B. G., 5 1477;  Prussia, without deduction from share in community, 
A. L. K., ii, I,  5 640,641 ;  Switz., Yorentwurf; 255. 
l0Germany,B. G., $1470;  Prussia,A. L. R., ii,  I, $§3gz, 410; France. C. C., 
1443  srq.; Switz.,  Yorentzuurf;  197 srq. 
l1 Germany, the right to demand that each shall receive the value of all the prop- 
erty that he brought Into the common mass, any deficiency to be equally sustained 94  PROPERTY  RELATIONS  OF MARRIED PAX TIES  [g4 
When  the  conjugal  relation  is  dissolved  by the death of 
one of  the parties, the survivor takes one share of  the com- 
mon  property and  the  succession  of  the  deceased  receives 
the  other.'"  In some  cases,  however,  rights  of  succession 
come in combination with pure matrimonial rights and affect 
the  equality  of  the  shares.  Thus, in  the canton  of  Basle 
City, the survivor takes two-thirds and the heirs of  the dece- 
dent receive one-third of  the common  property.I3  The ex- 
cess taken by the survivor is in the nature of  a legal portion 
in  the succession of  the decedent.l4  Under the law existing 
before  the  enactment  of  the  statute of  1884, the  husband 
received  two-thirds and  the wife one-third.15  This rule still 
obtains  in  some  of  the  Swiss  cant0ns.1~ In  some  of  the 
American  states,  the  surviving  husband  is  entitled  to  the 
entire common property, while the surviving wife takes only 
a  moiety.17  The greater  number  of  legislations, however, 
support the principle of  division into equal parts, leaving the 
survivor to his  general rights  of  succession in the estate  of 
the decedent.ls 
by each party, B. G., 9 1478; Prussia, A.  L.  R.,ii, I, $8  755 sq.,  812  sq.; Basle, 
Stat. Mch. 10, 1884, art. 2;seq.;  Switz.,  Yorcnhuurf,  170; for rule  in American 
community systems, cf:  references, posf,  43, notes 13, 14. 
l2  France, C.  C., 1474; Germany, B. G.,  1482;  Prussia, A. L. R., ii, I, $8  637, 
638;  Saxony, B. G., $1702; Austria, B. G., 5 1234;  Switz., Vormfwurj; 253. 
lj Stat. Mch  10,1884,  art. 13. 
l4  Post, 9 47. 
l" Lardy,LPgtsZafzons Suzssts, p. 51. 
l6 See  zhd.,  chart  in  appendix, showing  att~tude  of  cantons  respecting this 
matter. 
lTCal.,C. C.,§§ 1401,1402; Idaho, R.S., 1887, $8  5712, 5713; Nev., G.S., 1885, 
$9 508, 509;  for  other  particular  regulations  concerning succession to common 
property, see  Prussia, A. L. R., ii,  I,  $ 638 seq.;  Ariz., R. S., 1887,$$ 1100,  1467; 
Cal., C. C.,  5 1265; Idaho, R.  S., 1887, $8  3073,  5447:  Texas, R.  S.,  1895, art. 
1696; Wash., G.  S., 1861,s  1481. 
18Posf, 5 45 seq. 
CHAPTER IV. 
SYSTEMS  OF 1NL)IVIDUAL  PROPERTY. 
DIVISION  I. 
EXCLUSIVE  RIGHTS  OF  THE  HUSBAND. 
25. In  Roman  and in  Teutonic Law. 
The family relations in early Roman and in early Teutonic 
law were characterized  by the element of  paternal headship 
and  authority.  This was  true  as well  of  the relation  be- 
tween husband and wife as of  that between parent and child. 
The Roman law was primarily influenced  by the conception 
of  the  power and  right of  the man, while  the Teutonic  law 
emphasized  the  idea of  guardianship in  the  position of  the 
husband  and  father.  In the  Roman fnanus marriage, the 
wife, in the eyes of  the law, occupied the position of  a slave. 
This form of  marriage may be regarded as  a  legal  method 
of transferring ownership in  the person and  property of  the 
woman.  The woman occupied essentially the same legal re- 
lation toward  her  husband  that she had  formerly held with 
respect  to  her  father  or Pater  familias.  The  latter  was 
master of  the persons  and  goods of his  household, so that 
there could arise no questions of  personal or property rights 
between  him  and  the  members of  his  family.  As regards 
third  parties, the  relations would  be  determined  as  in  the 
case of  master  and  slave.  The property which the woman 
held or which was constituted for her benefit, passed into the 
poscession or ownership of her husband.  He became liable 
on her contracts in the same degree as if  the obligations had 
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been contracted by his child or slave, and the same was true 
of  his  responsibility for her tortious  acts.'  In this system 
there were no proper matrimonial relations.  The husband's 
rights were  paternal  rather  than  marital, and, so far as  the 
law was concerned, paternal rights were as unlimited as those 
of  a dominus. 
This rigorous system  received  modifications  at an early 
period.  The extreme legal  powers  of  the  husband, which 
resulted from  his  manus, were  not  necessarily embodied  in 
actual conditions.  With  the development of  the free  mar- 
riage, where  mayzus  maviti  was  excluded, the  property  as 
well  as  the  personal  rights of  the wife came  to  be recog- 
nized.  The  woman in contracting marriage did not lose her 
position  in  her  agnatic  family, and  hence did  not  suffer  a 
diminution in  her  status.  The exclusive  property rights of 
the husband disappeared with the loss of  his absolute powers 
over the person of his wife.  The marriage, as such, did not 
affect  the  property  of  the woman.  This did  not  exclude 
property  relations  between  husband  and  wife.  Strictly 
speaking, such relations were  now for  the first  time  recog- 
nized.  They resulted, however, not directly from  the estab- 
lishment of  the  conjugal relation, but  from  specific  acts of 
the parties or of  persons acting in their behalf.' 
In Teutonic law  the domination of  the man was  not  im- 
mediately  connected with  conceptions of  power  and  force. 
The element of  guardianship was  the characteristic  feature. 
Primitive law, however, emphasized the rights instead of  the 
duties of  the guardian.  By the marriage, the woman, with 
her  property, passed  from  the control of  her  father to that 
of her  husband.  Whether  the latter  became  the owner of 
such property is a disputed question.3  Where the Raubelic 
1 Sohm, Inst., $9 93,94;  Muirhead, Roman Law, p.  27. 
Sohm, Inst.,  $88  93, 94. 
Heusler, Inst., v6l. ii, pp. 294 sq., 303 sq.; Schrcder, Lehvbuch, p. 304, n. 196.. 
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was the typical form of  marriage, there could be no question 
of  legal  property  relations  between  the  parties.  This was 
not necessarily true of  the  Brautkauf,  and it is clear that at 
an early period certain  property was  recognized  as belong- 
ing to the wife.4  The husband, as  the guardian of  the wife, 
continued to administer such property. 
The development was influenced  by local conditions, as a 
result of  which distinct types appeared.  Upon one side, the 
Germanic conception of  society or partnership found expres- 
sion  in  various  forms  of  con~munity  of  property.  On  the 
other  hand, the principle  that the wife or some one  acting 
for her should make a contribution  to support the common 
expenses was embodied in the systems of  marital usufruct. 
The English common law represents a type of  the system 
of  exclusive rights of  the husband, though particular modifica- 
tions, in derogation of  the general principle, are to be noted.5 
The husband  is entitled  to  the sole administration of  all of 
the wife's property.  All of  the personal property which  he 
brings into  his possession,  becomes  his  property.  For the 
real  property  the  principle  of  marital  administration  and 
usufruct obtains.  The husband cannot affect the substance 
of  such property, but he is entitled to the income and profits 
and  is  not  required  to account  for  the same.  In addition, 
the  husband  has the right  to his wife's  services  and  to  all 
that she may acquire  by her personal  activity.  Connected 
with  these extensive privileges  is  his  liability for  the wife's 
obligations, whether arising in  contract or in tort.6 
'The wife brings with  her  a species of  dowry  (Gevnde); the husband makes 
certain gifts to the wife, e.g., the dos, which Tacitus describes, Morgengabr, etc. 
It does not follow that these arose as limitations upon the absolute powers  of 
the husband.  Quite the converse may have been true.  They may be the renlalns 
of  a system which accorded the wife greater rights,of  which a later period deprived 
her;  cf:  Pol. 61  Mait.,  H&.,  vol. ii, pp. 400, 401. 
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The dower  of  the wife  and  the  curtesy  of  the husband 
were distinguishing features of  the common law system.  Uy 
the beginning  of  the thirteenth  century, the  principle  was 
established  that  a widow is  entitled  to an estate  for  lrfe in 
one-third  of  all  the  lands  of  whi~h  the  husband  is  seized 
of  an estate of inheritance during the marriage.  hus- 
band could not limit this privilege of  the wife, and it was not 
subject to the claims of  his  creditors.  While  primarily in- 
tended as a  provision  for the widow, it was something more 
than a mere right  of succession.  The wife acquired  a fcrm 
of  proprietary right in her husband's lands.  Whilc she could 
not make good  her claims during the  marriage, they would 
attach so as to enable her, upon the death of  her husband, to 
follow lands which  he may have  alienated  during the mar- 
riage,  without  her  consent,  given  in  the  formal  manner 
required.7 
The husband, upon the birth of  issue of  the marriage, be- 
came entitled  to a tenancy by the curtesy, for  his life, in  all 
of  the lands of  which  the wife was  seized during coverture. 
The  effect of  the fulfillment of  the condition was to extend the 
husband's interest in the wife's lands from an estate for their 
joint  lives  to an estate  for his  life.8  It is  somewhat analo- 
gous  to the  continued  community, where  the matrimonial 
property relations  are practically unaffected  by the dissolg- 
tiot? of the marriage so  long  as one of  the  parties survives. 
In  effect,  the husband's  guardianship  of  the  matrimonial 
property was extended so as to apply, during his life, to the 
share  falling to the issue of  the marriage.  It is  necessaly 
to note, however, that while  the  birth of  such  issue was es- 
sential to the extension of  such guardianship, the latter con- 
tinued, notwithstanding the fact that no issue survived at the 
death of  his wife. 
'Ibtd.,  p. 418 seq.  g Ibtd., p. 41 2 seq. 
991  S 1's TEMS 0  F Zi\'Df  VID  LTAL PR OPEK T  Y 
99 
These  are the fundamental  features of  the common  law 
matrimonial property system which obtained in England and 
was  carried  over  into  the  legal  systems  of  most  of  the 
American states.  It was adapted to a rude state of  society, 
where  personal  property  was  of  little  consequence.  With 
the increasing importance of  the latter, the hardships of  the 
system  made  themselves  man~fest,  and  remedial  measures 
became necessary.9 
DIVISION  11. 
MARITAL AD\II>IS~RATIOU  AND USUFRUCT. 
$  26.  Ge7zevaL C/la~,act~r  of the  I.t7zYe's Property. 
The general principle at the basis of the system of  marital 
administration and  usufruct  is  that, as a result  of  the mar- 
riage,  the  property  which  the woman  possesses  and  that 
which  she  afterwards acquires  pass  into  the administration 
of  the husband, who  is  entitled  to  the use and p~oceeds  of 
the same.  The  title  to sucll property remains  in  the wife.1 
Thus,  by  operation  of  law,  the  property  of  the  married 
woman becomes dotal in character. 
An except~on  to the general  rule arises in the recognition 
that  certain  kinds  of  property are excluded  from  the hus- 
band's  control  and  enjoyment,  and  are  reserved  for  the 
administration and usufruct  of  the wife.  The character  of 
the system and  the position of  the wife with respect to  her 
See PGS~,  37. 
l Germany, B. G., 5  1363, Prussia, A. L. R..  ~i,  I,  zoo;  Saxony, B. G,  1655; 
France,  C.C.,  1529 sq.; Glaris, L  B.,  ii, art. 172;  Lucerne, Stat. Nov. 20,  1880, 
art. 6; Zurich, P. R. G., 5s 5Sg,593; Sw~tz.,  Vore~ztr~ulf;  226 seq.  In a fe\v of  the 
Swiss legislations the huahand become5 owner of the wlfe's  fortune, and IS respon- 
slble for ~ts  value (Lardy, Lspslatzons Suzsses, pp. 27,65).  In many cantons h~s 
unl~m~ted  powers of disposition produce  pract~cally  the same result (cfiposf,  27, 
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property  will  be  affected  by  the extent  of  the  separate' 
property which obtains. 
Separate  property  may  arise  as a result  of contract be- 
tween  the  parties,3  by  the  act  of  a  third  party,  where 
property accrues to the wife by donation or succession, and 
the  donor  or  testator  provides  that it  shall  become  her 
separate property,4 or by operation of  law.  While the two 
former sources may  lead  to a  wide  extension  of  separate 
property, it is the last which is of  chief importance in deter- 
mining the general property rights of  married women under 
any particular system. 
The legislations, in general, accord the character of statu- 
tory separate property to all  things which  are  intended  for 
the soleFpersona1 use of  the wife.5  According  to  the  three 
preliminary drafts of  the code of  Germany such objects were 
dotal  property  (Ekegut), but  were  excluded  from  the 
marital  usufrucL6  Thus,  the  husband  could  control  the 
disposition  of  such  property.7  In  the  code,  as  fiirally 
adopted,  this  position  was  rejected.  The  articles  are  in- 
'  In the consideration of  systems of  individual property the terms "  dotal " and 
M separate "  property are used in the same sense as that previously indicated under 
systems of community.  Under individual systems, however, the proceeds of  dotal 
property go to the husband alone.  Cf. ante, $15. 
SGermany, B. G.,  Q  1368; Prussia, A. L. R., ii, I,  $ 208; Saxony, B. G.,  QQ 1691, 
1693;  France, C  C., 1387; Lucerne, but  cannot exceed one-third of  the fortune 
of  the wife, Stat. Nov. 26, 1880, art.  11; Zurich, P.  R. G., Q 597;  Switz.,  Ibrmt- 
wurf,  216;  cf.  qnfr,  Q 12. 
'Germany,B.G,,Q  1369; Prussia, A.  L. R., ii, I,  $ 214; Saxony, B. G.,$ 1693; 
France,  C.  C.,  1401;  Lucerne, Stat. Nov.  26,  1880, art.  I I; Uaris, L. B., ii, art. 
174; Ziirich, P. R. G.,  Q 597;  Switz.,  Vorrnfwu?jf;  216. 
KGermany, B. G., Q 1366;  Prussia,X. L. R., ii, I,  Q 206;  Saxony. B. G.,  $ 1671; 
Lucerne, Stat. Nov.  26,1880, art. I I ; Glaris, L. B.,  ii, art. 1 74;  Z'irich, P.  R  G., 
g 597;  Switz., Vormfwurf; 217. 
'In  Saxony the husband could prevent the wife from making any other than the 
intended use of such objects.  B. C., $  1671. 
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cluded  in  the  statutory separate  property  of  the  married 
woman, and, as such, are subject  to  the exclusive adminis- 
tration  as well  as the  enjoyment  of  the  wife.8  Statutory 
reserved  property also includes  the things accruing  from or 
taken  in  exchange  or  as  compensation  for  separate  pro- 
perty? 
Under individual systems, the principle  that  the husband 
has an exclusive  right  to the services, and  hence  to all  of 
the personal acquisitions of  his wife, is apt to entail greater 
hardships than it produces in systems recognizing a commu- 
nity of  property interests.  Under a strict application of  the 
principle, all  that the wife  acquires  by  her  industry  would 
become the husband's sole property.  The legislations have, 
therefore, generally modified  the rule so as to secure to the 
wife an interest in the products of  her personal activity.  In 
the more recent  legislations this has been accomplished  by 
giving the character of  statutory separate  property  to that 
which is the result of  her labor or is acquired  in a business 
which she carries on independently of  her  husband.''  The 
older  codes,  however,  regard  such  property  as  dotal 
property,  the  capital  of  which  is  preserved  for  the  wife, 
while the husband has the use of  the same." 
'B.  G., $8 1366, 1371,1427seq. 
Germany, B.  G.,  Q 1370;  Prussia, A. L. R., li, I, 5 217;  Saxony, B. G.,  Q 1693; 
Lucerne, Stat. Nov. 26,1880, art. 12. 
l0 Germany, B. G.,  $ 1367; Lucerne, Stat. Nov. 26,1880, art.  I I ;  Zurich, limited 
to that which she acquires in an independent occupation or industry, but includes 
capital as well as profits so long as such  activity is continued, P.  R. G.,  Q  621,622; 
Switzerland, all property employed in business become separate property, Vorenf- 
wurj, 217. 
"  Prussia, A.  L. R., ii, I,  Q 220;  if  business  is transacted entirely with her sepa- 
rate property, the income will have  the same character, ibid., 5 219;  Saxony, B. 
G., $ 1668.  In many of  the Swiss cantons the husband  becomes  owner  of  the 
property which  the wife acquires  by  her personal  industry : Glarls, L. B., ii, art. 
173;  Ziirich, so far as it is not acquired  in an independent occupation, P. R. G., 
5 593; rf;  Lardy, LPgisLations Suzsses, pp. 8,17,27,65, 175,204, 277, 299,303,347. I 02  PROPERTY RELA TIONS OF MARRIED PARTIES  [  102 
2 7. Administration of  the  Wife's Property. 
The husband  is  the  administrator of  the  dotal  or matri- 
monial property.  He is entitled to take possession of  it and 
to exercise all functions  connected with  its  ordinary admin- 
istration.  To this extent, there is  general agreement among 
the codes.  Marked divergence appears, however, respecting 
the  further  extension  of  his  powers, and  particularly  with 
reference to his right to dispose  of  the  property.  Many of 
the Swiss cantons emphasize the exclusive rights of  the hus- 
band.  In  sonie  cases  he  becomes  owner  of  the  wife's 
property subject  to  the  obligation to return  its value.'  In 
other instances he is  given an absolute right of  disposing of 
all of  the dotal property subject to the same liability.'  'l he 
wife  or  her  representatives  will  receive  the  value  of  the 
property which  she  has b~ought  into the  marriage without 
any deduction for the  losses, or any claim to a  share in the 
gains which have a~crued.~ 
The German  systems and  the Swiss draft  code, however, 
start with the general principle that the wife's property shall 
be kept intact, and that the husband shall not dispose of  the 
substance of  the same nor bind it in any way without the con- 
sent of  the wife.-he  rule is  similar to that which governs 
the relations between the owner and usufructuary in an ordi- 
nary  usufruct.  This  principle,  however,  is  not  rigorously 
maintained in the case of  the ordinary usufructuary, and it is 
naturally modified  in the interests of  the marital administra- 
'  Ank, 5 26,  note I. 
Glaris, I,  B., ii, arts.  172, 177;  c/  Lucerne,  Stat. Sov.  26.  1880, arts.  5-7; 
Lardy, Lrgislaftons Suisses, pp. 8,  I  g, I 25, 176,  204,  21  7,  293, 303. 
Contra in Glaris, where the wife is entitled to profit upon sales of  her property. 
She also suffers the losses in such casa if  husband  proves that same are not due 
to his fault.  L. B.,  ii, art. 177. 
'  Germany, B. G.,  $$  1375;  Prussia, A. L. R., ii, I,  5 231  seg. ;  Saxony,B. G., 55660 
623; 5\%sltZ.,  Vorentwurf; 230. 
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tion.  So far as immovables are  concerned, the general rule 
is maintained that they cannot  be  alienated  or encumbered 
without the consent of  the wife.5 
It is with respect to the disposition  of  movables  that the 
codes begin to differ.  Some accord the husband the general 
right  of disposition, limited, of  course, by his  obligation  to 
restore the value of  the  objects alienated.=  Others  tend  to 
make the right of  disposition as limited as that possessed by 
an  ordinary  usufructuary.'  Important  considerations  are 
connected with the  determination of  this  matter.  The free 
activity of  the  husband  may be required in the interests  of 
the matrimonial property.  The interests of  the wife, on the 
other hand, may necessitate  protection  against  the  acts  of 
the husband affecting the substance of  such property.  It is 
undesirable,  moreover,  to  adopt  provisions  that  may  en- 
courage legal proceedings between married parties.  Finally, 
the power of  disposition must not be of  such a character as 
to deceive third parties. 
The  first  draft  of  the  German  code  placed  chief  stress 
upon the  husband's right of  usufruct.  It did  not  treat his 
right of  administration as a personal right resulting from the 
Germany,  B.  G.,  5 1375; Prussia, A. L. R., ii, I,  5 232; Saxony, B.G.,  5 660; 
France, C.C.,  1428;  Lucerne, Stat. Nov. 26,1880,art.  7; Ziirich, P. R.G.,  5 591; 
Switz., Vorentwurf;  230;  cf:  Lardy,LCgislafions  Suisses, pp. 39,  87,  278,  348. 
Prussia, A. L. R., ii,  I,  5 247, but  not of  capital  invested in the name of  the 
wife, or of her donor or testator, zbid., 5 233;  France, C.  C.,  1531, 1532;  Lucerne, 
if by ante-nuptial contract this right of  d~sposition  is restricted, the titles of  own- 
ership  of  the wife must  be publicly  registered,  Stat. Nov.  26, 1880,  art. 6; Zii- 
rich, P. R. G.,  5 590;  cf:  5  592. 
'Saxony,  B.  G.,  $5 660,  1655,1674,  1677;  Lardy, L&gislafions  Suzsscs, p.  277. 
The Swiss draft code provides that the husband cannot dispose, without the wife's 
consent, of  any of the marital property, of which  he has not acquired  the owner- 
ship.  It raises a presumption of  the consent of  the wife for the benefit of  inno- 
cent third parties,  except  where  it  should  have heen clear to every one that the 
property belongs to the wife ( Vorenfwurf;  230).  If  husband  has given  security 
for the movables he may freely dispose of  the same (zbzd.,  231). 104  PROPERTY RELA TIONS OF  MARRIED PARTIES  [  J 04 
establishment  of  the  marriage relation, but  defined it inde- 
pendently and limited it to very narrow bounds.  Emphasis 
was  placed  upon the fact that  he was  the  administrator of 
property of  which the title  was  in  another person.  Hence 
for all important acts of  administration he must act with the 
authorization of  such party, and in the name of  the latter.8  It 
was expressly provided  that the general rules governing the 
administration  of  property subjected  to  a  usufruct, should 
apply to the husband's usufruct in the matrimonial property, 
except  where  the  code provided  otherwi~e.~  So, also, his 
powers of  disposition were limited to the alienation of  objects 
whose use in general consisted in their cons~mption,'~  and to 
such acts, in the name of  the wife, as were necessary to fulfil1 
obligations binding upon the dotal property."  For all other 
acts of  disposition he must have the authorization of  the wife 
to act in  her name." 
These provisions of  the draft code  became the  subject of 
severe criticism on the part of  those who conceived that the 
establishment of  the property relations between husband and 
wife, upon the same basis as that existing between an owner 
and a  usufructuary, was contrary to  the  true conception  of 
the conjugal relationship.  They insisted  that the husband's 
right was  something more  than that  of  a  simple  usufruct- 
uary ; that  his right of  administration  flowed  directly from 
the  personal  relation  which  the  marriage  established, and 
was  not  a  mere  incident  of  his  right  of  usufruct.  It was 
argued that the  provisions of  the draft  code would  tend  to 
the  detriment  of  the  matrimonial  property,  and  that  the 
right of  either party to maintain judicial proceedings against 
the  other, for claims arising  out of  the  marital  administra- 
B I. Enfwurf, $5  1317-1325. 
Ibid.,  I 292.  l0lrgid., $ 1294. 
l1 Zbid,  1318.  l'lbid,  1319. 
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tion, would lead to conflicts  between  the  husband  and  wife 
which would destroy the family unity." 
These  arguments  had weight, and  in the later drafts  and 
the code as finally adopted, the husband's  right of  adminis- 
tration is regarded as a direct outgrowth of  the  matrimonial 
 relationship.'"^  virtue  of  the  marriage  the  husband 
acquires the personal right of  administering the  dotal prop- 
erty, though in the interests of  the wife, this  general right is 
limited by important exceptions,  A middle ground is taken 
between  the two  extreme  views  respecting  the  husband's 
right  to dispose  of  the  dotal  property.  The positive  acts 
that he can  perform without the consent of  his wife  include 
those recognized  in the first  draft code, and in  addition, the 
right  to dispose  of  money and  other  consumable  objects. 
The latter include  things whose  customary use is  exchange 
or alienation, e. g., a  stock of  goods, as well as those whose 
customary  use  lies  in  their  consumption.''  Moreover, the 
husband disposes of  such objects in  his  own  name, and  he 
can legally enforce in the same manner all rights  connected 
with the dotal property.16  If  the  matter is  one  over which 
he can dispose without the  assistance  of his  wife, the judg- 
ment in  such  process will  be  binding  upon  her.  On  the 
other hand, the husband is not permitted to dispose of  other 
movables without the consent of  the wife,"  but, following the 
l3  Briihl,  'L  Die  eheliche Nutzniessung,"  Arch. j:  d. civ. Prax., vol.  73, p. 408 
seg.;  Gierke,  Entwuq, pp.  409,  410, 412-414;  Mitteis,  "Bemerkungen  zum 
ehelichen Guterrecht," 2eit.f:  d. Privat. U.  of.  Recht., vol.  16,  pp. 545, 582. 
"11.  Entwurj;  $5 1272-1293;  111.  Enhurf; $5 1356-1377;  B.  G.:  $5  1373- 
1394. 
15Germany, B.  G.  $5 1376, 92;  c$  Switz.,  Vorentwurj; 229. 
l6 Germany, B.  G.  1380. 
"The  second and  third  drafts of  the code  permitted  the  husband  to  collect 
non-interest  hearing  demands  without  the  consent  of  his  wife  (11. Enfwurj; 
1275;  111. Entwurf; 5  1359)~  but  this provision  was  stricken  out in the final 
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practice of  other systems, it  is  provided  that such  consent 
may be supplied by the court when it  is  refused  on insuffi- 
cient  grounds, or when  the  absence  or  illness  of  the  wife 
prevents her from giving her consent.'Vinally,  it is  neces- 
sary to  note  that the  personal  character  of  the  husband's 
right  of  administration  and  usufruct  is  emphasized  by his 
inability to alienate his right as such.l9 
The  husband's  power  of  administration  is  protected 
against interference on the  part  of  the wife.  The latter has 
no general right of  disposition over the dotal property.  She 
is  prevented  from  encumbering  or  otherwise  disposing  of 
the  same, by virtue  of  her  general  incapacity  to  contract 
without  the  marital  authorization,"'  or  in  those  systems 
which recognize the general contractual capacity of  married 
women,  by  positive  provisions  making  such  dispositions 
dependent upon the consent of  the husband."  The disposi- 
tions made without the husband's  consent are ineffective  so 
far as regards  the dotal  property, but they may be binding 
upon the wife's separate property. 
The wife is not entirely excluded from acts of  administra- 
tion or disposition  over the dotal property.  She may bind 
the latter within the  sphere of  her activity as administrator 
of  the  domestic  affairs  of  the  household,'%r  in  an  inde- 
pendent business which  she carries  on  with  the consent  of 
her  h~sband.'~  The  wife  does  not  require  the  marital 
I8Germany, B. G., $ 1379;  C/  Prussia,  A. L.  R. ii.  I,  $ 299; Saxony,  B.  G., 
8 1657. 
19Germany, B. G., $ 1408. 
"  Ante, $ 3. 
"Germany,  B. G.,  $ 1395; Prussia,  A. L. R.  ii.  I, 8 320; Saxonv,  B. G., 
5 1638;  Switz.,  vorentzuurf;  232. 
22 Ante, 5  8. 
'$Ante, $6;  Germany,  B.  G.,  $ 1405;  Prussia,  A.  L. R.  ii.  I,  $5 335-337; 
France, C. C., 220; Lucerne,  Stat.  Nov.  26, 1880,  art.  17;  Zuricb.  P.  R.  G., 
§$621,  622;  Glaris, L.  B.  ii., art. 175. 
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authorization for the  acceptance or  rejection of  gifts or suc- 
cessions which fall to her,"  or for the  carrying on of  certain 
judicial processes for the  protection of  her  right^.'^  Where 
other acts of  the wife are necessary, the  court  may supply 
the consent of  the husband if  it is refused  without  sufficient 
reason.j6  Such acts may also be performed by the wife with- 
out the consent of  the husband where  the latter on account 
of  illness or absence  is  prevented  from  manifesting his will 
and there is risk of  damage from delay.'47 
The  property which  is  reserved  for  the  wife  under  the 
system of  marital administration and usufruct, is  subject  to 
the  same rules  of  administration  as  obtain  for  the  wife's 
property, in  general, under the system of  separate pr~perty.'~ 
5  28. Liability for Debts. 
The husband  enjoys the fruits of  the matrimonial property 
and he is  accordingly subject to the  obligations  of  a  usu- 
fructuary.  As such, he must defray the costs of  administra- 
tion, and meet the  public and  private obligations which  are 
binding upon the dotal  property.'  He is  not  under a gen- 
eral  obligation  to  answer  for  the  debts  of  his  wife,  his 
liability being connected with his relation to the matrimonial 
property rather than his  personal  relation to his wife.  The 
husband  is  under  a  personal  obligation  to  support  the 
"Germany.  B. G., $ 1406;  contra, Switz.,  Vorentwuvj;  232. 
'%Germany,  B. G., $1407. 
'"ermany,  B.  G., $ 1402;  Saxony,  B. G., $1644;  France,  C. C.,  218, 2x9; 
Switz.,  Vormtzuurf;  232. 
l'Germany,  B.  G.,  $ 1401;  Prussia, A. L.  R., ii,  I,  $5 202-204,  326, 327; 
Saxony, B. G.,  $ 1643;  cf. France, C.  C.,  1427. 
'Germany,  B. G., $5 1383-1388;  Prussia, A. L.  R., ii, I,  $ 231;  Saxony, B. G., 
$660; France, C. C., 1533;  Lucerne, Stat., Nov. 26, 1880,  art. 13; Glaris, L. B., 
ii, art. 176; Switz.,  Vorentwurj, 228, 232. I I 0  PROPERTY RELA TIONS OF MARRIED PAR TIES  [  I I 0 
of  administration  is generally quite extensive, and  the  ten- 
dency is  for  them  to  disappear  as  limitations  are  placed 
upon the husband's  power.  While affording adequate  pro- 
tection to the wife, they constitute a serious detriment to the 
marital administration and a menace to the interests of  third 
parties. 
The final remedy, which  the  wife  possesses  for  the pro- 
tection of  her property interests, is her right to demand that 
the marital administration  and  usufruct  be  terminated.  In 
the new code of  Germany, this  power, and  the  privilege  of 
demanding  security when  her  rights  are  endangered:  are 
made more effective  by the fact  that the husband  is  under 
an obligation to render the wife  a statement of  the condition 
of  the administration of  the dotal property.? 
Q 30. Termination of  the Marital Administvatio~z  and Usu- 
fvuct. 
(a) As  the  Legal Result of Bankruptcy. 
The system  of  marital  administration  and  usufruct  does 
not recognize any community of  property interests  between 
the  married  parties.  It is indeed  to  meet the  matrimonial 
expenses that the husband  has the use  of  the  wife's  prop- 
erty;  but  in  case  he  falls  into  bankruptcy,  his  personal 
creditors  acquire  a  claim  upon  the  fruits  of  such  prop- 
erty and  may thus  defeat  the ends for which  it was  estab- 
lished.  Accordingly, the more recent legislatioils recognize 
that the bankruptcy of  the  husband  has  the  legal  effect  of 
terminating  his  administration  and  usufruct  of  the  dotal 
property.' 
=Ante,  note 3. 
Germany, B. G., fi 1374. 
'Germany, B. G., fi 1419; Switz., bankruptcy of  either party, Vorcntvurf; 197.. 
Untll the settlement of the bankruptcy or satisfaction of  creditors: Lucerne, Stat., 
Nov. 26, 1880,  art.  19;  Ziirich, P. R. G.,  fi 613. 
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(b) Ufon the  Demand of the  W+. 
The existing  legislations  generally  agree  in  recognizing 
that the bankruptcy of the  husband or irregularities  in  his 
administration  of  the  dotal  property  justify  the  wife  in 
demanding  the  termination  of  the  marital  administration 
and  usufruct.'The  failure of  the  husband  to  fulfil1  his 
statutory obligation to provide for the support of  the family 
is also a valid ground  for such demand.3  The fact that the 
husband is under guardianship has also been recognized by the 
German code as sufficient  ground  for the demand for a ces- 
sation of  the marital administration and usufruct, but the at- 
tainment of  full capacity by the husband will enable him to 
demand the restoration of  his marital property rights.4 
The legislations do not recognize that the husband  has the 
right to demand the dissolution of  the matrimonial property 
relations  where  the  marital  administration  and  usufruct 
obtain.5 
(c)  By MutuaL Agrecmenl. 
Where post-nuptial marriage agreements  are not  prohib- 
ited, the termination of  the  marital  administration  and usu- 
fruct may be brought about  by agreement between the par- 
ties, subject to the observance of  such formalities as the law 
may provide to safeguard the rights of  third par tie^.^ 
'Germany,  B. G.,  fi 1418;  Prussla, A. L. R., ii, I,  fi 258: France, C. C., 1443; 
Glaris, L.  B., ii, art. 179;  Lucerne, Stat., Nov. 26, 1880,  art. 18;  Zurich, P. R.  G., 
5 594;  Switz.,  Vorentvurj; 198. In Saxony,  the  wife  may  demand  that  the 
administration  shall  be  given to her.  This will  not  affect  husband's  r~ght  of 
usufruct, B. G., $5 16S4,  1585;  cj: ante, 8 22, notes g, 10. 
'Germany, B. G., 5 1418;  Prussia, A. L. R.,ii, I, 55 256, 258; Switz.,  Vorent- 
wurf, 198;  Lucerne, Stat., Nov. 26, 1880,  art. 19;  Ztir~ch,  P. R.  G., 5 594. 
'B. G.,  $5 1418,  1425; cl; Lucerne, Stat.,  Nov. 26, 1880,  art. 20, Z~~rich,  P. R. 
G., fi 614. 
51/oh've, vol. iv, p. 294; Prussia, A. L. R., ii, I,  fi 251; Saxony, B. G.,  5 1686; 
France, C. C., 1443;  conha, Switz.,  ~orcnlwurj;  199. 
Germany, B. G., fi 1435;  Prussia, A. L. R., ~i,  I, 4s  251,  252; Switz., Vorcnt- 
wurf; 195; cl; Saxony, B. G., 8 1694. I I 2  PROPERTY RELATIOrVS  OF AIARRIED PAR TIES  [I  I 2 
(d)  By the  Dissolutton of  the Marriage. 
The dissolution  of  the  marriage  by the death of  one of 
the parties or by decree of  divorce  leads regularly to a ces- 
sation of  the marital administration and  usufruct.7  No pro- 
visions  exist  for  a  continuation  of  the  property  relations 
between  the  surviving  married  party  and  the  common 
children. 
3 I. Efects  of  the  Termination of  the  klarital Adminis- 
tian and Usufruct. 
The general rule is that, upon the termination of  the mari- 
tal administration  and  usufruct, the dotal property is  to be 
immediately returned  to the wife  or  her  representatives, in 
accordance  with  the  regulations  governing  the  ordinary 
usufruct.'  The property, so far as it  still exists, is to be re- 
turned,'  and compensation must be rendered for the remain- 
der, except where it has been destroyed without fault on the 
part of  the husband. 
The codes differ with respect to the compensation due the 
husband on account of  expenditures which  he  has  incurred 
for  the  dotal  property,  over  and  above  those  which  he  is 
legally  obliged  to  sustain.  The older  codes  require  that 
these expenditures shall have been  made with the consent of 
the wife.3  If  the  husband  has  made the expenditure with- 
'  Regarding effects of  judicial separation, see ante, § 23, (d).  Lucerne, Stat., 
Nov.  26,1880, art. 19. 
Germany, B. G.,§$  1421,  1423;  Prussia,A. L. R.,  ii. I, $5 548seq.; 55gseq.; 570 
seq.;  585 seq.;  595 seq.;  interest  can be  demanded only after  the expiration of 
the first quarter, if  usufruct  is  terminated  by  death  of  either  party, ibzd.,  549; 
Saxony, B. G., $5 1688, 1689, 660;  Glar~s,  L.B.,  ii, art. 177; Lucerne, Stat., Nov. 
26, 1880, art. 21; Zurich, P. R. G.,  609. 
In Prussia, in case the marital usufruct ceases  as a  result of  the death  of  the 
wife, the husband  had an election between  returning the real estate or its value, 
A. I,.  R.,  ii, I,  570 seq. 
3Prussia, A. L. R.,  ii, I,  S$ 587, j88;  Saxony, B.  G.,  169~. 
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out the consent of the wife or the authorization of  the court, 
he will  be  treated  as an ordinary usufructuary and  entitled 
to take  back  the improvements in so far as this is possible 
without producing  alterations  in  the  previous  condition  of 
the property.4  The new German code adopts a more liberal 
attitude.  It regards  the husband, where  he was justified  in 
considering  the  expenditure  necessary,  as  occupying  the 
same position as one acting  under  a  mandate, and  as such 
entitled to compensation.5 
If  the conjugal community is not suspended or dissolved, 
the  matrimonial  property  relations  for  the  future  will  be 
regulated by the system of  separate pr~perty.~ 
The legislations  are  divided  regarding  the  effects  of  di- 
vorce upon property rights.  Some do not accord any privi- 
lege to the  innocent party aside  from  a claim  to  support,7 
while others recognize  the right  to demand  particular conl- 
pensati~n.~  Where the marriage  is dissolved  as a result of 
the death of  one of  the parties, the dotal  property will  be 
returned to the wife or go over to her estate in succession. 
Prussia, A.  L. R.,  ii,  I,  586,  i,  21,  124-131;  according  to  the code of 
Saxony he would be treated as one acting  without  a  mandate and hence entitled 
to compensation to the extent to which the property was enriched, B.  G.,  $ 1690; 
cf:  Lucerne, Stat., Nov. 26, 1880, art. 21. 
B. G.,  1390;  cf:  ibid., J 670. 
' Germany, B.  G.,  1426;  France,  C.  C.. 1443 seq.,  1449;  Lucerne, Stat.,Nov, 
26, 1880, art. 22; Switz.,  Vorefthourf, 197 seq.;  contua, Prussia, where existing sys- 
tem continues with the wife as administratrixand usufructuary,  subject to thesame 
obligations as were imposed  upon  the husband, A. L. R., ii,  I,  258, 261 seg.; 
cf: Saxony, B. G.,  1684, 1685.  In Zarich  the  dotal  property will be adminis- 
tered under control of the court of guardians,  P.  R. G.,  5 594. 
7Afotivc, vol. iv,  p. 228  seq.;  Germany,  B.  G.,  1578-1585;  Saxony, B. G., 
§ 1750. 
8Prussia,  A.  L. R.,  ii,  I,  766 sq.; France,  C.  C., 299 seq.;  Lucerne,  Stat., 
Nov. 26, 1880, art. 25;  Switz.,  Vorentwurf; 170. 1  I 4  PROPERTY  RELA TIONS  OF  MARRIED PARTIES  [  I I 4 
DMSION  111. 
SYSTEM  OF DOWRY. 
5 32.  General Cha~acter  of  the  Wife's Property. 
The general principle at the basis of  the system of  dowry, 
as it is defined in  the  law of  Justinian  and in  modern legis- 
lation~,  is that the marriage, as such, does not affect the legal 
proprietary  relations  of  the  parties.  Nevertheless,  the  es- 
tablishment of  the  conjugal  relation, by producing  certain 
effects upon the personal relations of  the parties,'  may exer- 
cise an influence upon their property rights.  Moreover, the 
marriage regularly leads to other legal acts that result in  the 
establishment of  matrimonial property relations.  The most 
important of  these acts is the constitution of  the dowry and 
the establishment of  certain benefits for the wife. 
The early Roman law of  dowry was subjected to profound 
modifications  as a  result of  juristic  and  legislative activity. 
Modern Roman law, however, exhib~ts  distinct  traces of  its 
development from  the primitive system.  The dowry is pri- 
marily a contribution which  the wife, or some one acting in 
her interest, makes to the husband to assist him in fulfilling 
his obligation of supporting the expenses of  the matrimonial 
community.'  In the second  place, the dowry is intended as 
a means of  future provision  for  the wife, and, as such, is to 
be preserved and returned to her upon the dissolution of  the 
marriage.3  This latter  characteristic of  the  dowry was  not 
recognized  in  the  older  Roman  law.  Custom  led  to  its 
gradual  introduction  and establishment.  The husband  in 
some cases was  bound  by an  express agreement  to return 
the dowry.  In other instances the wife was granted an actio 
67  ante, $8 4, 5. 
'Austria,  B.  G., 5  1218;  France,  C. C., 1540; Italy,  C. C., 1388;  La., C. C., 
2335. 
"'ost,  5 36. 
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rei zlxorice,  under  which  the  husband,  while  not bound  in 
law to return  the dowry, could  be compelled  to act in  ac- 
cordance with  the principles of  equity and good faith.4  At 
a later  period, imperial legislation  completed  the develop- 
ment by making provision  for the preservation of  the dowry 
during the period of  the  husband's  administration, and  by 
enabling the wife  to maintain  a  personal  action against the 
husband for the return of  the same or to sue as owner of  the 
dotal effects.5 
The marriage does  not  give  the  husband  a  right to de- 
mand a dowry.6  The latter is not established by the law as 
in the system of  marital  administration  and  usufruct.  The 
dotal property, under  the system of  dowry, must have been 
given or promised to the husband.7  The legal rules govern 
the  dotal relation  only after  it  has been established  by the 
act of  the parties or of  persons acting in their interest. 
While the dowry was not an essential feature of  the marriage 
relation, it was, nevertheless, the general  custom during the 
Roman  period, for  the woman  to  bring  her  husband a dos. 
An unendowed wife was apt to be regarded as resting under 
a stigma, an attitude which obtains to-day in some European 
countries.  Thus, the  Roman  law and  some European sys- 
tems recognize that the daughter has a legal right to demand 
a dowry from her father or  parent^.^ 
Sohm, Inst., 5  95.  See  post, $8 331 34. 
Windscheid, PandeRfen,  vol. ii, 5 493; Dernburg, Pandelten, vol. iii, 5 15. 
'France, C. C.,  1540, 1543;  Italy, C. C.,  1388,  1391;  Spain, C. C,  1336;  La., 
C. C.,  2338; Austria, B. G.,  $5 1218  sq., 1225.  In Austria, under  the  influence 
of  the German principles of marital administration and usufruct, the presumption 
obtains, so  long as  the  wife  does not  contradict  it, that  she has entrusted her 
husband with  the administration of her  property, and  in th~s  case, he 1s  entitled 
to the fruits and  profits.  But  his right  ceases from the moment  the wife mani- 
fests her opposition.  Ibid., $5 1238,  1239. 
Windscheid,  Pandekten,  vol.  ii, 5 493; Dernburg, Pandekten, vol.  iii, 5 15; 
Austria, B. G., 5 1220; Spain, C. C., 1340; cf:  Saxony, B. G.,  1661  sq.; Ger- 
many, B. G.,  1620. I I 6  PROPERTY RELA TIOh'S  OF  MARRIED PAR TIES  [  I I 6 
The Roman law developed  side by side with  the dos, the 
donatio propkr nujtias.9  This is a gift  from the husband to 
the wife, intended as a future provision for the latter and made 
to take  effect  upon  the dissolution  of  the  marriage.  The 
wife, in the free marriage at Roman  law, had only  a distant 
limited  right  of  succession.x0  The  donatio  jrojter  nuptias 
was  a  settlement which  mitigated  the  hardships  resulting 
from the law of  succession as well as from  the institution of 
free divorce.  The Austrian civil code, under the title  Widev- 
lage, regulates a  similar settlement  for  the wife.'  In most 
of  the modern codes, however, there is no special definition, 
the husband  being  permitted  to make  gifts  to the wife, in 
augmentation of  her dowry, subject to  the  rules  regulating 
donations and agreements between married parties.I2 
All of  the property of  the wife, including  the proceeds of 
her  personal  industry, which  is  not  settled  as part  of  her 
dowry, is  her  separate property (paraphernalia), and  is  in 
general  subject to the  provisions which  regulate the wife's 
fortune under the system of  separate propert,v.l3 
4  33.  Administration of  the  Dowry. 
As the dowry  is constituted  for  the  primary  purpose of 
assisting the husband in sustaining the matrimonial charges, 
its administration must  be  directed  to this end.  The hus- 
band  is therefore entitled  to the administration of  the dotal 
property.  The extent of  his rights in  this respect was  con- 
siderably limited in the course of  Roman legal development. 
In the earliest period, the dos, in passing into the possession 
of  the husband, acquired much the same  legal  character  as 
the other property of  a woman who contracted  a  marriage 
which  brought  her  under  the  mnnzis  marifi.'  It bccarne 
Sohm,  Inst.,  96.  l0 Post, 5  45.  "B. G.,  5 123~. 
l'  Anfe, $5  3, 5.  '3  Contra, Spain, C. C.,  I 385 ; cf:  post,  5 42. 
Ante, 5 25. 
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the property of  the husband, and he disposed of  it as freely 
as he did of  his other property.  The measures, referred to in 
the preceding se~tion,~which  compelled the restitution of  the 
dowry, did not affect the husband's  power of  disposition dur- 
ing the marriage.  At the outset, they conferred  upon  the 
wife a right of  action against the husband alone, and  hence 
did  not  bind  the  dotal  property  in  the  hands  of  third 
parties. 
The first limitation upon the husband's powers of  disposi- 
tion occurred in the legislation of  Augustus.  The lex Julia 
de adulteteriis, prohibited  the husband  from alienating or en- 
cumbering  certain  dotal  immovable^.^  The  legislation  of 
Justinian completed  the development  by extending the lim- 
itation to all dotal immovables 3  and by giving the wife other 
substantial  remedies  for  the  protection  of  her  property 
rights.4 
In  strict  form  the husband  still  remains  owner  of  the 
dotal  effects,  but  it  is  a  form  that is  deprived  of  all sub- 
stance  by positive exceptions  and  limitations.  He retains 
the right of  administration, but cannot alienate nor encumber 
any  dotal  immovable.  For  the  further  protection  of  the 
wife, and  to guard her from the undue influence of  the hus- 
band, such dispositions are considered invalid even  if  made 
with  her  consent.5  Moreover, the wife, in  addition  to her 
personal claim against the husband, is given the right to sue 
as owner  for  the return  of  the  dowry.6  As such she can 
vindicate  her  immovables,  but, with  respect  to movables, 
the right  is limited  to those which  have not been alienated 
by the husband.  Justinian's law, in fact, makes the wife the 
owner of the dowry, but  binds her  by the valid  acts of  her 
Bechmann, Dofalrecht, vol. ii, p.  445 sq. 
'Cod.,  5, 13, 15; NOV.,  61.  '  See post,  5  34. 
&Cod., 5, 13, 15;  NOV.,  61. 
Cod.,  5,  12, 30;  Bechmann, Dotalrecht, vol. ii, p. 468 sq. I I S  PROPERTY  RELATIOhTS  OF  MARRIED PARY'ZES  [I I Q 
marital  administrator.  The  latter  is  in  reality  a  mere 
usufructuary, but in  accordance  with  the old  theory, he  is 
regarded, pending the wife's action for the restitution of  her 
dowry, as  the  formal  owner, whose activity is subjected .to 
extensive limitations. 
In the modern codes, the fictitious elements  have  largely 
disappeared.  The general principle  with  which  all  of  the 
systems start  is that the husband is the administrator of  the 
dowry, while the wife is the owner of  the dotal effects.7  The 
husband may and  should  exercise all  of  those  acts  of  ad- 
ministration which  an ordinary  usufructuary  has  the  right 
and obligation of  undertaking.  In accordance with the gen- 
eral principles governing usufruct, he becomes owner of  that 
part of  the dotal  property which  consists  in  money, nego- 
tiable  instruments or other  fungible  things, while  the  wife 
has only a personal claim for  the restoration of  the value of 
these objects.  The same result follows where movables are 
settled  in dowry at a  fixed  estimate, unless  it  is  expressly 
stipulated  that the valuation is not intended  to effect a sale 
of  the pr~perty.~  On the other hand, the valuation of  dotal 
immovables will not be held  to transfer title to the husband 
unless the sale is proven.9 
To the extent  that the  husband  does not  become owner 
of  the dowry, he does not  possess  the  right  to alienate  or 
encumber the dotal effects.  The codes differ respecting dis- 
positions  affecting  such  property.  Some,  following  the 
'  Austria, B. G.,  §§ 1227, 1228; France, C. C.,  1549, 1551  seq.,  1560, 1561; Italy, 
C.  C.,  1399, 1401  sep.,  1407; Spaln,C.C.,  1346, 1357;  La., C. C., 2350. 
8France. C.  C.,  1551 ; Italy, C. C.,  1401  ; La., C.  C., 2354.  In Austria (B. G., 
8 1228)~  and Spain (C.  C.,  1346)~  the burden of  proof is upon the husband and 
those claiming under him to show that the sale was made. 
9Austr1a,  B.  G.,  5 1228; Spain, C.  C.,  1346; by  express  declaration:  France, 
C. C.,  1552; Italy, C  C., 1402; in  Louisiana, they will  not  pass into the owner- 
ship of the husband even if an express agreement has been made, C. C.,  2355. 
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Roman law, make a distinction between dotal  movables and 
immovables.  The mortgage or alienation of  the  latter is in 
general invalid, even  if  the wife gives  her consent  or joins 
in ,the act.I0  This rule has been  influenced  by the fear that 
thc wife will suffer from the undue influence of  the husband, 
as well as by the desire to keep the land intact for the benefit 
of  the family.  The provisions  do not however constitute an 
absolute  prohibition  upon  the alienation  of  dotal  immov- 
ables.  Certain exceptions are recognized on the ground  of 
necessity or evident  uti1ity,l1 and  also where  such  disposi- 
tions have been permitted by the contract of  marriage." 
The Austrian and Spanish codes do not follow the Roman 
rule.  In the former, there are no limitations upon the married 
woman's capacity of  disposition, and, in accordance with the 
general principle,'3  it appears that she can freely alienate the 
dotai effects without the consent of  her husband, subject al- 
ways to his right of  administration and  usufruct during the 
marriage.  In  Spain, the wife, with  the consent of  her hus- 
band, may alienate  or mortgage the  dotal effects of  which 
she has the 0wnership.~4 
The codes  which  distinguish  between  the disposition  of 
l0 France, C.  C.,  1554;  Italy, C.  C.,  1405;  La., C.  C., 2357. 
"  They may  be  alienated:  With  wife's  consent to endow  children  (France, 
C. C.,  1555,1556; La., C. C.,  ~358,2359)~  or to make exchange foranother immov- 
able after official appraisement (France, C. C.,  1559) ;  with authorization of  court 
for support of  family, to release either party from prison, pay ante-nuptual debts of 
wife or party settl~ng  dower, make necessary repairs to dotal immovables, or affect 
necessary  partit~on  of  property held  in  coparcenary (France,  C. C.,  1558; La., 
C. C., 2361, 2362).  The Italian  code makes a general  exception where husband 
and wiie consent and the court authorizes act uponground of  necessity or endent 
utility, C. C.,  1405. 
l2 France, C.  C.,  1557;  Italy, C. C.,  1404;  La., but value must  be reinvested in 
other immovables, C. C.,  2360;  cf.  ibid., 2355. 
l4 C.  C.,  1361.  If  wife is a minor, the intervention of  party from whom dowry 
proceeds and the consent of the court are necessary. I 20  PROPERTY  RELATIONS OF  MARHIED PARTIES  [I 20 
dotal movables and immovables  do not  contain  any special 
provisions  respecting  the  alienation  of  the  former.  They 
can, accordingly, be  disposed of  by the wife, subject  to the 
marital  authorization which is required for  such  acts  under 
these systems.'5 
34. Protection of  the Dowry. 
Notwithstanding  the  limitations  placed  upon  the  hus- 
band's right of  administration, the wife is generally accorded 
extensive privileges by way of  further  security for  her dotal 
effects.  An explanation  of  this attitude  is  to be found  in 
the  Roman  law,  which,  while  developing  the  substantial 
proprietary rights  of  the wife, continued  the formal  owner- 
ship of  the  husband.  Moreover,  the  husband,  at Roman 
law, had  the power  to  alienate  dotal  movables.  Accord- 
ingly the law of  Justinian  gave  the  wife  a  privileged  legal 
mortgage  which  extended,  independently  of  registration, 
over  all  of  the  husband's  pr0perty.I  Under  the  modern 
codes, the wife is unable to revoke any alienation  until after 
the dissolution  of  the marriage.'  And while it is expressly 
provided that dotal immovables shall be imprescriptible dur- 
ing the marriage,s this does not seem to be the rule respecting 
movables.  Finally, it is considered necessary to protect the 
wife's  interest in the estimated dowry, and  in that which, by 
reason of  its general character, passes into the ownership of 
the husband. 
The legal mortgage of  the wife  for  the protection of  her 
dowry is  recognized  by the French and  Italian codes.  By 
virtue of  this  mortgage, the wife  acquires  a  statutory lien 
l6 Ante, 8 3. 
1  Cod., 5, 13,  I ;  Inst., 4, 6, 29; Windscheid,  Pandekten,  vol.  i,  8 246,  vol. ii, 
1  503. 
'France,  C. C., 1560;  Italy, C. C.,  1407; La., C. C., 2363. 
3 France, C.  C.,  1561  ; La., C. C.,  2364,3524. 
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over all the immovables  possessed  by the husband.'  Such 
encumbrance obtains  by operation of  law and  does  not re- 
quire public inscription for its validity.  Provisions exist for 
restricting  or  barring  such  lien, but  all such measures de- 
pend  upon the express or  implied  consent of  the wife, and 
judicial or other formalities must generally be observed.5 
In  Spain  and  Louisiana, the  privilege  of  the wife  is  re- 
stricted to the  right  to have a mortgage recorded over the 
husband's  property  to secure  her dowry.6  In Austria, the 
wife is given no particular security by way of  mortgage, but 
it is provided that the one who gives the dowry may demand 
suitable security, and, where  the woman is  under guardian- 
ship, the guardian can not dispense with such security except 
with consent of  the court.7 
All  of  the states recognize that, under certain conditions, 
the wife may demand that the husband shall  be deprived  of 
the administration of  the dowry. 
3  5. Separation of  Pyoperty. 
The same conditions which  lead  to a separation of  prop- 
erty under community systems will generally bring about the 
separation of  the dowry from the property of  which the hus- 
band  has the administration.=  In no case, however, do the 
modern  codes  recognize  that separation of  property is  the 
'France,  C. C., 2121,  2135; Italy, C. C., 1969. 
sFrance, C. C., 2140,  2144,  2193 seq.;  Italy, C. C., 1969. 
6 Spain, C. C., 1349  seq.;  where  mortgage  over  husband's  property  is  inade- 
quate to cover value of  stocks, bonds, etc., held in dowry, the titles of  ownership 
must be publicly recorded, ibid., 1355;  La., C.  C., 2376, 2377,  3252,  3254; the 
wife has also a privilege over ordinary creditors, in the husband's movables, ibid. 
2376,  3x91- 
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legal result of  the bankruptcy of  the husband.'  The neces- 
sity for  such result does  not  exist  under  this  system  as it 
does  under  the  system of  marital  administration  and  usu- 
fruct, or even of  community.  The privileges which the wife 
enjoys will enable her to protect  the dowry and preserve its 
fruits for the use of  the family. 
The separation of  property may be demanded by the wife 
and decreed by the court  upon  the  same grounds as would 
justify  such  action  if  community of  property  obtained  be- 
tween the married parties.3  In Austria, the separation may 
be the result of  mutual  agreement, but the  principle of  the 
invalidity of  post-nuptial agreements forbids this in  the other 
countries.4 
The dissolution of  the marriage by death or divorce gives 
ground for the separation of  the dowry from the property of 
the husband.  In some  cases, as is  generally true of  com- 
munity systems, the judicial  separation  of  the parties  will 
produce  the  same  result.5  In  others, however,  it  confers 
only a right to demand such separatioa6 
5  36.  Restihtion of  the Dowry. 
The rule of Roman law, which was derived  from  the old 
equitable actio vei uxori@,I was based upon the principle that 
In Austria, while  bankruptcy dissolves  the  community of  goods, it  will  not 
bring  about  the  separation of  property where  dowry exists.  It  does not  even 
justify a demand for the restitution of  the dowry, but only a claim to the security 
for  the  future, and,  under  certain  conditions, to the  enjoyment of  the  dowry, 
B. G., $5  1260, r261. 
France, C.  C., 1563; Italy,  C. C., 1448  seq.;  Spain, C. C., 1365; La., C. C., 
2425 S??. 
Ante, 5  3;  Austria, B. G., 5  1263. 
"pain,  where  husband  is gu~lty  party, C. C., 73;  La., C. C.,  155;  C$  Austria, 
B. G.,  S 1264. 
OItaly, C. C.,  1418; Austria, the  innocent  party  may  resist  demand, B. G., 5 
I 264. 
'See, ante, 5  32. 
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it would be unjust to require the husband to return immediately 
after separation the full amount of  the dowry.  The husband 
had the right to alienate movables, and where he had invested 
the capital  resulting  from  such disposition, as well as  from 
other dotal funds, it might entail considerable sacrifice if  he 
were obliged  to call  in  the same without delay.  Hence he 
was allowed one year within which to make such restitution.' 
As he was not permitted  to alienate immovables, these were 
to be returned at once. 
The modern  codes  have  been  influenced  by  this  rule. 
That part of  the dowry of  which  the ownership remains  in 
the wife, must be restored at once.3  The remainder, includ- 
ing  the value  of  fungible  goods  and  of  those  objects  that 
have  been estimated and sold  to  the husband, need not  be 
returned  until  the expiration of  one year  thereafter.4  The 
husband  is  not  held  for  the deterioration  or destruction of 
dotal effects of  which the wife  retains the ownership, unless 
the damage has occurred through his fault.5 
If  the separation of  goods is not accompanied  by a disso- 
lution of  the marriage, the general  rules  governing  the sys- 
tem of  separate property come into ~peration.~ 
Following the Roman law,7 the modern codes have partic- 
ular  regulations  respecting  the  restitution of  the  dowry in 
case  the  separation  of  property  is  the result  of  divorce. 
=Windscheid, Pandekten, vol.  ii, 5  502;  the  earlier  rule  gave  him  a  longer 
period, zbzd.,  5  502,  note I. 
'France,  C. C., 1564; Italy, C. C.,  1409;  Spain, C. C.,  1369; La., C. C.,  2367, 
2368. 
France, C.  C.,  1565; Italy, C.  C., 1410;  Spain, C.  C., 1370;  La., C.  C., 2367, 
2368. 
SFrance, C.  C.,  1566, 1567; Italy, C.  C.,  1411, 1412;  Spain, C.  C.,  1375. 
France, C. C., 1563, 1448  sep.;  Italy, but  the goods retain the dotal character 
and must be employed with authorization of  the court, C.  C., 1423, 1424; Spain, 
C. C.,  1443; La., C.  C.,  2430, 2434, 2435;  C$  Austria, B. G.,  $8 1263, 1264, 1237. 
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The  innocent  party retains  while  the  guilty  party  loses 
all  of  the  advantages  conferred  by  the  other.8  If  the 
dissolution  of  the  marriage  results  from  the  death  of 
the wife, her  dowry falls into  her succession,  which  is  en- 
titled to the profits of  the same from the day of  the dissolu- 
tion.  If  the death of  the  husband causes  the dissolution, it 
is generally recognized  that the wife may elect between the 
profits of  her dowry during the  year of  mourning  and  ali- 
mentary support from the husband's succession for the same 
period? 
DIVISION  IV. 
SYSTEM  OF  SEPARATE  PROPERTY. 
5  37. Development of  the System. 
The system  of  separate property  interests  between  the 
husband and  the wife  obtains as a  statutory or contractual 
system in the legislations of  practically all of  the important 
civilized states.'  In the majority of  the legislations it is de- 
fined as a distinct system, and where this is not the case, the 
definition of  paraphernal or reserved property ( Vorbekaltsgut, 
biens  rhervis),  provides  regulations  which  may  readily 
lead to the establishment of  such a rPgime.  While the sys- 
tem is defined  in most of  the Continental codes, it  is  prob- 
able that it was not framed in  any of  them, with  the excep- 
tion of  the  civil  code of  Russia, the  new code of  Germany, 
and  the draft  code of  Switzerland, with  any expectation of 
its extensive application.'  Primarily, it was intended to take 
8France, C.  C.,  299, 300; Italy, C.  C.,  156;  Spain,  C.  C., 73; La., C. C.,  155; 
In Austria, the innocent party may  demand the continuation or abrogation of  the 
mamage agreements, B. G.,  1264. 
*France, C. C., 1570;  Italy, C.  C.,  1415;  Spain, C. C., 1379; La., C.  C.,  2374. 
'  C$,  table, ante, 5 13. 
'The  Norwegian  statute  of  June  29, 1888 (An.  Ctran., vol. 18,  p. 762 scq.), 
shows distinct traces of  an  attempt to  introduce separate  property as the  statu- 
tory system. 
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effect when the  statutory system was  set aside by operation 
of  law  or  judicial  decree.  In  England  and  the  United 
States, on the contrary, it has become the  regular  statutory 
system. 
The movement which  has  resulted  in  the  substitution of 
the  system  of  separate property for  the  English  common 
law  system  of  exclusive  rights  of  the  husband,  covers  a 
period of  a little more than the latter  half  of  the nineteenth 
century.  It will  be  necessary to consider  only the general 
character of  the development  in order to indicate  the pres- 
ent conditions  and  tendencies  of  legislation  in  the field of 
matrimonial property relations. 
The essential features of  the English common law system 
have been  indicated.3  Whatever  may have  been  the  influ- 
ences which affected and determined its development, it was 
a system based fundamentally upon  the principle of  the su- 
periority of  the man as the head of  the family.  It was quite 
natural that the recognition of  the independent existence of 
the wife should come first from the customary rather than from 
the  statutory sources of  legislation.  The English Court of 
Chancery  was  an  organ  for  realizing  social demands to 
which  the conservatism of  the legislators failed  to respond. 
As soon  as  personal  property began  to assume  import- 
ance, the  inequitable  character of  the  common  law system 
became manifest.  At an early date the Court  of  Chancery 
recognized the wife's  equity to a  settlement out of  her  per- 
sonal  property  which  the  husband  had  the legal  right of 
reducing to his possession  and ownership.  This was a pure 
and simple act of  legislation clothed under the forms of  judi- 
cial fiction.  It was not a principle that applied to all of  the 
wife's personal property.  The courts of  common law would 
not enforce it with respect  to personal  property of  the wife 
which  came  under  their  jurisdiction.  In the beginning, it I 26  PROPERTY RELATIONS  OF  MARRIED PARTIES  [  I 26 
was only where the husband found it necessary to appeal to 
the  Court of  Chancery, in  order  to  gain  possession  of  his 
wife's  personal  property, i. e., where  the  question involved 
came under  the peculiar jurisdiction of  such court, that the 
rule came into operation.  The court  said  in effect:  "  You 
have the legal right to this property, but you are asking the 
assistance of  a court whose essential function  is the enforce- 
ment  of  equitable  principles.  It is a  fundamental  maxim 
that he who claims equity must do equity.  It is unjust (un- 
righteous) and inequitable for you to take all of  the property 
of  the wife and thus leave her without any means of  support, 
except such as you  are willing  to accord  her.  Hence, be- 
fore we will  give  you  possession of  this property, you must 
settle a portion of  the same upon your wife." 
Beginning with the wife's equity to a settlement, the Court 
of  Chancery gradually developed a system of  separate prop- 
erty rights for the married woman, which it enforced, regard- 
less of  whether  such  rights were settled  upon  the wife  by 
judicial decree, by act of  the husband or by the intervention 
of  a third party.  It was sufficient if  there was a clear inten- 
tion  to  set aside  the property for  the  separate use  of  the 
wife.  In such  an  event,  the  Court of  Chancery gave  the 
property the character of  a trust estate, and enforced the ex- 
ecution of  the trust for  the  benefit of  the wife.  The estate 
assumed the character of  the separate property, which is re- 
served under the system of  marital  administration  and usu- 
fruct,  for  the use  and  profit of  the  wife.4  The husband's 
common law rights were excluded, and the property was ad- 
ministered by the wife  directly, or through the agency of a 
trustee, for her benefit. 
This system  gave  efficient relief  to  those who  were en- 
abled to seek  the  assistance of  the lawyers and  the courts. 
But  only  the  more  wealthy  and  intelligent  classes  could 
'Ante,  26. 
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avail themselves of  such  a  remedy.  In those  cases where 
the rule was  apt to work  the  severest hardships, as in  the 
case of  women  dependent upon  the  proceeds of  their  per- 
sonal activity, the  situation  was quite similar to that which 
may arise under community systems, where the sole protec- 
tion of  the wife is her right to demand  separation of  prop- 
erty.5  The expense and complex character  of  the  proced- 
ure precluded its application to such cases.  Moreover, mat- 
rimonial property rights  which  cannot be  enjoyed  without 
recourse to legal formalities and  judicial procedure must al- 
ways be limited  in  the extent of  their  use  and  enjoyment. 
In the great majority of  cases, parties on the eve of  matri- 
mony will scout the idea of  the possible  necessity of  meas- 
ures  of  security  against  each  other.  An  equitable  legal 
definition of  property rights  is  hence  essential, not only for 
the  regulation of  the relations in  the normal  marriage, but 
also for  the  protection of  those who  come to grief  as a re- 
sult of  misplaced confidence.  It does not necessarily follow 
that in the normal marriage the actual conditions of  the ad- 
ministration and  enjoyment of  property will conform to the 
statutory  system.  Under  separate  property  systems  the 
wife  will  frequently  entrust  her  property to  her  h~sband.~ 
The existence  of  legal  rules,  of  which  advantage may be 
taken  at any time,  will,  however,  be  a  guarantee  of  the 
preservation of  equitable relations between the parties. 
The operation of  the English system, even after the estab- 
lishment  of  the  married woman's  equitable  separate estate, 
revealed  its  radical  defects.  The wife,  however  extensive 
the property which she has brought to the husband, has no 
legal claim to be heard in the matter of  its disposition or en- 
Anfc, s 18. 
=It  has been declared  that it  is  the  custom  in  Russia  for  mamed parties to 
hold and enjoy their goods in  common (Lehr, Droit Rwsc, pp. 17,41).  Practi- 
cally the same condition may be found in  many American families. 128  PROPERTY RELATIONS  OF  MARRIED PARTIES  128 
joyment.  However industrious and economical she may be, 
she can not claim the fruits of  her  activity, or the results of 
her savings.  The husband, however extravagant, dissipated 
or worthless, has a  legal  right  to all  the acquisitions which 
proceed from the personal industry of  the wife.  This right, 
moreover, is not personal to the husband, but may be taken 
advantage of  by his creditors. 
It was  under  the  influence  of these  conditions  that  the 
movement arose during the early part of  the nineteenth cen- 
tury for  a  statutory definition of  the married woman's  sep- 
arate property rights.  This movement produced its first re- 
sults in America, in acts according the wife certain  rights of 
ndependent  legal activity in case she has been deserted  by 
her husband.7  These were followed  by statutes recognizing 
her separate rights in particular classes of  property, such as 
in life insurance policies, deposits in savings banks, etc.,8 and 
exempting  such property  from  the  husband's  disposition 
and from liability for his debts. 
About the middle of  the century statutes appeared which 
accord  the character of  separate property to the entire for- 
tune which the wife possessed at the time  the marriage was 
contracted.  From  this  period, the movement became gen- 
eral  throughout the  United  States, one statute  being soon 
supplanted  by another  affording  greater  privileges  to  the 
married woman.  So earnest were  the  advocates of  the  re- 
form  that in  many states, by bringing the  question  before 
the legislatures or constitutional conventions, they succeeded 
in  having  clauses  inserted  in  the body of  the  organic  law 
making it mandatory upon the legislative  body to provide a 
system of  separate property rights for married women or to 
7  Cf:  proposal in  France  to  give the wife in case  of  husband's  misconduct, a 
right to control the proceeds of her labor, ante, 5 18. 
-  8 Cf: recent similar acts in  France and  proposal  in  Belgium, ante, $ 18, notes 
g. 10; Norway, Stat., June 29, 1888, art. W. 
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exempt their  property  from  the  husband's  disposition  or 
from liability for his debts? 
The legislation  in  the different states has been influenced 
by the earlier statutes, but while there is substantial agreement 
as to general purpose, the details  are  not  worked  out har- 
moniously.  Some of  the states have gone much further than 
others.  In many instances  the acts have been passed with- 
out due consideration of  the consequences that would  result, 
and  it  has  frequently happened  that the  legislature, in ac- 
cording the wife free activity, has failed to repeal rules which 
conceded  privileges  to her on  account of  her incapacity of 
acting.1°  While the principle of  separate property interests 
has  been definitely accepted  in  practically all of  the  states 
which do not recognize community property, the formulation 
of  the  system  has  not  been  perfected.  It has  become  a 
common saying  that every legislative  assembly amends the 
statutes respecting  the  property rights  of  married women. 
The later measures show a tendency to take the form of  gen- 
eral  statutes, defining  systematically the matrimonial  prop- 
erty  relation^.^'  It is quite significant that the recent amecd- 
ments are often designed  to correct, in the interests of  third 
parties, the inconsistencies and lack of  equity resulting from 
some of  the earlier acts. 
In Great Britain, the movement has been characterized by 
C/  provisions  in  Constitutions  of: Ala.,  art.  X,  5 6;  Ark.,  art.  ix, S$ 7, 8; 
Cal., art. xx,  5 8; Fla., art. xi, $5 I, 2; Geo., art. iii, 5 11; Kans., art. xv, $6; Md. 
art. iii, 5 43;  Mich., art. xvi,  5 5;  Miss., 5 94; Nevada, art. iv, 5 31; N. C.,  art. X, 
$8 6, 7;  N. D.,  art. xvii,  5 213;  Oreg.,  art. xv,  5 5;  S. C.,  art. xvii,  5 g;  S. D., 
art. xxi, 5 5;  Texas, art. xvi, 5 15 : W. Va., art. vi, 5 49. 
l0  Ante, 5 7. 
l'  Several of  such acts have been passed  during the period in which the present 
study has been  made.  See Md., Laws, 1898, c. 457;  N. Y. Laws, 1896, c. 272; 
Dist. of  Col., Act, June  I, 1896, U. S. Stat. at Large,  vol. 29, p. 193;  cf:  Penn., 
Act, June 8, 1893, Laws, p. 544;  W. V., Acts, 1893, c.  iii.  In many  states, the 
periodical revisions of the statutes have produced similar results. 130  PROPERTY RELAZYONS  OF  MARRfED PARTIES  C130 
greater  conservatism.  The  legislations  of  the  American 
states and the results of the same have been carefully investi- 
gated by parliamentary commissions.  As a result, the  stat- 
utes are more  harmoniously framed and  more consistent in 
their operation than the earlier American statutes.  The first 
Married Women's  Property Act was  passed  in  1870.-  As 
was true of  the first American statutes, it limited the charac- 
ter of separate property to certain objects,'~  and  it was  not 
until  the  Married Women's  Property Act of  r 882 '4  that all 
the property of  the wife became impressed with this charac- 
ter.  The above-named acts apply only to England and Ire- 
land, but statutes, passed in  1877,'s 1880  l6  and 1881  ,l7 intro- 
duce substantially the same  system  in  Scotland, subject to 
modifications  resulting  from  the  peculiar  development  of 
matrimonial  property relations  in  the latter  country.  The 
English-speaking  colonies  of  Great  Britain  have  generally 
followed  the acts of  the mother country with respect  to the 
separate property rights of  married women. 
Q 3 8.  General Character of  the Married Woman's Proferty. 
The normal condition under this system is for all the wife's 
property,  of  whatever  nature,  and  whenever  and  however 
acquired, to be held  in her own name, free  from any claims 
on the part of her  husband to any interest  in the substance 
or in  the  fruits of  the same.  In considering  the extent to 
which  this condition  has  been realized  in  England  and  in 
most of  the American states, it is necessary to keep in mind 
1'  33 and 34  Vict., c. 93. 
1s Ibid., earnings of  wife (3 I), deposits in savings banks, public funds, stock in 
companies where no liability attaches to holding  of  the  same ($3 2-S), personal 
property, not exceedtng $200,  coming to wife during marrtage by deed or succes- 
sion (5 f),  rents and profits of  real property falling to wife by intestate succession 
(Q  8), policies of life insurance (5  10). 
,445 and 46 Vict., c. 75,  3 2.  "Act,  40 and 41 Vict,  c. 29. 
'6 Act, 43  and qq  Vict., c. 26.  l'  Act,  and 45 Vict., c. 21. 
the fact that the common law system prevails in so far as it 
has  not  been  abrogated.  A  number  of  special  privileges 
accorded  the  wife  in  particular  kinds  of  property will  not 
destroy the husband's general and residuary rights.  To ac- 
complish this, there must be a positive provision abrogating 
the common law system, or the wife must be granted general 
privileges  sufficiently  comprehensive  to  exclude  the  hus- 
band's common law rights. 
The method  pursued at first was  to  exempt certain kinds 
of  property from  the  husband's  usufruct  or right  of  own- 
ership  and  to  reserve  the  same  as  the  separate  prop- 
erty of  the wife.'  This did  not establish a system  of  sepa- 
rate property relations, but created merely a species of  sep- 
arate  property  for  the wife, which  was  distinguished  from 
her other property over which the husband exercised exten- 
sive rights.  This separate property has been extended more 
or less  rapidly in its  scope until  in  some states it  includes 
practically  all  of  the  property  of  the  wife.  Where this 
condition exists the legislation  is generally simplified by the 
adoption of  provisions giving  the married  woman the right 
to  hold  all  of  her  property as  a femme  sole, or  expressly 
abrogating  all  of  the  rights  of  the  husband  in  his  wife's 
property. 
This last stage has been attained  in  Great  Britain and  in 
most of  the American  legislations, but the method  of  stat- 
utory definition is  not  the same.  As previously indicated, 
the development  of  the system  has not  been completed  in 
many instances, and  the statutes in some cases remain  in  a 
chaotic  condition.  In  eight  of  the  American  legislations 
positive provisions have  been enacted  expressly abrogating 
the common law effects of  the  marriage upon  the  property 
of  the wife  or of  the  married  parties.'  In addition, those 
'Ante, 8 37. 
'For  example of such  provisions see post,  Appendix,  note A; Conn., G. S., I 32  PROPERTY  RELATlONS  OF  MARRIED PARTIES  [I 3 2 
legislations  in which  the community system has been intro- 
duced, have abrogated  thecommon law rule so far as it ob- 
tained among them.3 
In the  great  majority oi  the states  either there is a pro- 
vision in general  terms that  all  of  the  property of  the wife 
shall be her separate  property or shall  be held  by her as if 
unmarried,4 or there is a number of specific enactments  fol- 
lowed by such a general clause,5 or there is a series of  general 
grants of  property  rights to  the  wife  sufficiently cornprc- 
hensive to produce the same re~ult.~ 
Finally, there  are  nine  states  which, while  providing  in 
general  or  specific  terms that  all  of  the  property  of  the 
married woman shall be her  separate property, make an ex- 
ception  of objects  donated  by  or acquired  from  the  hus- 
band.~ Similar  limitations, which  existed  in other legisla- 
1888,  2796;  Ky.,  Stat.,  1894, 8 2127;  Me.,  R. S., 1883, c. 61,  5 2;  Miss., An. 
Code, 1892, $ 2289; Mont., C. C.,  1895, $8 213,22";  N. D., R. C.,  1895, $8 2766, 
2767; Oklah.,  R. S.,  1893, 5 2967;  S. D.,  C. L.,  1887, $5 2588, 2600. 
S Anfc, $ I 7  (b). 
'For  examples  of such provisions  see post, Appendix, note B;  N.  C.,  Const., 
art.  X,  $ 6; Ohio, R. S., 1891,  5 3114; Oreg., An. Stat.,  1887, 5 2992, as amended 
by  statute  of  Feb. 22, 1893 (Acts, p.  I 70) ; Penn.,  Statute of  June 8, 1893, 5 I 
(Laws, p.  344); R. I.,  G. L.,  1896,~.  194, 5 I;  Va., Code, 1887, 5  2284; Hawail, 
Laws, 1888, c. xi, $ I; Act, 45 and46 Vlct.,  c. 75, 5 2. 
For example of  such provisions see post, Appendix, note C;  Ala., Code, 1896, 
$5 252c+2523,  2530;  Ark.,  Dig.  Stat.,  1894, $5 4940,  4945;  Ga.,  Code, 5 2474; 
Md.,  Laws, 1898, c. 457, 5  I; Mich. An.  Stat.,  1882, $ 6295;  Minn.,  G. S., 1894, 
$ 5531: N. J., Act, Mch. 27, 1874, §$I,  3,4, Rev.,  1877,  p. 636; N. Y.,  Laws, 1896, 
c.  272, $5 20, 21; S. C.,  C.  S.  L.,  1893,  $ 2164;  Wis.,  An.  Stat.,  1889, $5 2341, 
2342, as amended by Laws, 1895, c. 86. 
6For example of  this class see post,  Appendix,  note D; Ill.,  An. Stat.,  1885, 
C.  68, TT 7, g; Ind., An. Stat.,  IQ,  $5 6962,  6975;  MO.,  R. S.,  189%  5 434c; 
Utah,  R. S.,  1898, 5 1198; Dist. a1  Col.,  Act,  June  I, 1896, 5 I, U. S. Stat. at 
Large, vol.  29, p.  193. 
For example  of  this class, see post, Appendix, note E; Col.,  gifts of  money, 
jewelry  and  wearing  apparel become  her  separate  property,  An.  Stat.,  1871, 
$5 3007,  3012;  Del., Laws, vol.  15,c. 165, 5 I,  R. C.,  1893, p.  600; Kans., G. b., 
1889, 5 3752;  Mass., gifts of wearing  apparel and  articles for personal  use  not 
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tions, have recently been repealed  and  the general tendency 
is to permit such gifts to become the wife's separate property, 
subject, in some instances, to a proviso  that  the latter shall 
be liable for the debts of  the husband existing at the time of 
the gift, and  in all cases to the rules against gifts in fraud of 
creditors.9 
Of  a similar character are  the rules  governing  the  bene- 
ficial  interest  of  the wife  in  policies of  insurance upon the 
life of  her  husband.  It has been  indicated  previously that 
such provisions arose before  the married woman was accorded 
a general right of  holding her property for her separate use. 
The acts generally provided  that  where  a  married  woman 
was the beneficiary in an insurance policy, whether the latter 
had been contracted by the husband, the wife or a third party, 
the  proceeds  of  the  same  should  be  for  her sole use and 
benefit.  The effect  was  to  create  a  trust  in  favor  of  the 
wife.  With  the  development  of  the  investment  feature  in 
life insurance, the danger arose that such policies in favor of 
the wife might  be utilized for the purpose of  defrauding the 
husband's creditors of  the means for satisfying  their claims. 
Hence,  in  some  states,  qualifications  exist  limiting  the 
amount of  the annual  premium that may be paid out of  the 
property of  the husband, and  providing that any excess  in 
the premium or in  the insurance effected  thereby, shall be 
the husband's property or shall be liable for his debts.'"  In 
exceeding  $2,000  in  value,  become  her  separate  property,  P. S.,  1882, c.  147, 
$8 1-3,  as amended  by Acts,  1884, c. 132 and  Acts,  1889, c. 204;  Neb., C.  S., 
1891,  $ 1411; N. H., P.  S.,  1891, c.  176, 5 I; Vt.,  Stat, 1894, 5 2647;  W.Va., 
Code, 1891, c. 66, $5 2, 3, as amended  by  Acts,  1893, c. iii;  Wy.,  R.  S., 18?3-. 
$ 1558.  C$  ante, $ 5. 
B Wis., An. Stat.,  1889, 5 2342, Laws, 1895, c. 86; Dist. of Col.,  R. S.,  1873-74, 
$727, Act, June I, 1896, 5  I, U. S.  Stat. at Large, vol. 29, p.  193. 
'  Ank, 5 5. 
l0 The maximum  premiums  are  as  follows:  Ala.,  $SW, Code,  1896,  $ 2535; 
Mich., $300,  An.  Stat.,  1882, $ 6300; N. Y.,&OO, Laws, 1896, c. 272, $22; Ohio, 134  PROPERTY  RELATIONS  OF MARRIED PARTIES  [l34 
other  states, there is  either an express  provision  that pre- 
miums paid  in fraud of  creditors shall inure to their benefit, 
or the general rule against such transactions will  qualify the 
wife's interest in such property to the extent that the frauds 
can be presumed or proven," 
Of the American states  in  which  individual  matrimonial 
property systems exist, Florida and  Tennessee are  the only 
ones which  fail  to  recognize  that the normal  condition  of 
the wife's fortune is that obtaining under  the system of  sep- 
arate property.  In the former state, the constitution as well 
as the statutes, declare that the property of  the wife shall be 
her separate property  and  not  liable  for  the  debts  of  her 
husband."  Nevertheless  the  husband  has  the  administra- 
tion of  such  property and  the wife  is  forbidden to sue  him 
for the profits and proceeds of  the same.  Thus the property 
of  the married woman is dotal rather than separate, and the 
system is that of  marital  administration  and usufruct.  The 
statutes, however, recognize separate  property  in  the strict 
sense as existing  in the earnings of  the wife,'" her  deposits 
in banks"  and stock  held  by her  in  building and loan asso- 
ciation~.'~  Moreover, the court, if  satisfied  as to her  quali- 
fications, may, after certain formalities  have  been observed, 
grant the wife  a license  to become  a  free  dealer, in  which 
case all  of  her  property becomes separate and she controls 
the same as if unmarried." 
In Tennessee it is recognized  that separate  property of  a 
married woman  may be established  by donation, testament- 
$150,  R. S., 1891, § 3628;  Vt., $300, even  if  insurance is effected  by  wife, Stat., 
1894, $5 2653-2657;  U'.  Va., $150, Code, 1891,  c. 66, $ 5, as  amended by  Ads, 
1893, c. iii;  Hawaii, $500, Act  of  1868, C. L., 1884, p. 429;  cf.  Wis., An. Stat., 
1888, $2347, as amended by Laws, 1891,  c. 376. 
Ante,  5.  'l  Fla., Const., art. xi, $1, R. S., 1892,  2070. 
ISFla., R. S., 1892, 5 2075.  l'  Ibid., $21  99. 
l5  Ibid., $2208.  l6 Ibid.,  I 505-1508. 
1351  SYSTEMS  OF INDIVIDUAL  PROPERTY  I35 
ary or inter vivos, as well  as  by  grant."  There  is  also  a 
statutory separatee state  in insurance  policies,"  deposits in 
banks  l9 and stock in building and loan asso~iations.'~  More- 
over, if  the husband  has deserted  his wife or  is  insane, the 
latter  will  acquire  property  for  her  separate  account.21 
Under ordinary conditions, however, where no positive stip- 
ulations have  been made, the woman's  property, as a result 
of  the marriage, becomes subjected to  the  husband's com- 
mon law rights, which  have been modified  somewhat in  the 
interests of  the wife.zz 
In Russia, it  is the statutory rule  that the marriage  does 
not affect the property of  either party.  That which the wife 
possesses at the time of  the marriage or afterwards acquires 
in any legal manner, is her separate property.'3 
In those codes in which the system of  separate property is 
a  cor~tractual  or extraordinary  statutory system, it  is  the 
regular rule that where such system obtains, all of  the wife's 
fortune shall become her separate property. 
939. Products  of  the  Personal  Industry  of  the  Mawied 
Woman. 
Where  the  perfect  system  of  separate property obtains, 
the married woman  has the same rights  over  the  proceeds 
of  lier  personal industry as those which  she possesses with 
respect to her other  property.  This  is recognized  in all of 
the systems of  Continental Europe.  The codes do not con- 
tain  express  provisions  with  reference  to  such  property. 
These  are  unnecessary under this  system, as well  as  under 
the system  of  dowry.  The general  principle  in  both  sys- 
tems  is  that  the economic interests  of  the woman  are un- 
IT Code, 1884,  3343.  l'  Ibid., 85  3335, 3336- 
l9 Ibid.,  1729.  Ibid., f 1757. 
Ibid.,  3344, seq.  22 Ibid., 5%  3338-3341. 
28 Leuthold, R. R., p. 59;  Lehr, Droit Russr, p. 42. I 36  PROPERTY RELATIONS  OF MARRIED PARTIES  [I  36 
affected by the  marriage, and  hence, unless there  is  a posi- 
tive exception, she possesses the right to receive and to hold 
her earnings as her separate property.=  The question of  her 
personal right to engage in  particular undertakings depends 
upon  different  considerations  which  have  been  previously 
considered.'  While  the married woman  may be  limited  in 
her right  to engage in certain  activities, she can  not  be de- 
prived of  the proceeds which result from an enterprise which 
she is permitted to undertake. 
The English common  law  principle  that  the  husband is 
entitled  to  all  that which  his  wife  gains  by  her  personal 
activity, probably had its chief  basis  in the fact  that  he had 
an  absolute right  to  her  personal  property.  It was  also 
connected with his right  to the services of  the wife.  When 
the courts came  to construe the married women's  acts, they 
followed the strict rule of  interpretation of  statutes  in dero- 
gation  of  the common  law,  and  held  that  the  provisions 
that the property of  the wife should be held to her separate 
use, did not deprive the  husband of  his  right  to the latter's 
earnings.  It was argued  that his right  to his wife's services 
was  not  affected  by the  property acts, and  hence  he  con- 
tinued to possess  his  right  to the proceeds of  her personal 
activity. 
Where the statutes have expressly abrogated the common 
law effects of  the marriage upon the property of the wife, or 
have declared that all of  the property of  the married woman, 
however acquired, shall be her separate estate,3 it would ap- 
pear  that the  wife's  earnings  would  become  her  separate 
property.  Most  of  the  states  have  placed  the  matter be- 
'  Bridel,  Femmc  nraride,  p.  4; Guntzberger, pp.  92, 96,  97; Pascaud, "Le 
Droit de la Femme mariee aux Produits  de  son Travail," Rcv. $02.  et parle, vol. 
i(, PP.  570, 571. 
Antr, $ 6. 
S See ask, $ 38,  and  cf:  statutory provisions,post, Appendix. 
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yond  question  by positive  statutory  provisions  giving  the 
wife the sole right  to the products of  her personal industry. 
A qualification generally exists however that she shall not be 
entitled to compensation  for  services  rendered  to her  hus- 
band  or family.4  In  a  few  of  the  states, the  provision  is 
that the  wife's  earnings  shall  not  be  liable  for  the  debts 
of  her husband.5 
$  40. Dower and Curtesy. 
The widow's  dower and the husband's curtesy are peculiar 
creations  of  the  English  common  law.  Representing  at 
once  elements  of  matrimonial  property  relationships  and 
rights  of  succession, they  indicate the intimate  connection 
existing  between  these  legal  relations.'  These institutions 
continued  for  many centuries  as  essential  features  of  the 
legal  property relations  of  husband  and wife.  During  the 
nineteenth  century, however, they have  suffered  considera- 
ble  modification  in  some  legislations,  and  in  others  they 
have been entirely abrogated.' 
'Ala.,  Code,  1896,  $ 2531;  Ark., Dig. Stat., 1894,  $4945; Conn., G. S., 1888 
$5 2790, 2796; Del., R. C.,  1893,  c. 76,  $ 3;  Fla., R. S., 1892,  $ 2075; Ill., An. 
Stat.,  1885,  c. 68, 7 8; Ind., An.  St., 1894,  $ 6975; Iowa, Code, 1897,  $ 3162; 
Me., R. S., 1883,  c. 61,  $3;  Mass., P. S., 1882,  C. 147, $4;  Minn., G. S., 1894, 
5 5531;  Miss., An.  Code, 1882,  $ 2293; MO.,  R. S., 1899,  $ 4340; Mont., C. C., 
1895,  $225; Neb., C.  S., 1891,  $ 1414;  N. H.,  P.  S., 1891,  c.  176, 5  I; N. J., 
Act, Mch.  zg, 1874,  $4,  Rev., 1877,  p.  637; N. Y., Laws,  1896,  c.  272,  $21; 
Oreg., An.  St., 1887,  $ 2993; S. C., C.  S.  L., 1893,  $ 2165;  Utah,  R. S., 1898, 
$ rzor; Vt.,  Stat., 1894, $ 2647, Acts,  1888,  p.  98; Va.,  Code,  1887,  5 2287; 
W.  Va., Code, 1891,  c. 66,  $ lz  as  enacted  by  Acts, 1893, c.  iii;  Wis., An.  St., 
1889,  $ 2343; Wy.,  R.  S., 1887,  $ 1562; Dist.  of  Col., Act, June  I, 1896,  $ 3, 
U.  S. Stat.  at  Large, vol. 29, p.  193;  Hawaii,  I.aws,  1888,  c. xi, $ 3; England 
and  Ireland, Act, 33 and  34 Vict., c. 93,  $ I,  Act, 45 and  46 Vict., c. 75, $ z; 
Scotland, Act, 40 and 41 Vict., c. 29, 8 3. 
5N.  D., R. C., 1895,  5 2770; Oklah., R. S.,  1893,  5  2972; R. I., G.  S., 1896, 
c. 255, $ 5; S. D., C. L., 1887,  $ 2594.  Cf:  rule in American community systems, 
ank, $ 18. 
'  cf:  ~OJ~P  8 45. 
'See rhetorical soliloquy of  an old lawyer occasioned by the abolition of  dower 
=nd curtesy in Mississippi in 1880,  post, Appendix, note F. I 38  PROPERTY RELA TlONS OF MARRIED PARTIES  [  I 38 
With the development of  real  estate  transactions, it was 
inevitable  that such  provisions  should  prove  inconvenient 
and  that  hardships,  and  even  injustice,  should  frequently 
occur.  It was natural that a demand  should  be made for a 
modification of  the rules governing the wife's  interest in  the 
husband's lands.  Thus, in England, in  1833, it was enacted 
that "  no widow shall  be  entitled  to dower  out of  any land 
which  shall  have  been  absol~ltely  disposed  of  by her  hus- 
band  in his  lifetime, or  by his will."3  Moreover, a  simple 
declaration  in  the  husband's  will  is  sufficient  to  bar  the 
widow from any dower  in his  lands of  which  he dies  intes- 
tate.'  The widow's dower is  also niade secondary to all in- 
terests or charges created by any disposition of  the husband 
to which his land  is subject, including simple debts, as well 
as formal encumbrances.5  These profound  breaches  in  the 
old system were part of  a general movement  to  relieve  the 
alienation of  land of  the obstacles and cumbersome  proced- 
ure  of  the  common  law.'  That it was  not  primarily  in- 
tended to deprive the wife of  any interest  in  her husband's 
lands  is  indicated  by  the  fact  that  the  act  extended  her 
dower right to trust estates and mere rights of  entry.8 
In the United  States the legislation has been influenced not 
only by the same considerations, but also by the effects of  the 
married women's  acts.  The latter, by taking away the hus- 
band's  interest  in  his  wife's  property,  removed  a  condi- 
tion which many believed was  the justification for the exist- 
s Act, 3  and 4  Wm. IV.,  c.  105,  § 4. 
'  lbrd., 5  7.  Ibid., 5 5. 
=The  husband's curtesy was not affected by the above act, but marriage settle- 
ments in  England  have  to a great  extent  caused  its  disappearance.  Schouler, 
H. & W.,  423. 
'  An act, of  the same session, which  abolished  fines and recoveries, provided a 
method  for alienating  the lands of  a married woman.  Act, 3  and 4 Wm.  IV.,  c. 
74,  § 77  sq.;  rf:  post, 5 42. 
uAct, 3  and 4 Wm. IV.,  c.  105,  $5 2, 3. 
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ence of  dower.  Here, also, the  states  have failed  to follow 
a uniform policy.  Some have been more strongly influenced 
by the  one  motive  than  by the  other, and  different  meth- 
ods have been adopted for realizing the desired end.  Thus, 
some legislations have entirely abolished dower and curtesy,g 
while in others the dower  has been  continued but made to 
apply equally to the husband and to the wife.'"  Some states 
have  abolished  dower  and  curtesy but  have  instituted  in 
their stead other estates generally more extensive in scope.I1 
In a few  cases the interest  has  been limited to a legal or in- 
testate  portion  in  the  succession, by being confined  to  the 
real property of  which the party died seized.12 
OCal., C.  C.,  173; Col.,  An.  St.,  1891, 1524;  Conn., G.  S.,  1888,  2796; 
Idaho,  R.  S.,  1887,  5 2506; Miss., An.  Code, 1892, 5  2291; Nev.,  G.  S., 1885. 
5 505; N.  D.,  R.  C.,  1895,  $5 2770, 3743; Oklah.,  R.  S.,  1893,  5  6262,  probably 
inoperative  so  far as dower  is concerned,  rf:  Act, Mch. 3, 1887,  5 18,  U.  S. Stat. 
at Large, vol. 24, pp. 638,  639; S. D.,  C. L.,  1887,  $5 2594,  3402; Wash., G.  S., 
1891,  5 1405;  Wy.,  R.  S., 1887,  5 2221, Neither dower  nor  curtesy obtains  in 
Louisiana or Texas. 
l0 Ill., An.  St., 1885, c.  41,  7 I;  Ky., Stat.,  1894,  2132;  Me.,  but  husband's 
interest is dependent upon solvency of  wife's  estate, R.  S., 1883,  c.  103,  $9 I,  14; 
Md.,  Laws,  1898, c. 457,  $8  6, 7; Ohio,  R.  S., 1891, 4188; Oreg., wife's dower 
is increased to life interest in one-half  of  husband's  lands and husband's  curtesy 
attaches even  if  marriage  is  without  issue,  Statute, Feb. 22, 1883,  Acts, p.  194, 
An. St.,  1887,  5 1983. 
'l In all  real property,  of  which decedent  was seized during  coverture, to the 
conveyance  of  which the survivor has  not consented : X  in fee simple:  Ind., as 
against  cre(litors, wife  takes  only  % or  '1,  if  the  property  exceeds  $IO,OOO  or 
$20,000  respectively  (An. St., 1894,  $5 2639, 2640, 2652,  6961), while husband's 
interest is subject to wife's  ante-nuptial  debts  (Ibzd.,  52642) ; Iowa, Code, 1897, 
$8  3366,  3376; Minn.,  subject  to debts which  are not  satisfied out  of  personal 
estate, G.  S.,  1894,  5  4471; Neb., G.  S., 1891,  5  1124;  in  fee simple:  Kans., 
except in that sold at publlc auction or necessary for the payment of  debts, G. S., 
1889,5§  25999 2619. 
ILDower: Geo.,  Code, 1895,  $4687;  N.  H.,  P.  S.,  1891,  c. 195,  5 3;  Tenn., 
Code, 1884,  $8  3244 seq.,  3251; Vermont, X  in fee simple, Pub.  Acts, 1896,  no. 
44,  $5  I,  2.  Curtesy :  Ark., Dig. Stat., 1894,  5 4945,  Neely v. Lancaster, 47, Ark. 
175; Vt.,  in fee simple, but  limited  to property of  which  both  husband  and 
wife are seized in her right,  Pub. Acts,  1896, no.  44,  5  15;  Wis.,  does not attach 
if issue of  wife by  former marrlage exists, An. St., 1889,  2180. 140  PROPERTY RELA TIOAS OF  MARRIED PAR 7YES  [  140 
In  a  number of  states the statutory provisions  recognize 
the  widow's  dower  alone.'3  The  husband's  common  law 
curtesy exists in these states,"  except where it has  been ex- 
pressly  or  impliedly  abrogated  or  modified.'s  There  are, 
finally, a  few  states that  define dower  and  curtesy substan- 
tially as they existed at common 1aw.1~ 
Where  the  common  law  dower  or  curtesy  obtains,  or 
where the interest of  one party extends to all of  the lands of 
which the other was  seized during the marriage, every con- 
veyance  or disposition  of  the  property  will  be  subject to 
such interest unless the party entitled participates in  the act 
or his  interest  is  barred  by the acceptance of  a  pecuniary 
Is Ala.,  subject to reduction in proportion to wife's separate estate, Code, 1896, 
$5 1500,  1508;  Ark., Dig.  Stat.,  1894, $2520,  see preceding  note for  rule as to 
curtesy;  Fla., R. S., 1892,  51830;  Mont., C. C.,  1895,  $ 228; N.  Y., Laws, 1896, 
c.  547, $ T  70 seq.;  S. C., C. S. L.,  1893,  lgco seq.; Utah, dower and curtesy are 
abolished, but wife is given substantially the same, except that she takes K  in fee 
simple,  R.  S.,  1898, $52826, 2832; U'is.,  An.  St., 1889,  $ 2159, see  preceding 
note for rule respecting curtesy; Dist. of  Col., Act, June  I,  1896,  $ 10,  U. S. Stat. 
at Large, vol. 29,  p. 193.  By the Edmunds-Tucker Act of  Mch. 3,1887  (5 18,  U. 
S. Stat.  at Large, vol. 24, pp. 638,  639), the widow's  common  law  dower was 
established for the territories of  the United States.  Thus, it would appear that 
the widow can claim this  right independent of  the acts of  the territorial legisla- 
ture. 
"It  is recognized  by positive provisions in some states that have modified the 
widow's  dower.  C/  N.  H.,  P. S.,  1891,  C.  195, $ 9;  Penn.,  even  if  marriage is 
without issue, Dig.,  1883,  p. 930~54;  Tenn., Code, 1884,  5  3351. 
Is It has been abrogated in Ariz.,  R. S.,  1887,  $ 225;  Geo., Code, 1895,s  3094; 
Mont., C.  C., 1895,  $ 257; S.  C., C.  S.  L.,  1893,  $2169;  C$  Me.,  R.  S.,  1883, c. 
61,  5  2. 
Del., R. C.,  1893,  c. 87,  $ I,  c. 85,  $ I,  c.  76, Act, Apl. 9, 1873,  $ 5; Mass., P. 
S., 1882,  C.  124,  $S I,  2,  if  no  issue, the husband  has  life  estate  in  one-half  of 
wife's  lands, Acts,  1885,  c.  255, $ 2; Mich.,  An.  St., 1882,  $5  5733,  5783, it  ap- 
pears that husband's curtesy will not attach to wife'sseparate  estate (ibid., 56295), 
and in no case if  wife has issue by  a former marriage (ibid., $ 5770);  MO., R.  S., 
1899,  $5 2933, 1x1; N.  J.,  Rev.,  1877,  p.  298, $ 6, p.  320,  $ I;  R.  I., G.  L.,  1896, 
c.  194,  $g,  c. 203, $ 12,  c.  264, $  I;  N. C.,  Code,  1883,  $5 2102,  2103,  1838; 
Va.,  Code, 1887,  $5 2267,  2286; W.  Va.,  Code,  18g1,  c.  65,  1.  Husband  has 
curtesy even if  marriage is without issue, ibid, $ 15. 
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provision  expressly  or  impliedly  made  in  lieu  thereof. 
Where the survivor  is granted an intestate right of  succes- 
sion or a  legal  portion  in  real  property, the acceptance of 
such  interest  will  generally  bar  any  claim  to  dower  or 
curtesy.'7 
41.  Homestead. 
In  American  states, the  homestead  and  exemption  laws 
have created  for married  persons common interests in  their 
respective  properties.  The primary  purpose  of  such  stat- 
utes has been to provide for the support of  the family in the 
event of the insolvency of  its  head.  They provide  for  the 
exemption of  the  homestead  from execution, the maximum 
amount of  land and the value of  the same varying in the dif- 
ferent states.  Personal  property of  a certain character and 
value  is  also  generally  exempted  from  execution  for  the 
debts of the owner.  In order to  secure such  property for 
the  future needs of  the family and  to prevent the husband 
from  sacrificing  the same, it  is very generally provided that 
no disposition of  the homestead or mortgage of  the exempt 
personal  property shall  be valid without  the joinder of  the 
wife  in the deed. 
As an  interesting  result of  the  married women's acts, the 
wife, in many states, is  permitted  to select a homestead and 
to hold  certain personal property exempt from execution by 
her  creditors.  In  some  states  this  results  from  express 
statutory provisions,'  while  in  others  the  enactment  that 
17 C/  Post,  $8  46, 47.  The conduct of  the party may also  lead to  barring  of 
such interest. 
1 Geo., if  wlfe  with  minor  child  lives  separate  from  husband,  Code,  1895, 
2842; Ind. An. St., 1894,  $ 6969; Iowa, Code, 1897,  $ 2978; Md.,  Laws, 1898, 
c.  355; hlich., An.  St., 1882, $87728, 7729; Miss., An.  Code,  1892,  $5 1970. 
1984; MO. R. S.,  1899,  $4335;  Mont.  C.  C.,  1895,  1671;  N. H.,  P. S., 1891, 
c.  138,  I;  N. Y.,  C. C.  F.,  $8  1392, 1397;  Ohio,  R. S., 1891,  $ 5435; Oklah., 
Laws, 1897,  c. 8, $ 5; Oreg.,  Laws,  1893,  p. 93; N. D.,  K. C., 1895,  $8 3606, I 42  PXOPERY'Y RELATIONS  OF MARRIED PAX TIES  [I 42 
owners or householders  are entitled  to the  privilege would 
seem to include married women.z  In the later statutes, it is 
generally provided  that husband and wife shall not  both be 
permitted to claim such exemptions. 
The provisions limiting the disposition of  the homestead do 
not apply eqnally to the husband and the wife.  Most of  the 
acts were framed in the expectation that the exempted prop- 
erty would  be selected from  that  belonging  to the husband. 
The provision that no disposition of  the  homestead  shall be 
valid without the consent of  the wife does not  limit her dis- 
position  of  the  same where  it has  been  selected  from  her 
own  property.  There  is,  however, a  distinct  tendency  to 
require the consent of  each  married  party to'every disposi- 
tion affecting the title of  a homestead claimed by or selected 
out of  the property of  the other.  The homestead  thus be- 
comes  a  species  of  common  property  and  the  rules  of 
succession emphasize this character.3 
42. Administration  of  the  Wife's Proferty. 
The general  rule, recognized  in  all of  the  legislations, is 
that the wife alone is competent and qualified  to perform  all 
acts of  simple administration over her separate property.  In 
3621;  S. C.,C. S. L., 1893, $ 2132; S. D., C. L., 1887, $2456,  sq.;  Utah, R. S., 
1898, $8 1149, 1152, 1154;  Wash., Laws, 1895, c. 64; W. Va., Code, 1891,  c. 41, 
$5 23, 30;  Dist. of  Col., Act, June I, 1896,  5, U. S.  Stat. at  Large,  vol. 29, p. 
193;  C$  La. Const., 1898,  art.  244.  In  following, husband  must  join  wife  in 
making  claim  to  homestead  out  of  her  separate  property: Arii., R.  S., 1887, 
5 2074;  Cal.  C.  C.,  $9:  1238,  1239;  Idaho,  R.  S.,  1887,  $5 3036,  3037;  Nev., 
G. S-, 18859 $539. 
Ala., Const., art. X,  5 2;  Conn. G. S., 1888, $2783;  Ill., An.  St., 1885, c. 52, 
I; Kans., Const., art. 15, $ g; Ky., Stat., 1894, $ 1702;  Me., R. S., 1883, c. 81, 
$563-66;  Mass.,  P.  S.,  1882, c.  123,  5 I; Minn.,  G.  S., 1894,  $ 5521; N.  J., 
Rev., 1877, p. 1055, 51; N. C.,  Const., art.  X,  Q 2;  Vt.  Stat., 1894,  5 2179;  Va., 
Code, 1887, $$3630,3650-3652;  Wis.,  An.  St.,  1889, 5 2983;  Wy.,  R. S., 1887, 
5 2780. 
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this respect  she acts  as  a femme  sole.I  The husband does 
not have a right to such administration.  It is, nevertheless, 
recognized by some of  the statutes that the marriage estab- 
lishes such  an intimate  relation  between  the parties  as to 
justify the presumption that the wife  has entrusted the hus- 
band with  the administration of  her goods,'  and where, as a 
matter  of  fact, she permits  her  husband  to exercise  such 
functions over  her property, she will not  be able, in the ab- 
sence of an express agreement, to hold  him accountable for 
the expenditure which he  has made of  the fruits and profits 
resulting from his administration.3 
With  respect  to administration  in  the broader  sense, in- 
cluding the right of  encumbering and alienating the separate 
property, there is not such general agreement.  As an aid in 
determining this question it will  be well  to refer to the gen- 
eral  attitude of the  legislations  respecting  the  contractual 
capacity of  married women.4  In those that accept the prin- 
ciple  that the wife has the  same general  capacity to make 
contracts as is  possessed  by the  unmarried woman, she will 
have  the power  to dispose of  her  separate  property unless 
special provisions to the contrary exist.  On the other hand, 
according to  the  legislations  that  regard  the  marriage  as 
qualifying the  general  contractual capacity  of  the woman, 
the wife will have the right to make only such dispositions of 
her property as are within  the scope of  her granted powers. 
1  Contra in Texas, where the husband has the sole management of the property 
and  wife has only a limited right  of  administration, R. S., 1895, $$ 2967, 2970. 
2971 ;  Cf. rule in Florida and Tennessee, ante, 5 38, note 13, srq. 
2 Austria, B. G., 5 1238; only as regards paraphernalia under system of  dowry: 
France, C. C., 1578;  Italy, C.  C., 1429;  La. C. C.,  2385.  Contra,  Spain,  C. 
1383, 1384;  Basle, Stat., Mch. 10, 1884, art. 30. 
'Austria,  B. G.,  $ 1293;  Germany, B. G., 1 1430;  France, C. C.,  1539, 1578; 
Italy, C. C., 1429;  La., C. C.,  2386;  Switz.,  Vormhwrrf; 271. 
a C' post, 5 48. 
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On  this  question, the  legislations  divide  themselves into 
three classes : 
I. Where the wife has the general right of  disposition over 
all her separate property.  This is subject, of course, to par- 
ticular  provisions  governing  dispositions  between  husband 
and wife, contracts of  surety, donations, etc.5 
11.  Where the married woman is limited in the disposition 
of  her immovables. 
111.  Where the wife is restricted in  the disposition of  her 
property in general. 
The first class includes  those  states  that have  continued 
the  rule of  Roman  law, as well  as  a majority of  the  newer 
legislations.  Most of  them recognize  that the general con- 
tractual capacity of  the woman  is unaffected by the marriage, 
and hence particular provisions are unne~essary.~ 
Most  of  the  American  states  that  are  not  included  in 
the  first  group, constitute the  second division, which  limits 
the  married woman  in  dispositions  affecting  her  real prop- 
erty.  The peculiar  sanctity  which  feudal  ideas  conferred 
upon  land and  the desire  to preserve such property for  the 
family have influenced  these restrictions.  It is necessary to 
note that the existing limitations were primarily designed to 
facilitate rather than to restrict  the conveyance of  the wife's 
real property.  At common law such property was regarded 
as  inalienable whether  the  husband  acted  alone  or jointly 
Cf:  ante, $1  3-5. 
6The  following are included  (cf: references,  ante, QQ 2, 3) : Austria, Germany. 
Prussia (but  consent of  husband  is  necessary for contracts of  sale or pledge  of 
jewelry  or articles of  adornment, A. L. R., ii, I,  223), Saxony, Russia, Norway, 
Basle, Glarls, Lucerne,  Zurich,  Draft  Code  of  Switzerland, England, Alabama, 
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georg~a,  Illinois, 
Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,  Michigan,  I\f~ssiss~ppi,  Montana, 
Nebraska, New  York, Nofth  Dakota, Oh~o,  Oklahoma,  Oregon, Rhode Island, 
South  Dakota,  Tennessee,  Utah,  Virginia,  Washington,  Wisconsin,  Wyoming, 
District of  Columbia. Hawaii. 
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with  his wife.  The procedure which  was  devised  to evade 
such  restriction, was  cumbersome  in  its  operation and was 
abrogated as a result of  the general movement to abolish an- 
tiquated obstacles  to  the  transfer of  land.7  The joinder  of 
the  husband  and wife  in  the deed of  conveyance, executed 
with more or less formality, came to be sufficient to pass the 
title of  the wife's  real  pr~perty.~  With the barring  of. the 
husband's  interest in  the wife's  lands and  the conferring of 
general  contractual  capacity upon  the  married woman, the 
tendency  has  appeared  to  remove  the  remaining  restric- 
tions.9 
The general rule that the joinder of  the husband and wife 
is necessary to a valid  conveyance of  her real  property still 
obtains in a number of  states."  The provision  intended  to 
protect the wife from undue influence by requiring her sepa- 
rate examination respecting  the  voluntary  character  of  the 
act, is also retained  in  a  few statutes."  The protection  of 
C/: ante, Q 40. 
OAct, 3 &4  Wm. JV., c. 74,  77 stq.  Custom and statutes in American states 
introduced similar rules. 
g Recent  abrogations  have been  made  in:  Ala.,  c$  Code, 1886, $2346, with 
Code, 1896,  Q 2526;  Ark., the courts having  decided  that  wife could  not  make 
executory  contracts  to convey  land  (Christman v.  Partee, 38 Ark., 31;  Walters 
v. Wagley, 53 Ark., sag), an act of  1895 gave her this power (Laws, p. 58);  Cal., 
Stat. Sr Amend.,  1891,  p.  137, idzd., 1895, p. 53;  Md. cf:  P.  G. L.,  1888, art. 45, 
5 2, with Laws, 1898, c. 457, $5 4, 5. 
l0 Fla., R. S.,  1892,  Q 1956;  Idaho,  R. S.,  1887, Q 2922;  Ind., An.  Stat.,  1894, 
$6961; Ky.,  Stat., 1894,  2128; Minn., G. S.,  1894, QQ 5530, 5532;  MO., R. S., 
1899,  $901;  Nev.,  C;.  S.,  1885, Q§  2570,  2588 seq.; N.  H., P. S.,  1891, c.  176, 
$3; N.  J., Act, Mch.  27, 1874, S 14, Rev., 1877, p.  637;  N. M.,  C.  L.,  1897, 
Q 1510; N. C.,  Code, 1883,  $5 1826, 1834; Penn.,Act, June 8, 1893,  $5 I, 2, Laws, 
p. 344;  Tenn., Code, 1884, $8 3338-3340;  Vt.,  Stat., 1884,  Q 2646;  W. Va.,  Acts, 
1893, c. iii, $5 2,  3;  cf;  Texas, R. S.,  1895, art. 635. 
I1Idaho, R. S.,  1887, Q§  2922,2956, 2960; Ky.,  Stat., 1894,  507; N. C., Code, 
1883, Q§  1834, 1246, 1256; Tenn.,  Code,  1884,  3340;  C$  La.,  C. C.,  127, 128; 
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the husband's curtesy appears to be the chief  reason for  the 
retention of the restriction in  the other legi~lations.~~ 
The third class includes legislations  in  which  the  system 
of  separate property  is  regarded  as  unusual, and  in which 
the married woman is generally restricted in her contractual 
capacity.  The chief representatives  of  this class are the French 
Civil Code and those Codes that have been  most strongly in- 
fluenced  by it.  The provisions of  the codes are somewhat 
obscure  and,  in  some  instances, conflict with  each  other. 
The starting point is the general provision that the wife, even 
if  living under the separate property system, can not acquire 
or alienate property without  the consent  or joinder  of  her 
husband.13  This  principle  is  adhered  to so far as separate 
property (paraphernalia) under the system of  dowry is con- 
cerned.  The wife has the management, but  is restricted  in 
dispositions over the substance of  the goods.14 
A distinction  is  made  respecting  the system of  separate 
property, according as it  is the result  of  a judicial  separa- 
tion or of a marriage contract.  In the former case, it is ex- 
pressly provided that the wife  may dispose of  her movables 
and alienate the same."  In the case of  contractual separate 
lt Wherever  the common law  right of  curtesy exists,  any  disposition  by  the 
wife, even if she possesses  the general right of  alienating her real property, wil~ 
be subject to the conditional estate of  the husband, c-  ante, 8 40. 
13 France, C.  C.,  217;  La.,  C. C.,  122; Cf. Finland, Stat., Apl. 15, 1889,  c. 11, art. 
6.  In Spain the limitation is general, but  does not contain the specific reference 
to the system of  separate  property, C. C.,  61. The Italian code does not  contain 
the specific reference to the system of  separate property, and is limited to aliena- 
tion or mortgage of  immovables, contracting of  loans and assignment or recovery 
of  stocks, C. C.,  134. 
l4 France, C.  C.,  1576;  Spain,  C.  C., 1344, 1387;  La.,  C.  C., 2384, 2390;  c/ 
Italy, C. C.,  1427, 134. 
5 France, C. C.,  1449; La., C. C., 2435;  in  Spain the wife has the same power 
over her property as the husband when he adm~nisters  her goods, but she cannot 
al~enate  or  engage  her  immovables without  judicial anthorization,  C.  C.,  1442, 
1444; in Finland she may dispose of her property as a widow, Stat., Apl. 15, 1889, 
c.  v, art.  15. 
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property, the codes  are silent  respecting  the alienability of 
movables, but  contain  provisions expressly prohibiting the 
alienation of  immovables without proper authorization.'Vt 
has been argued  that the fact  that emphasis is placed upon 
the  prohibition  of  the  alienation  of  immovables  must be 
taken  as  evidence  that the  alienation  of  movables  is  per- 
mitted, as  under  the system  of  judicial  separate  property. 
This  seems  to  be  the prevailing view1' despite the positive 
statements  of  the  general  provision  limiting  the  powers 
of  the wife." 
$  43. Support of the Family. 
The equitable character of  a matrimonial property system 
will be affected by the provision  that  is made for  the liqui- 
dation of  the charges of  the conjugal society.  In all of  the 
systems previously considered, the chief  justification  for the 
privileges which the husband possesses in his wife's property 
is to be found in  the fact  that  he supports the  expenses of 
the family household.  Under  the  system of  separate prop- 
erty, the husband is not entitled to any gain from  the prop- 
erty of  the wife.  Moreover, the increasing  extent to which 
wonleil are engaging in  industrial and  other  pursuits, tends 
to  decrease the  economic  value  of  the  personal  services 
which  the wife  renders  the family.  The  interests  of  third 
parties  are likewise  concerned.  Where  the  husband  be- 
comes incapable of  sustaining the matrimonial charges, shall 
creditors who  have  furnished  supplies for  the family suffer 
losses, while the wife, who  has contributed  to  the  expenses 
lRFrance,  C.  C.,  1538; La., C. C.,  2397;  in  Spain, it  would  appear  that  the 
same rule obtains as where the system  1s  the result of  judicial  decrees,  cf:  C. C., 
1432, 1442, 1444. 
'7  C$  Guntzberger, pp. 105, 98, 99.  Respecting the tendency to apply thesame 
rule to movables of the paraphernalia, see ibid., p. 93 sq. 
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for  which  the  debts have  been  incurred,  possesses  ample 
means for liquidating such obligations? 
Many  states recognize  that equitable considerations  de- 
mand that the wife, who  is  able, shall assist  in  bearing  the 
burden of  the family expenses.  In some  cases  the  princi- 
ple of  joint  liability has  been  adopted, the expenses of  the 
family being  chargeable upon  the property of  the husband 
and wife or of  either of  them.'  Other legislations  make the 
wife only secondarily liable, postponing execution upon  her 
property until  the failure of  the husband's  property to sat- 
isfy  the  debts, or  granting  her  a  right  of  indemnification 
against her husband.' 
The legislations  of  Continental Europe generally  require 
the wife  to make a  contribution  out of  the  income  of  her 
property and the proceeds of  her labor.  In some cases it is 
provided that the contributions  shall  be suitable, or in pro- 
portion  to the resources  of  the two parties,3 while  in other 
instances, a  definite  proportion of  her income  is  required.4 
Particular provisions exist for the case where  the system  of 
'Col.,Act,  Apl. 6, 1891,  Laws, p.  238;  Ill. An. St., 1885,  c.  68,  15;  Iowa, 
Code, 1897, $ 3165;  MO.,  wife's separate persunal property is liable for debts for 
necessaries,  K. S.,  1899, 5 4340;  N. M., if  for necessaries, C. L., 1897, $ 151 I ; 
Oreg.,  An.  St.,  1887,  $2874; Utah  R.  S.,  1898,  5 1206;  Wash.,  G. S.,  1891, 
§ 1414. 
Ariz., where  wife  contracts  debts  upon  her  husband's credit,  R.  S.:  1887, 
$5  2107, 2108;  Conn., G. S., 1888, 5 2797;  Neb.,C. S., 18g1,s  1411; Penn., Dig., 
1883, p. 1151, $ 15; cf.  Mont., C.  C., 1895, $ 212; for  maintenance of  children: 
England, Act, 33 & 34 Vict., c. 93,  $ 14;  Act, 45  & 46  Vict., c. 75,  $ 21; Leut- 
hold, R. K., p. 68;  cf;  Idado, R. S., 1887, $ 5859;  Nev. G. S., 1885, $ 537. 
SGcrmany, B. G.,  $ 1427; Italy, C. C.,  1426,  138;  Spain, C.  C., 1434; Switz., 
Vormtwurj;  274. 
4France, X,  C.  C., 1537, 1575; La., X,  C.  C.,  2388, 2395; Basle, M and  if 
husband is  incapable, all, Stat.,  Mch. 19, 1884, art.  31; in  Spain the  profits  of 
paraphernal property are  employed in defraying the matrimonial charges and the 
substance may be taken in case the dowry and the husband's property are insuffi- 
cient, C. C., 1385. 
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separate property is the result of  judicial decree.  The con- 
tribution, in such event, must  generally be in  proportion to 
the  resources  of  the  two  parties, and  may affect  the sub- 
stance of  the wife's  property as well as her income.5 
The married woman  may indirectly be compelled  to bear 
a  portion of  the family expense even  in  those  states which 
do not  impose  upon  her  a  general  obligation  to  sustain 
such charges.  It is a general  rule  that the minor children 
have a right of  demanding maintenance from  the  mother as 
well  as  from  the father,  though  the former's  liability is  in 
most cases secondary to that of  the latter. 
There has  been  no  such unanimity in  granting the  hus- 
band a  right  of  demanding the necessary aliments from his 
wife.  Most  of  the legislations, particularly in  England and 
America, have  rules for enforcing  the  husband's  obligation 
to support  the wife.  The provisions may lead  to the plac- 
ing  of  the  husband's  prcperty  in  the  hands  of  trustees. 
They include  criminal  as well  as civil  penal tie^.^  Many of 
the acts date back  to the period  in which  the economic  in- 
terests of  the married woman were entirely in  the control of 
the husband. 
The English  common  law  recognized  no  obligation  on 
the part of  the wife to support her husband out of  her prop- 
erty.  Such a provision would  have  been  redundant under 
the old system.  The husband was entitled to the substance 
of  the wife's personal property and to the profits of  her real 
estate.  The law likewise  secured  him  the privilege of  con- 
trolling  his  wife's  services  and  of  collecting  the proceeds 
6France, C. C., 1448; Italy, C.  C., 1423; Spain, C.  C.,  1434;  La., C. C.,  2434; 
Finland, Stat., Apl. 15, 1889,  c. v, 5 16;  Basle,court determines the amount,Stat., 
Mch. 10, 1884, art. 41;  Lucerne, restricted  to income, Stat., Nov. 26, 1880,  art. 22; 
c$  Prussia, A. L. R., ii. I,  5  262. 
61t is  possible in some states  for  a wealthy wife  to  obtain  a divorce on the 
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arising  from  her  labor.  Aside from  the  substance  of  the 
wife's  realty,  the  husband  had  absolute  right  to all  of his 
wife's  property.  To-day, the  husband  is  deprived of these 
extensive  privileges,  and  is  left  with  practically  no  legal 
rights of  economic value as regards his wife or her property. 
His right to her services can  no longer  be enforced against 
her will. 
Some of  the Continental codes require the married woman 
to support her  husband  if  his  means  are insufficient,'  and 
similar provisions were incorporated  in the English  Married 
Women's Property Acts of  1870 and  1882.Vhe  American 
states have  been slow to accept this  principle.  Only a few 
legislations contain positive provisions making the wife liable 
for the  support of  her  husband, and  in  all  cases  the  hus- 
band's  incapacity to  support himself  must  be  due to infir- 
mity.$  In a few  cases the husband is given privileges in  his 
wife's property in case she has abandoned him.1° 
Some  evidence  of  a tendency to place the husband  and 
wife upon a condition of  equality with respect to obligations 
for support is to be found  in the newer legislation regarding 
the effects of  divorce.  No part of  the law regulating family 
relations in the United States is in such a chaotic state as that 
which  provides for  the judicial  dissolution of  the  marriage 
and the effects of  such dissolution.  Statutory provisions  in 
the respective states display a great  lack  of  uniformity, and 
TGermany,B.G.,  1360;  Saxony, B. G.,  1637; Italy, C. C., 132; Spain, C. C., 
143, 144;  cj:  Prussia,  A. L. R., ii.  I, $262.  In  some  of  the  states  there  is  a 
general provision requiring married parties to  render mutual assistance;  France, 
C. C., 219;  Prussla, A. L. R.  ii. I,  174;  Leuthold, R. R., p. 59. 
8rlct, 33 & 34 Vict., c. 93,  13;  Act, 45 & 46 Vict., c. 75, S 20. 
UCal., C. C., 176; Idaho, R. S. 1887,  2507;  Mont., C. C., 1895,  246; Nev., 
G. S., 1885,s  522. 
10 Iowa, Code, 1897, S$ 2220, 3158; Oklah.,  R. S , 1893,  2975;  Penn., Dig., 
1883, p.  1348, $8 51-55;  Utah, R. 5., 1898,  1220. 
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in  many  cases  are  illogical  and  inequitable  in  character. 
This condition  is due not only to the great extension of  the 
grounds for  divorce, but also  to changes which  have been 
effected in the matrimonial property relations. 
Under  the old  system, alimony existed for  the wife, gen- 
erally  without  regard  to  the question  of  her innocence  or 
guilt.  Moreover,  if  the  husband  was  the  guilty  party, he 
was  required  to  restore  the wife's  property at once, while 
the wife retained her dower in his lands.  If  the husband ob- 
tained the divorce, he retained all or a portion of  the prop- 
erty of  the wife, while  the latter  lost  all  her  rights  in  her 
husband's property.  In all cases the husband was liable for 
the support and maintenance of  the common children. 
With  the  development  of  the  separate  property  of  the 
wife these provisions assumed an inequitable character.  An 
innocent  husband  might  be compelled  to  pay alimony, in- 
cluding the expenses of  defending  the suit for  divorce, to a 
guilty  wife  possessed  of  independent means, while, on  the 
other hand, he  had  ceased  to possess  property of  the wife 
which he might use  to assist him  in defraying the expenses 
of  the  maintenance  of  the  children  and  of  the  common 
household. 
The  states  have  not  adopted  the  same  methods  for 
ameliorating  this  condition.  In some, statutory provisions 
have made the wife, equally with the  husband, liable for the 
maintenance  of  the minor  children,==  while  in  others such 
liability of  the wife will attach only where  she has  been ad- 
"  Conn., G. S., 1888, § 2812;  Ind., An. St.,  1894,  § 1058; Ky., Stat.,  1894, $ 
2123; Me., R.  S., 1883, c. 59,  8 17; Minn., G.  S., 1894, §§4&1-4803;  Miss., 
An.  Code, 1892, 8 1565;  MO., R.  S., 1899, 4  2926;  Mont., C.  C., 1895,  191; 
Neb., C. S., 1891,  1432;  N. J., Rev.,  1877, p. 317, 9 19;  N. D., R. C., 1895, 
2759;  Ohio, R. S., 1891,  5701, as amended by  Statute, May  19, 1894, Acts, p. 
348;  S. D., C.  L., 1887,  2582;  Utah,  K. S., 1898,  1212; Va., Code, 1887, 
2263;  W.  Va., Code, 1891,  c. 64,  11; Hawaii,  C. L., 1884,  1328, 1329;  Cj. 
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judged  the  guilty party.l2  A few  statutes  provide  that the 
separate estate of  the wife shall  be taken  into consideration, 
and that alimony may be refused  if  she has sufficient  prop- 
erty for  her needs.l3 
Quite a number of  the states  have accepted the principle 
of  equal rights for both parties.  There is a  general  provis- 
ion that  alimony may be granted  to the innocent  party, or 
the court is authorized to make such disposition of  the prop- 
erty of  the parties  as under  the  circumstances will  be  just 
and equitable.14  This is the position of  the European legis- 
lations.15 
A  tendency  has  appeared  in  the  newer  legislations  to 
limit the amount which either party may receive  to an  ali- 
mentary pension payable only so long as it may be needed. 
This  is  generally  coupled  with  a  proviso  that  the  guilty 
party shall restore, while the innocent  party shall retain, all 
economic benefits gained as a result of  the marriage. 
llKans., G.  S,  1889,  Q 4756;  Mass.,  P.  S., 1882, c.  146, $ 27;  N. H., P.  S., 
1891, c.  175, $ 13; Oklah., R.  S., 1893, $ 4550;  Oreg., An.  St., 1887, $ 501; 
Wis., An. St., 1889, $ 2365;  cf:  England, Act, 20 and  21 Vict., c. 85, 5 45. 
13Ala.,  Code, 1896,  Q 1495; Cal., C.  C., 142;  Geo., Code, 1895, $ 2458;  Idaho, 
R. S., 1887, 5 2477;  Mont., C. C., 1895, $ 195; Tenn., Code, 1884, $ 3326. 
ILIowa,  Code,  1897, Q$  3177-3180;  Mass., P.  S., 1882,  c.  146, $ 15;  Nev., 
G. S., 1585,  Q 494;  N. C., Code, 1883,  Q  1290; Ohio,  R. S., 1891,  Q$ 5690-57011 
as amended by Statute, Feb. 9, 1893,  Acts, p. 30, and Statute May  19, 1894, Acts, 
p. 348;  Oreg., An.  St., 1887, Q 501; R.  I., G.  L., 1896, c.  195, $8; Vt., Stat., 
1894, $2694; Va.,  Code,  1887, $2263;  Wash.,  C.  P.,  1891, $771; W. Va., 
Code,  1891, c.  64, Q  11; England,  Act, 20  and  21 Vict., c. 85,  5 45;  cf:  Ariz., 
R. S., 1887, 5 2114; Cal., C.  C., 146; Idaho,  R.  S., 1887,  Q 2480;  Ill., An. St., 
1885, c. 68,  5. 
'SGermany,  B.  G.,  $Q 1578-1585;  Prussia,  A.  L.  R.,  u.,  I, $$ 783  seq.,  809 
scq.;  Saxony, B. G., $8 I 750, 175 I ;  Austria, B. G., $ 117; France, C. C., 299-301; 
Italy, C. C., 156; Spain, C. C., 73;  Basle, Stat., Mch. 10, 1884, art. 23;  Lucerne, 
Stat., Nov. 26,  1880, art.  25;  Zurich,  P.  R. G.,  Q 629  seq.;  Switz.,  Vorentwurf; 
170-172. 
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44.  Liability for Debts. 
Under the rules of  the English common law, the husband 
was liable for his wife's ante-nuptial and post-nuptial obliga- 
tions, including those arising from torts as well  as those pro- 
ceeding  from  contracts.'  The married  women's  property 
acts have affected  this  liability and  practically abrogated it. 
When the husband ceased to receive economic benefits from 
the wife  as  a  necessary result  of  the  marriage, one of  the 
chief  grounds justifying his responsibility for her obligations 
disappeared. 
The husband's  liability did  not  rest alone upon  the  fact 
that he received property from the wife.  He  was liable even 
if  he received nothing, while, on the other hand, his liability 
ceased at her death even if  he had received all of  her prop- 
erty.  At the same time, it is beyond question that the chief 
explanation of  the husband's release from such liability is to 
be found in  the  fact  that  the  law does not accord  him any 
right to his wife's  property. 
Another influence has grown out of the change in the legal 
economic  position of  the married woman.  To-day the wife 
possesses  property which,  even  during  coverture, is  liable 
to execution for the payment of  her debts. 
Most of  the legislations take the position that where sepa- 
rate property obtains, neither married party is responsible for 
the obligations of  the  other  except where  these  have been 
contracted  for necessaries  for  the support of  the famil~,~  or 
in the sphere of  an express or implied agency.  In order to 
protect  the wife's  ante-nuptial creditors, a proviso  has been 
introduced in  some statutes making  the husband  liable  to 
the extent of  any property he may have  received  from  the 
wife.3 
For character and  extent of this obligation, see Schouler, H. & W., Part iv, 
Chaps. ii, iii.  '  C/: ante, $ 43. 
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Particular provisions exist in  some legislations respecting 
the  obligations  arising  from  the  post-nuptial  torts  of  the 
wife.  A  few  of  the American  states  retain  the  husband's 
common law liability,'  but the majority of  the legislations do 
not recognize  any resposibility on  the  part of  the  husband 
except where the act was done under his coercion or author- 
ization or where  he would  be  jointly liable  if  the marriage 
did not exist.5 
lute exemption.  This was repealed  by Act, 37 and  38 Vict., c. 50, which  intro- 
duced above rule; asbetween husband and wife her separate property is primarily 
liable, 45 and 46 Vict., c. 75, $5 13-15;  Scotland, Act, 40 and 41 Vict., c. 29, $ 4; 
Ky.,  Stat., 1894, $2130;  Col., An. St., 1891,  $ 3014;  Geo., Code,  1895, $ 2473; 
Ind., An, St., 1894, Q 6970;  MO., R. S., 1899, $ 4341;  N. T., Laws, 1896, c. 272, 
$ 24;  \V.  Va., Code, c. 66, $ 11, as enacted by Acts, 1893, c. iii. 
'Geo., Code, 1895,s 3817;  N. M., C. L.,  Q 1503;  N. C., Code,  1883, $ 1833; 
Wy.,R.S.,1887,$1565; c$Del.,R.C.,1893,~.76,p.600. 
5Ala., Code, 1896, $ 2525;  Conn., G. S., 1888, $ 984;  Ill., An. St., 1885, c. 68, 
74; Ind., An. St., 1894, §$6965, 6966;  Iowa, Code,  1897,  $5 3151, 3156;  Ky., 
Stat., 1894, $ 2120; Me., R.  S., 1884, c.  61, $4; Md., Laws,  1898, c. 457, Q 5; 
Mich., An. St., 1882,$ 7714; Minn., Laws, 1897, c. 10; Mont., C. C., 1895, $1  218. 
226, 254;  N,Y.,  Laws, 1896, c. 273, $ 27; N. D., R. C., 1895, $ 2770; 0hi0,R. S., 
1891,  $ 3115; Oklah., R. S.  1893, 8 2972;  Oreg.,  An.  St.,  1887,  $ 2996;  R. I., 
G. L., 1896, c. 194,  $ 14; S. D.,C.L., 1887, $2594; Utah, R. S., 1898, $ 1204; Vt., 
Stat.,  1894, $2648;  Wash., G.  S., 1891, $ 1413;  Wis.,  An.  St.,  1889, $ 2969; 
Hawaii, Laws, 1888, c. xi, $ 7;  England, Act, 45 and 46, Vlct., c. 75, $$ I, 14, 24. 
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SUCCESSION OF MARRIED PARTIES. 
6 45.  Geneyal Relation to Matrimonial Property Rights. 
Any general comparison of  matrimonial property systems 
will  be  incomplete without  a  consideration  of  the  mutual 
rights  of  inheritance  of  married  parties.  The converse  is 
equally true.  An examination of  the  provisions  governing 
the succession of  married  parties reveals  the greatest diver- 
gence  among  the various  legislations, and  it would  be  im- 
possible  to explain  the differences without  reference  to the 
property relations of  the parties during the marriage. 
The history of  the law of  succession of  married parties in 
a  particular  legislation  often  illustrates  this  close  relation- 
ship.  Thus, in the early Roman law, the wife has the same 
right of  succession  as the children.  In legal  terms  this  is 
explained  by the  fact  that she is one of  the agnatic family, 
one of  the szti keredes.  Its moral basis, however, reveals it- 
self  in the fact that the husband, in the marriage with manzds, 
receives all  that the wife possesses or  acquires  in  the same 
way  as he  obtains  the  acquisitions  of  his  children, hence 
she is of  right entitled to the same share in his succession as 
is accorded to a child. 
The rule of  succession was confined  in  its  application  to 
the civil law marriage with manus.  The woman who did not 
come under  the marital  power was not  recognized as a wife 
(mater fnmilias)  in  the strict sense of  the civil law, and she 
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could  not claim  the civil  law rights which  a wife  possessed 
in  the succession  of  her  deceased  husband.  She did  not 
become a member of  his agnatic family. 
The prztorian  law, which introduced important modifica- 
tions in the civil law of  succession, did not accord any exten- 
sive privilege  to the wife.  The przetor brought about a de- 
velopment from the succession based upon agnatic or family 
organization  to that resting upon cognate or blood relation- 
ship.  The surviving married party, in so far as  he did not 
possess a civil  law right of  succession, was postponed  to all 
relatives of  a degree capable of  succeeding. 
The explanation of  this seeming harshness, in a legal sys- 
tem  that was distinguished  by its  equitable character, is  to 
be  found in  the  fact  that the relations of  the husband and 
wife  had,  in  general,  come  under  the dotal system.  The 
wife's property did not pass, as a result of  the marriage, into 
the  ownership  of  the husband.  The dos  and  the  donatio 
propter nuptias  generally furnished  the wife  adequate provi- 
sion  for  the  contingency  of  the  husband's  prior  death. 
Moreover, under  the  praetorian  system, she had  a  right of 
succession to the  property of  her  father and cognatic rela- 
tives.  The later imperial  legislation  made  provision  for  a 
widow in indigent circumstances.  She was granted a fourth 
part of the  estate of  her  husband, but  if  the  decedent  left 
three or more children she was restricted  to a child's share. 
If the children  were common to both parties the share was 
held in usufruct.  This interest was not subject to the testa- 
mentary disposition of  the husband.' 
Teutonic law did not accord the wife a right of  inheritance 
in  the  proper  sense  of the  term.z  But, as a result  of  the 
marriage, she acquired certain economic  interests  from  her 
l Sohm, Inst., 5 I  I I. 
P Heusler, Inst., vol. ii, p. 421,  "g. 
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husband or rights in his property which  were  in  the nature 
of  provisions for the future dissolution of  the marriage.3  In 
addition, where  community  of  goods  obtained, the widow 
received  her  share  of  the  joint  property  or  retained  her 
rights in  the community which was continued with  the chil- 
dren  (fortgesetzte  Giitergemeinsckaft).  Where the  marital 
administration and usufruct was the rule, the dotal  property 
was returned to the widow as nearly as possible in the same 
condition  as  it  existed  at the  time  the  husband  received 
the same. 
The English common  law rules, while  influenced  by pc- 
culiar  conditions,  illustrate  the  same  general  principle. 
The wife  is  given no right  of  inheritance or claim to a dis- 
tributive share in  the estate of  her deceased  husband.  But 
her dower right in the  lands of her husband  becomes  con- 
summate upon his death and  she regains  possession  of  her 
individual real  property. 
Modern systems of  inheritance rest  upon the principle of 
blood relationship.  In all legislations, however, this general 
principle is modified by the recognition of  an interest, great 
or  small,  of  the  surviving  married  party.  This  was  the 
position which  the Roman law was beginning to take at the 
time its development was checked.  Modern  legislations, in 
effect, recognize  that the  marriage establishes  a  bond  be- 
tween  the  parties  similar  to  the  ties  of  kinship.  If the 
matrimonial  property  system  contains  adequate  provision 
for the future of  the survivor, the law of  succession may dis- 
regard or but slightly emphasize such connection.  On the 
other  hand, if  death  immediately dissolves  the matrimonial 
property relationships and  leaves  the  survivor  in  the same 
economic position,  so far as concerns the decedent, as at the 
beginning of  the marriage, the  law of  inheritance will  gen- 
erally grant the former an interest in the  latter's succession. 
IVzderlagr,  Wifthum,  Morgcngabt.  CJ Heusler, Insf,  vol. ii, pp. 370-376. J  5  S  PI;  OPERTY RELA TIOLVS OF IV~ARKIEU  PAR TILS  [  I 5 8 
The modern  legislation has also tended to place the mar- 
ried  parties  on  a  condition  of  equality in  this  matter. 
Provision  is  made  for  the  surviving  married  party, and 
distinctions which were made according as the survivor  was 
the  husband  or  the  wife, are  gradually  being  eliminated. 
This interest  may be a simple right  of  intestate succession, 
or  it  may  be  a  legal  portion which  is  not  subject to tes- 
tamentary  disposition.  The latter, moreover, may  include 
only that which  is  necessary for subsistence, or  it  may ex- 
tend  to a distinct share in the succession of  the decedent. 
The French Civil Code was for a long period taken as the 
model by most of  the states which recognized a community 
of  property  as  the  statutory system.  This code originally 
postponed ' the surviving married  party to all  relatives  of  a 
degree capable  of  succeeding and to  illegitimate children.~ 
The theory was that the share of  the survivor in  the common 
property would constitute a sufficient provision, and  he was 
not even accorded an alimentary pension.'  The freedom of 
contract,  howzver, permitted  the  severe  restriction  of  the 
principle of  community as well  as  the  establishment  of  an 
entirely  different  system.  Thus,  it  was  possible  that the 
survivor who  possessed  no  individual  property would  find 
himself  in  reduced  and  even  necessitous circumstances  in 
case the decedent  died  intestate  or failed  to  make  proper 
provision in his will. 
In France, as early as 1572,3 an act  was. proposed  which 
had  for  its object the extension of  the successoral  rights of 
C.  C.,  767;  relatives up to the twelfth degree are capable of  succession, ibid., 
755. 
a  C/, post,  4 48. 
S  ITiollet,  l'rPcis, p. 696, note 3. 
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the surviving  married  party.4  Nearly twenty years elapsed 
before  the  legislative  sanction  was  finally  obtained  in  a 
statute of  March g, 1891.5  The French legislature was  in- 
fluenced by the fact that other states whose legislations were 
based  upon the Code NapolBon, had modified its provisions 
in  the  interests  of  the surviving spouse.  The most recent 
instance of  such legislation is the Belgian statute of  Novem- 
ber 20, 1896, which  modifies Article  767 of  the Civil  Code 
in accordance  with  the  same general  principles  that influ- 
enced  the French act of  I 89  I .6 
As a rule, the interest of  the survivor in the intestate suc- 
cession  of  the  deceased  spouse  is  limited  to  a  right  of 
usufruct  for  life  where  issue  or  heir  exists.  If  there 
are no  heirs  capable  of  succeeding,  the surviving  married 
party takes all in  full  ownership.  The amount of  the pro- 
perty covered by the usufruct will be affected by the number 
and  degree of the existing heirs.l  The states in which  the 
'Earlier  statutes had granted the widow certain  successoral rights in particular 
kinds of  property:  Right to dispose of  artistic and literary products of  decedent, 
Stat., Apl. 8, 1854, Bull. des  lots, xi. skr., vol. 3, p. 869;  Stat., July 14, 1866, art, 
I, dull.  des lois, xi. skr., vol. 28, p. 61;  widows  of  pensioned  officials are in cer- 
tain cases entitled to a continuation of  a certain proportion of  the pension, Stat., 
June 9, 1853, arts.  13, 14, Bull  des lois, xi. skr., vol. 1,p.g8g;  Stat., Apl. 11,1831, 
art. 19, Bull des lois, ix.  skr., vol. 2, p. 166; Stat.,  Apl. 18, 1831, art. 19, Bull des 
lozs, ix. silr.,  vol.  2, p.  239. 
jAn.fran., vol. 11, p.  147 sq.;  cf:  An. Pfran., vol. 4, p.  497, note 1. 
An. itran., vol.  26, p.  498 seq. 
France, X, if  issue exists, but not to exceed child's part if  issue is of previous 
marriage; X,  if  no Issue exists (C. C., 767 as amended  by Stat., Mch. 9,1891, art. 
I, An.  fran., vol.  I I, p.  147) ; Belgium, share  of  legitimate  child if  issue exists, 
but not to exceed M  if Issue is of  previous marriage; X,  if  no issue, but ascendants 
or brother or sister or their descendants;  all, lf only other collaterals exist (Stat., 
Nov.  20,  1896, 9:  I, Aw.  rtran., vol.  26,  p. 498);  Spain, legal  port~on  of  each 
child  if  issue  exists;  X,  if  no issue, but  ascendants; X,  in other cases  (C. C., 
834-837,  952);  Geneva,  ?k,  if  legitimate  issue  exists;  M in  ownersi:ip, if  no 
legitimate  issue;  34  in ownership, if  no  descendants, father  or mother c: their 
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system of  dowry is the statutory regime, have adopted simi- 
lar provisions for intestate succe~sion.~ 
The provisions, at least so far as concerns community sys- 
tems, where issue exists, are extensions of  matrimonial prop- 
erty law  rather  than  proper  hereditary  shares.'  The sur- 
vivor is given, in addition to his share in the common  prop- 
erty, a usufruct for life over a certain part of  the shares fall- 
ing to the issue of  the  marriage.'"  Upon  the  death  of  the 
survivor, the descendants  recover  the  usufruct of  the prop- 
erty of  which they have  previously  possessed  only the title. 
The  states  recognizing  marital  administration  and  usu- 
fruct as the statutory system do not follow this principle.  In 
this system, the  death of  either  party brings  about  an  im- 
mediate dissolution of  the matrimonial property relations, and 
the  survivor  does  not  retain  any privileges in the property 
of  the decedent.  The law  of  succession, accordingly, sup- 
plements  the  matrimonial  property law.  The survivor  is 
generally  accorded  an  hereditary share  in  ownership  even 
499) ; Basle City, survivor  postponed to relatives of  fifth degree, but he has dur- 
ing minority of  children the usufruct of  their shares in the succession (Stat.,  Mch. 
10, 1884, art.  48);  La., common  issue's  heritable  share  of  common  property; 
intestate's  share of  community if  no  issue or ascendants  exist (C. C.,  915-917). 
The other American  states that have introduced  community of  property provide 
a substantial right of  intestate succession for the survivor (see below, note 19). 
sAustria, usufruct  of  child's  share not  to exceed X; M in ownership, if  no 
issue exists (B.  G.,  $8 757-759) ;  Italy, usufruct of  child's share, the survivor being 
counted  in  the number of  children;  X  in ownership, if  no legitimate issue, but 
natural  children,  ascendants,  brother  or  sister  or  their  descendants  exist;  if 
natural children and ascendants come  together, the share is limited to M;  X  in 
ownership, if  none  of  foregoing, but  relatives  up  to sixth  degree  exist  (C. C., 
753-755). 
Cf:  community continued  between survivor and  common children, ante, Q 23, 
(e). 
'0 In European legislation, the surviving husband  has a right of  usufruct over 
the shares of  minor children, and where, as in the German code, parental instead 
of  paternal authority is established, the widow possesses such right.  9:  Motive, 
vol. 5, p.  368. 
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where  issue exists, though the extent of  such  share  is gen- 
erally affected  by  the  number  and  degree of  the  existing 
relatives of  the decedent." 
The legislations which recognize separate property as the 
statutory system likewise accord a right of  succession to the 
survivor  of the  marriage.  In  Russia, this  is fixed  at one- 
fourth  of the  movable  and  one-seventh  of  the immovable 
property of  the decedent, and obtains without regard  to the 
existence of  issue of  the marriage.=' 
In England and the United States, the determination of  the 
hereditary  rights  of  the surviving married  party  has  been 
complicated by many conditions.  The development of  the 
new  matrimonial property systems has not  been  perfected. 
Institutions  that are  the  products  of  the  earlier  customs 
have, in many cases, been carried over, without modification, 
into the new system.  Moreover, the distinction between the 
succession to real and personal property, which was empha- 
"  Germany, M, if  descendants;  X,  if  no descendants, but  parents,  or  their 
descendants,  or grandparents;  all, in  other  cases  (B.  G.,  Q  1931;  cf:  8 1932); 
Prussia, child's part not to exceed M;  X,  if  no descendants, but brother or sister 
or their children; fh, if  none of  foregoing, but other relatives up to sixth degree; 
all, in  other cases  (A.  L. R.,  ii, 1,  $8 621-627;  cfi  58 628-630);  Saxony, M,  if 
descendants;  X,  if no descendants, but adopted or natural children;  X, if  none 
of  foregoing, but brother or sister or their descendants, parents or grandparents; 
all, in other cases (B. G.,  QQ 2049-2053)  ;  Lucerne, M, in usufruct, if descendants; 
X, in ownership, if  only heirs of second class;  X,  in ownership, if  none of fore- 
going;  %,  in  ownership,  if  there are no  heirs  capable of  succession  (Lardy, 
L+gislafions Suisses, p.  145);  Ziirich,  in ownership or X in  usufruct, if  de- 
scendants;  M, in ownership or all, in  usufruct, if  only parents or their descend- 
ants;  %,  in ownership  and other  %, in usufruct, if  only  grandparents or their 
descendants; X,  in ownership and other M in usufruct, if  only greatgrandparents 
or their descendants;  all, in ownership, if  no relatives capable of  succession (P. 
R. G.,  $5 901, 905;  cf:  $ gm); Glaris, if survivor elects to turn all of  his individ- 
ual property into the succession of  the intestate, be will receive a child's share, and 
if no children, X  of  such succession.  Otherwise, he receives no share in the suc- 
cession (L. B.  ii, arts. 303, 304). 
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sized under the influence of  feudal ideas, has been continued 
to a large extent in the modern  rules governing  the succes- 
sion of  the surviving married party.  Finally, the distinction 
between  the  successoral  rights  of  husband  and wife  is re- 
tained to a greater degree than in other countries, though the 
tendency to eliminate the same is quite apparent. 
At common law the widow had no hereditary or distribu- 
tive  share in  the  real  or  personal  estate  of  her  deceased 
husband.  On the  other hand, the husband  was entitled  to 
all  of  his deceased wife's  personal  property, subject  to the 
payment of  debts.  The widow had her dower right and the 
husband,  if  the necessary condition  had  been  fulfilled, was 
entitled to his tenancy by the curtesy.I3 
The law affecting  personal  property was  modified  by an 
act  of  the  seventeenth  century,  which  gave  the widow  a 
share in the intestate's personal estate of  one-third, if  the de- 
cedent  left  children,  and  otherwise  of  one-half.14  This 
was a general statute of  distributions, but was  not  intended 
to  apply to the  estates  of  married  women.'S  No  further 
change in the rules of  succession of  married parties has been 
made  in  England, except that  a  statute, enacted  in  1890, 
gives the widow all of  the personal estate up to the value of 
£500  and  her  distributive  share  in  the  residue  when  the 
husband  dies intestate, without  issue.I6  Aside  from the re- 
stricted  interests  of  dower  and  curtesy,"  neither  party has 
any hereditary right  to the real estate of  the other, and  the 
lS  Ante,  25. 
"Act,  22 and 23, Car. 11, c. 10, $5 v, and vi, enacted  only for seven years, but 
re-enacted for similar period by 30 Car. 11, Stat.,  I,  c. 6,  and made permanent by 
I Jac.11,~.  17,cl.17,§5. 
16To remove  any  doubt  on this  score,  a  section  was  incorporated  in  the 
"Statute  of Frauds " (29 Car. 11,  c. 3, 5  xxv), declaring that the husband  should 
enjoy the same rights as betore the passing of  the statute of  distributions. 
16 Act, 53 and 54 Vict., c.  29. 
17 .:tzfe,  40. 
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same will escheat to the State  in  the absence  of  heirs  and 
of  testamentary di~position.'~ 
At first glance, the laws of  succession in the United States 
present a bewildering  mass of  divergent  rules.  Aside from 
the western states and territories that have followed the Code 
of  California, it is difficult to find  two legislations that agree 
in their provisions respecting the succession of  married par- 
ties.  Upon closer examination, however, certain tendencies 
appear that give promise of  greater unity and  uniformity. 
There is  substantial  unanimity in  according the  survivor 
an interest in  the  succession  of  the predeceased  intestate 
married  party.  This  may  be  a  share  in  the  estate  as  a 
whole, or it may be restricted to the real or to  the personal 
estate of  the decedent.  The most  significant feature, from 
the standpoint of matrimonial property relations, is  the ten- 
dency to  place  the  husband and wife  on an equality so far 
as respects the share of  either in the intestate  succession of 
the other. 
More  than  three-fifths  of  the  legislations  have  estab- 
lished such substantial equality, the interest in general being 
defined as one existing for  the benefit of  the surviving mar- 
ried party.'@ While  the right  to  such share  arises without 
'SThe same appears to be true of  one-half  of  the husband's  personalty, where 
relatives entitled to a distributive share do not exist. 
"Dower  and  courtesy are  sometimes recognized, in addition  to the intestate 
share, see ante, 5 40.  Arizona, if  issue, X,  but only for life in lands;  if  no issue, 
but father or mother, all of  personal estate and  of real estate in fee; if  no issue 
or parent, all (R. S., 1887, 5 1460). 
California,  if  issue,  child's  share,  not  to  be  less  than  X;  if  no issue,  but 
parent, brother or sister, X;  if  none of  foregoing, all (C. C.,  1386). 
Colorado, if  issue, $6; if  no issue, all (An. St., 1891,  5 1524). 
Connecticut, if  issue, g;  if  no issue, all up to $2,000  and g of  residue  (G.  S., 
1888,  623, as amended  by Laws,  1895, c. 21  7). 
Florida, if  issue, chlld's share;  if  no issue, all (It. S., 1892, $5 1820, 1833). 
Georgia, if  issue, child's share, but widow's share not to be less than '4 ;  if  no 
issue, all (Code,  1895, 55 3354, 3355). I 64  PROPERTY RELA TIOA-S OF MARRIED PAR TIES  [  I 64 
regard  to  the  issue  of  children  from  the  marriage,  the 
amount of  the interest  increases in  proportion  to the non- 
Idaho, same as California  (R. S.,  1887,  § 5705). 
Illinois, if  issue, X of  personal estate; if  no issue, but kindred, X  of  real estate 
and all of  personal estate;  if no kindred, entire estate (An. St., 1885,  c. 39, 7 I). 
Indiana, if  issue, X, but wife entitled  to claim  child's share;  if  no issue, but 
parent, X, and if  estate does not  exceed $I,CCO,  all;  if  no  issue  or parent, all 
(An.  St,, 1894,  $5 2640-2644, 2650, 2651). 
Iowa, if  issue, W;  if  no issue, but parents or their heirs, X;  if  none of  forego- 
ing, all (Code, 1897,  §§ 3362,3366,3376,3377,3382). 
Kansas, same as Colorado (G. S.,  1889,  $5 2599,2611,2619,2622). 
Maine, if issue, dower in real estate and X of  personal  estate;  if  no issue, but 
kindred, dower increased  to % if  estate is solvent and same share is taken in per- 
sonal estate;  if  no kindred, entire estate inownership (R. S., 1883,  c. 75, §§ I,  g, 
c.  1039 8 14). 
Michigan, if  issue, dower and curtesy (c)  ante,  40,  note 16)  in real estate and 
child's  share, not to be less  than j.j  in  personal  estate;  if  no issue, but parent, 
brother  or sister  or  their  descendants, % of  real  estate in  fee  and  all  of  per- 
sonal estate up  to $1,000  and % of  residue;  if  none  of  foregoing entire es- 
tate  (An.  St.,  1882,  5 5772 as amended  by  Pub.  Acts,  1889,  no.  168, p.  193, 
5 5847). 
Minnesota, if issue. %;  if  no issue, all (G. S.,  1894.  $5 4471,  4.477). 
Mississippi, same as Florida (An. Code,  1892,  5 1545). 
Missouri, if  issue, dower and curtesy in real estate and, for widow, child's share 
in personal estate;  if  no issue, but parent, brother or sister of  their descendants, 
M of entire estate in ownership;  if  none of  foregoing, all (R. S.,  1899,  $5 2908, 
2937-2939.) 
Montana, same as California  (C. C.,  1895, 5 1852). 
Nebraska, if issue, child's share not less than X; if  no issne, but kindred, X; 
if no kindred, all (C.  S.,  1891,  $8 1124, 1235). 
Nevada, if  issue, child's share  not  less  than W;  if  no issue, all  (Laws,  1897, 
c.  106,s  259). 
New Hampshire, if  issue, X, but if  issue of wife is by former marriage, surviv- 
ing husband takes only a life estate in W,  unless  he is  entitled to curtesy;  if  no 
issue,%  (P. S.,  1891,  c.  195, $8 10-13). 
New Mexico, if  issue, X;  if  no issue, all (C.  L.,  1897,  $5 2031,  2033). 
Korth Dakota, same as California, except that  if  no issue, but parent, brother, 
or sister. survivor takes all up to $~,CCO  and  of  residue (R. C.,  1895,  $3742). 
Ohio, if issue, dower in real estate and all of  personal estate up to $4~0  and j.j 
of residue;  if  no issue, entire estate, but limited to a life interest in ancestral real 
property if  intestate leaves kindred of blood of  ancestor from whom such property 
was derived (R. S.,  1891,  $8 4158.  4160,  4176). 
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existence  of descendants or of  near  relatives  of  the dece- 
dent. 
Oklahoma, same as California  (R. S.,  1893,  § 6261). 
Oregon, if  issue, dower and curtesy in real  estate and  of  personal estate;  if 
no issue, entire estate  in ownership (An. St.,  1887,  5 3098,  as amended by Stat., 
Feb. 25, 1889,  Acts, p.  72, § 3099, as amended  by  Stat., Feb. 22,  1893,  Acts, p. 
'95). 
South Carolina, if  issue, X; if  no issue, but lineal ancestor, brother or sister,%; 
if  none of  the  foregoing, but  kindred, %;  if  no kindred,  all  (C. S. L.,  1893, 
$5 1980,  2166). 
South Dakota, same as California  (G. L.,  1887,  f 3401). 
Texas, same as Arizona, except  that issue of  parent will limit right of  survivor 
in same degree as parent (R. S.,  1895,  art.  1689). 
Utah, same as North Dakota (R. S.,  1898, 2828). 
Vermont, if issue,  of real estate in fee, but husband's right is limited to lands 
of  which both parties are seized in right of  the wife, andsuwivingwife takes in ad- 
dition % of  personal estate as part of  widow's allowance;  if  no issue, but kindred, 
entire estate up to $2,000 and M ofresidue;  if  no  kindred, all (Pub. Acts, 1896, 
no. 44,  1, 2, 15,  Stat.,  1894,  2418,  2419,  2546and  2544,  as amended by Pub. 
Acts, 1886,  no. 45,  I. 
Washington, if  issue, child's share  in  real  estate, not  less than  X,  and  of 
personal estate;  if  no issue, but parent, brother or sister, % of  real estate and all 
personal  estate;  if  none  of  the  foregoing, entire  estate  (G. S., 1881,  $8 1480, 
1495). 
Wisconsin, if  issue, dower and curtesy (cf.  ante,  40, note 12), in real  estate, 
and for widow child's part in personal estate;  if  no issue, entire estate in owner- 
ship (An.  St., 1889,  §§ 2270,  3935). 
Wyoming, ifissue, dower; if  no issue, X, but if  estate does not exceed $~o,ooo 
in value, all (R. S.,  1887,s  2221). 
Hawaii, if  issue, dower;  if  no issue, but  parents  or  their descendants,  in 
ownership;  if  none of  foregoing, all (C. L., 1884,  1448,  as amended  by  Laws, 
1896,  no. 47). 
Massachusetts  may be placed  in this  class, as the tendency towards equaliza- 
tion  is  evident.  Surviving husband  takes : if  issue, curtesy and  of  personal 
estate;  if  no issue, all of  real estate up to value of $5,ooo in fee and life  interest 
in residue,  and entire personal  estate; if  no  kindred, entire estate in ownership. 
Widow takes:  if  issue, dower and  of personal  estate;  if  no issue, but kindred, 
all of real estate up to value of $g,ooo in fee and life interest in residue of  which 
husband died seized, or the same  amount and dower  in  other lands, and all of 
the personal estate up to value of  $5,000  and  of residue above value of $IO,O~; 
if  no kindred, entire estate in ownership  (P. S., 1882,  C.  124,  $5 I,  2, C.  135,  5 ; 
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It is  a  curious  fact  that  while  the common  law  rule  of 
curtesy favors the propagation of  issue, some of  the modern 
rules  of  succession  may  produce contrary effects, as where 
the survivor  is  given a child's share.  A  tendency  has  ap- 
peared  to accord  the  survivor a definite share or, where  he 
is given a child's share, to place a minimum upon the same.°O 
It may be noted  that in  the great majority of  those legisla- 
tions that  recognize equal  rights of  succession  for  the hus- 
band and wife, the distinction  between  the share in the real 
and in the personal  estate has been abolished. 
Most of  the remaining states retain the common law rules 
respecting the succession to real  property.  The survivor is 
generally  postponed  to  all  heirs  or kindred,  and  in  some 
cases  excluded  entirely,  the  property  escheating  to  the 
state."  It must be  kept in  mind,  however,  that in  these 
a0  Cf;  preceding note  and  rules  in  German, Saxon  and  Russian  codes, ante, 
notes 11, 12. 
2'Alabama, Code, 1896,  1453, but  husband  has life interest in real  estate  of 
intestate wife (ibid.,  2534). 
Arkansas, Dig. Stat.,  1894,  2476, but if  no issue, widow may take, as against 
collaterals, M, and, as against creditors,  in fee of  non-ancestral  real property, 
of  which  husband died seized and a life interest in proportionate amounts of  the 
ancestral real property (ibid.,  2542). 
Delaware, if  no issue,  husband takes  of  real  estate, subject to debts,  while 
widow takes a  life interest in same amount, and if  there are no heirs or  kindred 
she takes such interest in the entire real estate (Laws, vol.  14,  c. 550,s 5 in R. C., 
1893, c. 76). 
Kentucky, Stat.,  1894,  Q  1393, 7 g. 
Maryland, P. G. L., 1888, art.  46,  23. 
New Jersey,  Rev.,  1877, p. 297, Q  6. 
New York, a statute of  Mch. 28, 1895 (Acts, c.  I~I),  provided that the surviv- 
ing wife should  inherit  the same share of  an intestate's real estate as the nearest 
lineal  descendant,  and  that  if  no issue  existed  she should  inherit  all  of  such 
estate.  This Act  was to  go  into  effect  on  Jan.  I, 1896, but  was repealed  by a 
statute of  June  14, 1895 (Acts, c.  rozz), which re-established the former rules of 
inheritance. 
North Carolina, Code, 1883,  Q 1281. 
Pennsylvania, if  no issue  but  kindred, widow takes  for life (Dig.,  1883, pp. 
929, 932, §Q  1-3,  69  28). 
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legislatioris  the  matrimonial  property  rights  of  dower and 
curtesy have generally been retained, and  in some cases the 
husband's  interest  has  been made  the same as that of  the 
wife.  All  of  these  states, following  the  English  statute of 
distribution, grant the wife a share in the personal  estate of 
the intestate husband.  This interest is usually the one-third 
or one-half  of  the English statute, but  some of  the legisla- 
tions have departed  from  the  general  rule  by  making  the 
share  of  the  surviving  husband  the  same as that which  is 
accorded the widow." 
Rhode Island, G.  L., 1896, c.  216, $4. 
Tennessee, Code, 1884,  3272. 
Virginia, Code, 1887,  2548. 
West Virginia, Code, 1891,  c.  78,  I. 
District of Columbia, Acts of Maryland, 1786, c.  45, 5 2. 
Alabama, husband, M; wife, child's part, not less than  l/,,  and if  no children, 
all (Code,  1896,SS  2534, 14621. 
Arkansas, if  issue, wife takes g absolutely;  if no issue, she takes  as against 
collaterals,  and  as against  creditors;  if  no kindred, swivor takes all (Dig. 
Stat.,  1894, §S 2541, 2542, 2476). 
Delaware, husband  takes  child's  share,  and if  no issue, all;  wife takes X, if 
issue, X,  if  no issue but kindred, and all, if  no kindred  (Laws,  1895, c.  207,  I, 
R. C.,  1893, c.  89,  32). 
Kentucky, husband takes all;  wife takes K, if  issue, X,  if  no issue, but kindred 
and all, if  no ktndred  (Stat.,  1894,  1403);  2132 of  the Statutes, which applies 
to  testate  as well  as intestate  succession,  conflicts with  foregoing  section.  It 
gives surviving married party M of personal estate of testator or intestate. 
Maryland, survivor takes U,  if issue;  M, if no issue, but parent, brother, sister, 
nephew or  niece;  otherwise, all  (P. G. L.,  1888, arts.  120-122, as amended by 
Laws, 1898,  c. 331, 5 2). 
New Jersey, husband takes all;  wife takes pi, if  issue;  X,  if  no  issue  (Rev., 
18779 PP. 784,785, Q§  1479  148). 
New York, survivor takes : X,  if issue; M, if  no issue, but parent;  if  no issue or 
parent, but brother, sister, nephew or niece, all, if it does  not exceed $2,000, and 
if value is  greater, M  plus $2,000;  in  other cases, all  (R. S.,  1889, part ii, c. ii, 
$1 75979. 
North Carolina, husband takes all;  wife takes: child's part not less than X;  if 
no issue, M;  if  no kindred, all (Code, 1883, §Q  1479,1478 as amended by  Laws, 
1893, c. 82,  I). 
Pennsylvania, husband takes child's share, and if  no issue, all;  wife  takes : if 168  PROPERTY RELA TIUNS OF MRHRIED PARTIES  [  168 
47. Legal  Portion. 
The fundamental idea at the basis of  intestate, as well as of 
testamentary succession, is that of effectuating the intention 
of  the decedent.  The legislative  body creates an  order  of 
succession which it is presumed would have been established 
by the deceased  had  he left a legal testament.  In general, 
therefore, the rules of  succession established  by the  legisla- 
ture apply only in  the absence of  testament.  But there are 
other  rules  that  override  the will  of  the  deceased.  While 
the individual is accorded the right of  disposing of  his prop- 
erty by testament, he will not  be  permitted  to do so  to the 
injury of  those whose  relation  to him  is  such  as to justify 
them  in  expecting  a  portion  in  the  succession.  The law 
generally  provides  that  a  certain  proportion  of  the  share 
which  such  person  would  have  in  the intestate succession 
shall be a legal portion, and shall not be subject to testamen- 
tary disposition.  If the decedent leaves  a will  and  fails  to 
make  proper  provision  for  the parties entitled  thereto, the 
latter will be able to claim their  legal  portion in the succes- 
si0n.I  The legislature  gives  legal expression  to the moral 
issue, g;  if  no issue, but kindred, X;  if  no kindred, all (Dig., 1883, pp. 929-932, 
81 I-5,28). 
Rhode Island, husband takes all; wife, same as in Pennsylvania (G.  L., 1896, c. 
219, § 99  C.  19458 99  C.  216, §§ 49  9). 
Tennessee, husband takes all at common law;  wife  takes  child's share, and if 
no issue, all (Code, 1884,s 3278). 
Virginia, same as in Rhode Island (Code, 1887,  2557). 
West  Virginia, survivor takes g,  if  issue, and  all, if  no  issue (Code, 1891, c. 
78, § 9). 
District of Columbia, husband takes all at common law;  wife takes, if  issue, pi, 
if  no issue, but parent, brother or sister or their descendants, X;  in other cases, 
all (Maryland, Acts, I 798, c. 101, part  I I). 
'This is not an absolute right, but is capable of  being defeated when  the con- 
duct of  the  party entitled  has  been  such  as to justify  his disinheritance.  The 
statutes generally provide under what  conditions one may be deprived of  his legal 
portion. 
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right which certain heirs have to a share in the estate of  the 
decedent. 
The legal  portion  (Pjichttheil; portion ligitiwe) obtains 
very  generally  in  the  European continental  countries,  but 
has not received any extensive recognition in England or the 
United States aside from the succession of  married parties.  It 
may be  noted, however, that so  far  as concerns the  United 
States, at least, the numerous, and, in  some instances, dis- 
graceful cases of  judicial  breaking of  wills on the ground of 
insanity, testify to the operation of  the same principle.  The 
courts, in  effect, declare  that  no  sane  person  can  be  pre- 
sumed to have intended to disinherit those standing in close 
relationship to him.  The fiction of  insanity was  at the basis 
of  the Roman rule governing the claim to a legal portion as 
against the testamentary dispositions  of  the  decedent.'  It 
may be anticipated that the English law, following the exam- 
ple of  other legislations, will ultimately give a rational defini- 
tion of  the legal portion of  descendants, etc. 
While the principle of  the legal portion has received gen- 
eral acceptance in continental  legislations, its application, in 
many instances, has been limited  to those standing in blood 
relationship.  The Roman law, in  the time of  Justinian, was 
just  beginning to recognize the successoral rights of  married 
parties.  The principle of  the legal portion was not extended 
to them though the provision for the poor widow was of  this 
nature.3 
The states recognizing a community form  of  matrimonial 
property relations have been slow to recognize a right of  the 
surviving married party to a legal portion even when, in  de- 
fault of  all other heirs, such survivor would  be called to the 
intestate succession.  When  these legislations accorded the 
Sohm, Inst., 8 I 13. 
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survivor an intestate right of  succession as against all heirs,' 
they did not give it the character of  a legal portion.5  It was 
not the object of  the legislator to provide a share for the sur- 
vivor, but to carry out the intention of  the decedent by cre- 
ating  an order  of  succession  which  it  was  presumed  the 
intestate  would  have  established  had  he  not  forgotten  or 
neglected  to make  a  will.  Thus, these  statutes  generally 
require the surviving spouse to count towards  his  intestate 
share everything that he  has  received  by way of  donation 
from the decedent, whether the same  has  come to him as a 
result of  the contract of  marriage or otherwise.  Where the 
decedent has  clearly manifested  his  intention  by a  written 
testament,  the  necessity  for  the  application  of  the  statute 
ceases to exist.  The Spanish code furnishes an exception to 
this class of  legislations  in  according the  surviving spouse 
the same share in case of  testate as of  intestate succe~sion.~ 
Of  the  legislations  accepting  the  system  of  dowry,  the 
Italian code  makes  the  share  of  the  survivor  substantially 
the same as in Spain  by providing a right of  usufruct7  as a 
legal portion, while the Austrian8 follows the principle of  the 
Roman law. 
The codes recognizing marital administration and usufruct 
as the statutory system, accord  the surviving married  party 
a substantial legal portion.  In general, the amount is fixed 
Cf; ank,  46. 
5This  is true of  the American  states which recognize community of  property, 
though the liberal grants of  rights  in the homestead  and allowance for support 
bave created a substantial legal portion.  Cj; post,  48. 
'C.  C.,834-837,  but if  no heirs  exist, the legal portion will not be the entire 
estate, which is the share in case of  intestacy, but only  in usufruct. 
'  Of  a child's share, the survivor be~ng  counted in the number of  children;  of X, 
if  no issue, but ascendants;  of  %, if  no issue or ascendants (C. C.,  812-814);  cj; 
La.,  C. C.,  2382. 
S B. G.,  796. 
1711  SUCCESSION  OF  MARRIED PARTIES  171 
at a certain  part of  the share which the survivor would take 
in case of  intestate successionP 
Among the separate property legislations, Russia provides 
a legal  porti~n,~"  while  in England the principle has not re- 
ceived statutory recognition." 
So far as regards  the  application  of  the  principle of  the 
legal  portion  to  the  succession  of  married  parties,  the 
American states have gone  farther  than most  of  the  Euro- 
pean  legislations.  The recognition  of  the  legal  portion  in 
positive legislation is almost entirely confined to the husband 
and wife.  This apparently curious fact finds its explanation 
in the close relation existing  between  matrimonial  property 
relations and the law of inheritance.  Dower and curtesy are 
forms of  legal portion.  When the principle of  the legal por- 
tion commenced  to develop in America, the interest  of  the 
wife  was the chief consideration, as the husband's marital prop- 
erty rights gave him an adequate share.  Since he has been 
deprived  of  this  interest, the tendency has appeared to ac- 
cord  him  a  legal  portion of  the same general  character  as 
that which is possessed by the wife. 
Two-fifths of the American  legislations recognize  a legal 
portion  for  the survivor and  in  most  of  these  the share  of 
the surviving husband  is the same as that which is taken by 
a  widow.^^  A tendency appears to  make the  legal  portion 
Q Germany, X,  B.  G., 5 2303;  Prusria, X,  A. L. R., ii, I,  631;  Saxony, ifissue, 
all; if  no issue, but heirs of  second or third order of  succession, X;  in other cases, 
(B.G.,  $8 2565,2578-2580);  Lucerne, all of  intestate share taken where issue 
exists (Lardy, LPgisZations Suisses, p.  146) ; Zirich, K (P. R. G.,  $ 974). 
'0 Intestate  share in all  except  acquisitions, which are subject to testamentary 
disposition (Leuthold, R. R., pp. 79,80;  Lehr, Dvoif  Russr,  pp. 424-426). 
11 Even the widow's dower has been deprived of this character.  C$  ante,  40, 
Marriage settlements frequently make provision for the survivor. 
l2 Colorado, M  of estate (An. St., 1891, $5 3010, 301 I). 
Connecticut, life interest in % of  estate (G.  S.,  1888,  623). 
Illinois, if  issue, dower and intestate share in personalty;  if  no issue, may elect 1  72  PROPERTY KELA TIOA'S  0  F MARRIED PAR TIES  [  I 72 
equal to the  intestate share, with  a  general  proviso  that it 
shall  not  exceed  a  certain  proportion  of  the estate.  The 
share is generally large, in some cases extending to one-half 
of  the  entire estate in succession.  This  represents an  ex- 
treme  position, which is apt to  be modified  in  the interests 
of  children.  Moreover,  the  principle  of  the  legal  portion 
does  not  require that a  married  party shall  be  compelled 
to confer such a large part of  his  property ctpon one whose 
conduct may have been objectionable, or who possesses ade- 
in lieu of  above, M  of  entire estate  after  payment of  debts  (An. St,,  1885, c. 41, 
Tll 10912). 
Indiana, X  of  estate (An. St., 1894, $$2640, 2642,2648,2649). 
Iowa,  of  estate (Code, 1897, $5 3362,3366,3376). 
Kansas, % of  estate (G. S.,  1889,  $ 7239). 
Kentucky, dower and X  of  personal estate (Stat., 1894,  $ 2132), 
Maine,'dower  (R. S., 1883,~.  103, $5 1o,14). 
Maryland, dower and X  of  personal  estate (P. G. L., 1888,  art. 93, $5 292, 293, 
Laws, 1898, c. 331,  3). 
Massachusetts, substantially  Intestate  share in  real  estate;  in personal  estate, 
husband entitled  to  and  wife  takes intestate  share, except  that if  it  exceeds 
$10,000 in value, she receives only that amount and the income during life of  res- 
idue (P. S.,  1882,  C.  127,  18,  C.  147,s  6, as amended by Acts, 1885, c. 225,  I,  and 
Acts, 1887,  c. 290, $ 2). 
Minnesota, intestate share in real estate (G. S., 1894, $5 4471,4472). 
Mississippi, intestate share not to exceed  (An. Code, 1892,  $ 4496). 
hlissouri, substantially intestate share  not  to exceed that taken where kindred 
exlsts (R. S.,  1899,  $5 2937-2939,Act,  Mch. 2,1895,  Laws, p. 169). 
Montana, husband, g  of  estate;  wife, dower and, if  no issue,  of  real  estate 
in fee (C. C.,  1895,gs  255,236,1703). 
Nebraska, intestate share (G. S., 1891,  $8 1124,1235). 
New Hampshire, intestate share, or dower or curtesy and intestate share in per- 
sonal estate (P.S.,  1891,  c. 195, $$ 10-13,  C.  186,s  13). 
Ohio, intestate share (R. S., 1891,s  5963). 
Pennsylvania, dower and curtesy and intestate  share in  personal estate (Dig., 
1883, p.  632, S§ 3~5,  PP. 1153, 1154, $8 2,6, Laws, 1893,~.  345, § 5). 
Vermont,  substantially intestate share not  to exceed that taken where kindred 
exists (Stat., 1894,  2544, as amended  by Laws, 1896, no. 45, 5 I). 
West Virginia, intestate share not to exceed that taken where issue exists (Code, 
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quate individual resources.  A  few  of  the  American  states 
have confined the legal portion to the wife.'3 
The legislations which do not accord a legal portion in the 
strict sense of  the term, divide  themselves  into  two classes. 
The first class  includes those  which recognize a community 
of  acquisitions,  where  the  survivor  takes  his  share in  the 
common property and  is sometimes given special privileges 
in  the  portion  of  the  common property which  falls  to  the 
de~edent.~4.  In  the  other  class, the  matrimonial  property 
rights of  dower, and, in most  cases, curtesy, continue to be 
recognized.15  Moreover, the  liberal  provisions  which  very 
generally obtain  for  the support  of  the widow or survivor, 
have the character of  a legal portion. 
4 48. Provision for  the Suppovt of  the Survivor. 
Under all  systems of  matrimonial  property relations, ex- 
cept where perfect  community of  all  property obtains, it  is 
possible  that the death of  one party may seriously affect the 
position of  the other.  Where the household  expenses have 
been defrayed  largely, if  not entirely, out of  the property of 
the decedent, the survivor, in the absence of  suitable provis- 
ion, may be  compelled  materially to alter  his  mode of  liv- 
"Alabama,  dower and intestate share in personalty (Code, 1896,  4259). 
Arkansas, same as Alabama (Dig.  Stat ,  1894, S$ 2541, 2542). 
Florida, dower  in  real  estate; of  personalty,  if  issue, X;  if  no issue, M abso- 
lutely (R. S., 1892, $5 1830, 1831). 
Michigan, dower, or  intestate  share  up to  $~,wo,  and M  of residue  (An. St., 
1882,  5824) 
North Carolina, intestate share (Code,  1883,  2109). 
Tennessee, dower  and  child's  share, not  to  exceed  X  of  personalty  (Code, 
1884, $5 325193252). 
Utah, X  of  real estate, or intestate share in entlre estate (R. S.,  1898, $5 2731, 
2827). 
Virginia, intestate share of  personal estate (Code,  1887, 5 2559). 
l'  C$  antr, $ 24, notes 13-17. 
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ing, and  may even be  unable  to  secure the  necessary sub- 
sistence.  Such  deplorable spectacles  are opposed  to  the 
moral idea of  marriage, and have led to the establishment of  fl 
the legal  portion  for  married  parties.  The principle  ap- 
plies with  added force to  survivors who are in  indigent cir- 
cumstances.  At the  least, they should  be  entitled  to  the 
necessary alimentary support, under the same circumstances 
as they could have claimed it during the marriage. 
This principle has come to be generally accepted in those 
legislations which do not accord  a legal  portion to the sur- 
viving married party.  The Code  Napolkon did  not  recog- 
nize this  right for  the  survivor.'  The movement  to  incor- 
porate this principle  in the  French Code was  carried on for 
many years  in connection  with  the  attempt  to accord  the 
survivor a  share  in  the  succession of  an intestate married 
party.  Both principles were finally accepted  in  the  statute 
of  March g, 1891  .2  The recent Belgian statute, which intro- 
duced  the  intestate  share of  a surviving married party, has 
likewise followed the French statute in establishing the claim 
of  such survivor to alimentary support.3 
The succession of  the deceased married  party owes main- 
tenance  to  the  survivor,  provided  the  latter  is  in  want 
thereof.4  If  the survivor has sufficient  individual means, he 
can not  claim such alimentary provision, nor can he do so if 
his intestate share in the succession is sufficient for his needs. 
Where the system of  dowry obtains, the widow is entitled 
'The claim wh~ch  the Roman law gave to the poor widow, had obtained in the 
pays d'dcrtf,  but ~t was  not  admitted  into the code.  The Louisiana  Civll Code 
retains  the  Roman  rule, but  extends it so as to  apply to  the  survivor who  is in 
need (C. C., 2382). 
* Cf:  anfe,  8 46.  ldzd. 
'France, C. C., 205,  as amended by  Stat., Mch. g, 1891,  art. 2, An.fran., vol. 
11, pp. 153,  154;  Belg~um,  C. C.,  205, as amended  by  Stat., Nov. 20, 1896,  art. 
2, An. Ifran.,  vol. 26,  pp. 502,  503; Austria, B. G.,  5 796. 
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to lodging for one year, and mourning vestments  at the ex- 
pense of  the husband's succession.s 
It is in the American states that the provision for the sur- 
vivor  has  received  the  greatest  acceptance  and  develop- 
ment.  The general  provision  is  that  if  the estate is insol- 
vent,  the  personal  property, exempt  from execution, shall 
be set aside for the  benefit of  the widow or survivor.  Sim- 
ilar  provisions  entitle  such  party  to  claim  the  absolute 
property  of  the  homestead  or  its  use  for  life  or during 
wido~hood.~ 
These measures  are natural corollaries  to the exemption 
laws, and must be  justified  by similar  considerations.  This 
condition  does not  exist where  the widow  or  survivor pos- 
sesses separate property, or where the estate of  the decedent 
is  solvent, and the  legal  portion  or intestate  share  of  the 
survivor is sufficient for  suitable  support.  Notwithstanding 
these  facts, many of  the states grant  the allowance  in addi- 
tion to the legal  portion or intestate share, and  do not take 
into consideration the necessities of  the person to whom the 
same is accorded.  In  some cases the  amount exempted  is 
quite large, and  the interests of  heirs and  creditors are sac- 
rificed without justification.  Some of  the statutes, however, 
expressly enact that the  provision  shall  be  deducted  from 
the distributive share or legal portion, while others  make  it 
dependent  upon  the  necessities  of  the  party  entitled.  It 
may  be  anticipated  that  future  revisions  will  tend  to 
restrict the provision  to that which is essential for alimentary 
support. 
The original purpose of  the legislation was to ensure pro- 
vision  for  the  widow.  Thus, many  of  the  statutes restrict 
$France, C.  C.,  1570; Italy,  C.  C., 1415; La., C. C., 2374; C- Spain,  C. C., 
1379; Austria, B. G.,  8 796. 
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the allowance 7  and  the use or ownership of  the homestead 
to the widow and, in  some cases, the minor  children.  The 
tendency towards equalization of  the parties, which  has fol-  a 
lowed  the establishment of  separate property, is  also mani- 
fested in this connection.  It is  aimed to accord  the surviv- 
ing husband  the same rights in  his deceased wife's property 
as the widow  possesses  in  the estate of  her  deceased  hus- 
band.  Accordingly, in  a  large  number  of  legislations  the 
provisions respecting an allowance9 and the disposition of  the 
'Ala.,  Code, 1896, $$ 2072, 2073;  Ark., Dig. Stat., 1894, $$ 3, 73;  Col., An. St., 
1891, $$1534,  1536;  Conn., G.  S.,  1888, $$ 574,  605;  Del., R.  C.,  1893, c.  111, 
Laws, vol. 15, c. 479;  Fla., Const., art. X,  2;  Ill., An.  St., 1885, c.  3, TT 74-76; 
Ind., An. St., 1894, $$ 2419,2424;  Ky..Stat.,  1894,s 1403,T 5; Mass., P. S., 1882, 
c. 135, $8  I, 2;  Mich., An. St., 1882, $ 5847;  Minn., G. S.,  1894, $4477; Miss.,An. 
Code, 1892,  5 1877;  N.  H., P.  S., 1891, c.  195, $9 I, 2;  N.Y.,  Laws, 1896,~.  547, 
$ 184; N. C.,Code,  1883, $5 2116,  2118; Ohio,  R.  S.,  1891, $$ 6040, 6078, 6079; 
Oreg., An.  St., 1887,  $8  I 126-1129;  Penn., Dig.,  1883, p. 623, 5 3;  K. I., G. L., 
1896, c. 214,s 4;  Tenn., Code, 1884, $$3125-3128,  2934;  Texas, R. S.,  1895, arts. 
2037-2039,  2046-2056;  Vt., Stat., 1894, $5 2418,2419;  Vs., Code, 1887, $ 3640; 
W. Va., Code, 1891, c. 41,s 27;  Wis., An. St.,  1889, $ 3935. 
aAla., Code,  1896, $5 2033, 2069; Ark., Dig.  Stat., 1894, $ 3694; Fla., Const., 
art. X,  $ 2;  Me., R. S.,  1883, c. 81, $$ 63-66;  Mass., P. S., 1882,~.  123, $8 ;  Mich., 
An. St.,  1882, $$ 7728.  7729; MO., R. S.,  1899, $1  3620,  3621; N. J., Rev.,  1877, 
p.  1055, $ I; N. Y.,  C.  C.  P.,  $ 1400;  N. C.,  Const.,  art. X,  $$ 3, 5;  Ohio, R. S., 
1881, $ 5437, Stat.,  May 18,  1894, Acts, p.  307;  Oreg., An.  St.,  1887, $5 1126, 
1127; S.C.,  C. S. L.,  1893, $ 2129;  Tenn., Code,  1884, 5 2943;  Vt.,  Stat.,  1894, 
$5 2183-2185;  Va., Code, 1887, $S 3635, 3637; .Wk., An. St., 1889,s 2271. 
=Ark., R. S.,  1887, $ 1094;  an additional allowance may be made for widow in 
case  of  need,  zbid., $$ 1095-1099;  Cal.,  substantially  same  as Anz.  (C.  C.  P., 
$S 1463-1470) ; Geo., Code, 1895,s 3465;  Idaho, substantially same as Ariz. (R. 
S.,  1887, $5 5441-5446) ; Iowa,  Code,  1897, $8  3376,  33129  3314;  Kans., G.  S., 
1889, $$ 2833,2619;  Me.,  R. S., 1883, c. 65, $8 21,23,26, c. 66,$1;  Md., P. G. L., 
1888, Q$ 298, 299 gives allowance to widow;  Laws, 1898, c. 331,s 3, extends pro- 
vlslons to  surviving husband;  MO., R.  S.,  1889,  $$ 105-109  glves allowance  to 
widow to be deducted from her share in personal estate.  An act of  Apl. 8. 1895 
(Laws,p. 35), extends provisions  to widower, if the  wife  dies  intestate, but  the 
allowance is not deducted  from  his intestate share  (see R. S.,  1899, $$ 105-109, 
I I I)  ;  Mont.,  substantially same as Ariz. (C. C.  P.,  1895, $$ 2581-2586) ; Neb. C. 
S., 1891,s 1235; Nev.,  substantially same as Ariz. (G. S., 1885, $9 542,2790.-2796) ; 
N. J.,  Rev., 1877, p.  762,s 52; N.  M.,C.  L.  1897, $8 2041, 1993, 1994;  Oklah., 
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homesteadx0  apply to the survivor, whether widow  or wid- 
ower. 
substantially  same as Ariz.  (R.  S.,  1893, $5  1300-1308);  S.  D.,  substantially 
same  as Ariz. (C.  L.,  1887, $Q 5779-5786) ;  Utah, R. S., 1898, $ 2831 ;  Wy., sub- 
stantially same as Ariz. (Laws,  1890-91,  no.  70, c. xiii, $$ 1-7). 
'OAriz.,R.  S., 1887,  $5 1094, 1100; Cal.,C. C. P.,  $8 1465, 1474, C. C.,  $ 1265; 
Col., An. St., 1891,s 2135;  Conn., G. S.,  1888,s 2783;  Idaho, R. S.,  1887,s 5441; 
Ill.,  An.  St.,  1885, c.  52,  7 2;  Iowa, Code,  1897,  $ 2985;  Kans.,  G.  S.,  1889, 
$8 2595,2619;  Ky., Stat., 1894, $$ 1706,1708;  La., Const.,art. 244;  Minn., G.  S, 
1894, $4470;  Mont.,C.  C.  P.,  1895, $5 2581, 2584,  C.  C.,  1895, $$ 1703;  Neb., 
C.S., 1891,s 1124; Nev.,  G. S.,  1885,$$  542,2790;  N. H., P. S.,  1891, c. 138,$$2, 
5; N.  M,, C.  L., 1897, $5 1749,  1994;  N.D.,  R. C., 1895, $3626;  Oklah., R. S., 
1893, $8 1300,  1302;  S. D., C.  L.,  1887, $5 5779-5781 ; Texas, R.  S.,  1895, arts. 
w57-2062;  Utah,  R.  S.,  1898, $ 2831 ;  Wy.,  R. S., 1887, $ 2782,  Laws, 1890-91, 
no.  go, c. xiii, $ 8. APPENDIX. 
NOTE  A.  (See 5 38, note 19.) 
Miss., An. Code, 1892, 5 2289.  Married  women are fully emancipated from all 
,disability on account of  coverture, and  the  common law, as to the disabilities  of 
married women and its effect on the rights of property of  the wife is totally abro- 
gated, and marriage shall not  impose  any disability or incapacity on a woman as 
to ownership, acquisition, or disposition of  property of any sort, or as to her capa- 
city to make contracts  and do all  acts in  reference to property which she could 
lawfully do if  she were  not  married;  hut every woman  now married or hereafter 
to be married, shall have the same capacity to acquire, hold, manage, control, use, 
enjoy and dispose of  all  property, real and personal, in possession  or expectancy, 
and to make any contract in reference toit, and to bind herself personally, and to 
sue and be sued, with all the rights and habilities  incident thereto, as if  she were 
not married. 
NOTE B.  (See  38, note 21.) 
Ohto, R. S., 1891, $3rqq.  A  married  person  may take, hold  and dispose  of 
property, real or personal, the same as if  unmarried. 
Penn., Act of Yune 8,1893 (Laws,  p. gqq), 5 I.  Hereafter a  married woman 
shall have the same right and power  as an unmarried person to acquire, 0.-n,  pos- 
sess, control, use, lease, sell or  otherwise  dispose  of  any  property  of  any kind, 
real, personal or mixed, and either in  possession  or expectancy, and may exercise 
the said right and power in the  same  manner, and to the same extent as an un- 
married person,  but she may  not mortgagz  or convey  her  real property, unless 
her husband join  in such mortgage or conveyance. 
England. Acf, 5 45 &46  Vict., C. 75,  5 2.  Every woman who marries after the 
commencement of this Act shall be entitled to have and hold as her separate pro- 
perty, and to dispose of  in manner aforesaid all real and personal property which 
shall belong to her at the time of marriage, or shall be acquired by or devolveupon 
her after marriage, including any wages, earnings, money, and property gained or 
acquired by her in any employnlent,  trade, or occupation in whichshe is engaged, 
or which she carries on separately from hcr husband, or by the exercise  of  any 
literary, artistic or scientific skill. 
NOTE C.  (See 5 38, note 22.) 
Mich., An. St.. 1882, 8 6295.  The real and personal  estate of  every  female, 
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acquired before marriage, and all property to  which she may afterwards become 
entitled  by  gift, grant, inheritance, cievise  err in  any other manner, shall  be  and 
remain the estate and propertv of  such  female, and  shall  not  be  liable  for  the 
debts, obligat~ons  or engagements of  her husband, and  may he contracted, sold, 
transferred, mortgaged, conveyed, devised  or hequeathetl  by  her  as  if  she were 
unmarried. 
NOTE D.  (See 5 38, note 23.) 
Dist. of  Ch1, Act  of June  r,  1896 (  (7. S. Staf.  at Large,  Vol. 29, p. 193)~  5 I. 
The property, real and  personal, which any  woman  in  the District  of  Columbia 
may own at the timc  of  her  marriage, and the rents, issues, profits  or  proceeds 
thereof, and real, personal or mixed property which sha!l  come to her by descent, 
devise, purchase or bequest, or the  gilt  of  any person, shall  be  and remain  her 
sole and separate property notwithstanding her marriage, and shall not be subject 
to the disposal of  her busl)acd or liable for his debts, except that such property as 
shall come to  her by  gift of  her  husband  shall  Le  subject  to, and liable for, the 
debts of  the husband existing at the time of  the gift. 
NOTE E.  (See  $ 38, note 24.) 
('ol., An. St.,  1891, $3007. The property, real and personal, which any woman 
in this State n:ay  own at the tlme  of  her  marriage, acd the  rtnts, issues, profits, 
and proceeds thereof, and any rea!,  personal or mixcd property which shall come 
to her by  descent, devise or bequest, or the gift of  any person except her husband, 
including presents or gifts from her  husband, as jewelry, silver, tableware, watches, 
money  and wearing  apparel, shall remain  her sole  and separate  property, not- 
withstanding her marriage, and not be subject to the  disposal of  her husband  or 
liable for his debts. 
NOTE F.  (See 5 40, note 7.j 
Soliloquy of  an old lawyer occasioned by  the abolition of  dower and curtesy in 
Mississippi  (quoted  in  Miss., An. Code, 1892, p.  573, note) : "Venerable  relics 
of  antiquity, you  have come down to us  from  a  former  generation.  You  have 
survived the wreck of  empires and change of  dynasties.  Born away back in the 
womb of time, whereof  the niemory of  man runneth not to the contrary, you have 
outlived the war of  the Roses, passed safely through the Protectorate, crossed the 
ocean, survived  the great American  Revolution, and rode  out  the storm  of  the 
late great war.  Whatever attendants were  absent from the bridal altar, you two, 
at least, were always there;  and when  the bride  and groom mutually murmured, 
with  all my  worldly goods I  thee  endow,'  you, as priest and priestess, sealed the 
covenant.  L~ke  shades, you've  followed  the twain blended Into  one, and when 
either fell, one of  you  administered the  balm  of  consolation to the survivor.  If 
pure religion and undefiled be to visit the fatherless and the widow in their afflic- 
tion, thy mission has been akin to it.  Venerable priest and priestess of  the com- 
mon law, farewell!  You have been pleasant in your lives, and in death have not 
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[References are to pages, but the notes must be examined where the index refers 
to the legislation of  particular  states.] 
Abandonment of  Wife, effect of, 28,  30,  128,  I 35. 
Acquisitions, character  of, uuder  community  systems, 68,  69;  community  of, see 
Community Property Systems. 
Administration of  Property.  See Common  I'roperty,  Dotal  Property,  Separate 
Property. 
Alimony, in case of divorce, 93,  "3,  15  I,  I  52. 
Apparel.  See Wearing Apparel. 
America.  See United States. 
Austria, wife's  general capacity  of  acting in, 18;  wife's  contractual  capacity in, 
27; donations  betueen marr~ed  parties in,  40;  wife  as a  trader  in,  41; 
wife's  capacity to sue and bc sued in, 44;  marriage  agreements in, 53, 55, 
57,60,  61,66,  67,89,  122;  statutory and contractual systems in, 55, 57,  58; 
system of  commun~ty  in, 58,65-7,  72, 7~~79~85~88-90,93,94;  wife's earn- 
ings in, 71,72,  116,  135; common property In, 65, 72, 75, 79,93,94;  dotal 
property  in, 65, 66,  1r4-6,  117-24: separate  property  in,  66,  67,  85, 116, 
124,  143,  144;  obligations of  married  parties in, 7j. 79;  system  of  dowry 
in, 58,  114-6,  117-24;  system of  separate property In,  123,  124,  143. 144; 
alimony In, 152;  intestate  successim in, 160;  legal portion  in, 169,  170; 
provision for support of  survivor in, 174,  175. 
Basle  City,  statutory  and  contractual  systems  in, 58; succession  to  common 
property in, 94;  see also Swiss Cantons. 
Bankruptcy,  effect  of,  upon  contracts  between  married  parties,  26; effect  of, 
upon  gifts between  married parties, 38;  effect  of  husband's,  upon  wife's 
acquisitions, 38;  dissolution of  community resulting from, 87,  88;  termina- 
tion of marital admilnstration and usufruct resulting from, I 10;  wife's privi- 
leges in husband's,  109. 
Belgium,  statutory  and  contractual  S!-stems  In,  58; wife's  deposits in  savings 
banks in, 73; intestate succession in, 159;  provision for support of  widow 
in, 174. 
Chancery, English Court of.  See English Equ~ty  Rules. 
Classification  of  Matrimonial Property Systems, 49-52. 
Codification of  Law, effect of, upon matr~monial  property relations,  12,  14,  49. 
Common Law.  See English Common Law. 
1851  '85 Common Property, defined, 63;  under general community, 65;  under community 
of  movables  and acquisitions,  67, 68; under  community  of  acquisitions, 
68,  70; presumption as to existence of, 70;  administration of, 81-5;  restric-  .  - 
tion upon gifts of, 82;  division of, 91-4;  successicn to, 94. 
Community Property Systems- 
General Community, defined, 50; obtains as statutory or contractual Sys- 
tem, 58, j9; composition of, 64-7;  property excluded  from, 65-7;  obli- 
gationsof, 75-7;  continued between survivor and common children,g@ I. 
Community of  hlovables and hcquisitiuns, defined, 51  ;  obtains as statutory 
or contractual  system, 58, 59;  composition  of, 67,  68;  exclusion  of  im- 
movables from, 67,  68;  obligations of, 78. 
Community of  Acquisitions, defined, 50,  51;  obtains as statutory or con- 
tractual  system,  58, 59;  composition of,  68-70: in United  States, 69; 
property excluded  from, 69, 70; husband's  separate property not recog- 
nized under, 69, 70; obllgatlons of,  7s-81. 
Earnings of  wife under, 70-5. 
Administration  of  Community under, see Common  Property, 1)otal Prop- 
erty, Separate Property. 
Dissolution of  Community under, by  bankruptcy, 87, 88;  upon demand of 
.busband or wife, 88,89;  by mutual agreement, 89;  by divorce or judicial 
separation, 89,  go;  by death of  husband or wife, 90;  liquidat~on  of  com- 
mon  obligations  in  case  of,  91-4;  wife's  privilege  of  acceptance  or 
renunciation  in  case  of,  91,  92; division  of  common  property  in  case 
of, 91,  04. 
Attitude of, respecting legal portion, 94, 169, 170, 173. 
See  also  Protection  of  Wife's  Property,  Succession  of  Married  Parties, 
Provision for Support of  Survivor. 
Contracts.  See  Marriage  Agreements,  Legal  Capacity of  Married Women. 
Contractual Property Systems, 55-60. 
Creditors,  gifts  between  married  parties  subject  to  claims  of,  36-9, 41, 133; 
insurance  upon  husband's  life  subject to claims of, 37, 38, 133,  134;  pre- 
sumption as to ownership of  movables for protection of, 38,39, 70. 
Curtesy.  See Dower and Curtesy. 
Death of  Husband  cr Wife,  dissolution  of  community  by,  90;  continuation  of 
commun'ity after, 90, 91  ;  termination of  marital administration and usufruct 
by,  112;  termination of system of  dowry by,  122;  effect of, upon common 
property, 94;  effect of, upon dotal property, 113,  124;  see also Succession 
of  Married Parties, Legal Portion, Provision for Support of  Survivor. 
Debts.  See Obligations of  Married Parties. 
Denmark, statutory system in, 59; earnings of  wife in, 72. 
Deposits in  Banks,  wife's  power  to make and  dispose  of,  21,  33, 34, 73, 128, 
134, '35. 
Dissolution of  Community.  See Community Property Systems. 
Distribution.  See Succession of  Married Parties. 
Divorce or Separation, dissolution  of  community by, 89;  effect  of, upon  division 
of  common property, 93;  termination of marital administration and usufruct 
by,  I  12;  termination of  dowry by,  122;  effect of, upon property relations, 
93,  113. 124,  150-2. 
Donafio propter  nzrptias.  See  System  of  Dowry,  under  Individual  Property 
Systems. 
Donations.  See Gifts. 
Dotal Property, terms used  to designate, In community systems, 63,  64;  defined, 
63,  64; under  general  community,  65,  66; in  objects  for personal  use, 
65,  69;  in  objects  held  by  limited  title,  65, 69;  in  gifts,  66,  68,  69; in 
successions, 66,  68, 69;  established by agreement, 66;  in immovables, 67; 
under community of  acquisitions, 68,69;  under marital administration and 
usufruct,  99-101;  under  system  of  dowry,  114-16;  in earnings  of  wife, 
101;  administration  of, 85,  102-7,  116--120;  compensation due husband 
for  expenditures for, 112,  "3;  husband's  power  of  disposing of  immov- 
able,  103, "7,  118;  of  movable,  103-6,  118;  liability  of,  for  obligations 
of  wife, 108, 109. 
Dower  and Curtesy, at  common  law, 98;  statutory modification of, in  Englaud, 
:37, 138;  statutory  modification  of,  in  United  States,  138-41; barring 
of  claim to, 141;  as affecting  rules of  succession, 157,  167,  :73; as forms 
of  legal portion, 171,  173. 
Dowry.  See Individual  Property Systems. 
Earnings of  Wife,  movement  to secure  wife's  control  over,  7~-5;  under  com- 
munity systems, 66,  69-75; under individual  property systems, 71,  101,  116, 
127, 128,  134-7;  arguments against  exclusion  of,  from  community,  72; 
recent  statutes affecting,  73-5; measures  proposed  in  France respecting, 
73, $4;  subject  to marital  administration  and usufruct,  IOI;  subject  to 
wife's  exclusive  disposition,  71-5,  101,  I  16,  134-7;  exempted  from  hus- 
band's  control and debts, 72, 73, 75, 101,  116,  134-7. 
England, changes  in matrimonial property  relations  during  nineteenth  century 
in,  12,  29, 129,  I  30; wife's  general legal  capacity  in,  18;  development 
of wife's  contractual capzcity in, 29,  30; married women's  property acts in, 
29,  30, 130;  gifts between  married  parties in, 37,  40,  41;  wife as a trader 
in, 42,  43; wife's  capacity to sue and be sued in, 44,  45; wife's contracts 
for  necessities in, 46; marriage agreements  in,  53, 55,  60,  61;  statutory 
system in, 57,59;  separate property in, 28-30,1~5-7,130-2,135-7,142-4; 
system of exclusive rights of  husband in, 97-9; system of  separate property 
in, 59, 125-8,  129-32, 135-8,  142-4, 147,  148,  150,  153,  154; earnings  of 
wife in, 135-7; dower  and curtesy in, 137,  138; support of  the family in, 
147, 148,  150; alimony  in,  152; obligations of  married  parties in,  153, 
154; intestate succession in, 161-3;  legat portion in, 169,  171. 
English  Common  Law,  wife's  general  legal  capacity under,  17,  18;  fiction  of 
unity of  married parties under, 27, 40;  wlfe's  contractual power under, 27, 
28;  gifts between married parties under, 40,41;  wife as a trader under, 42; wife's  incapacity to conduct legal proceed~ngs  under, 44;  wife's contracts 
for necessities under, 46,47;  property relations of  husband and w~fe  under, 
97-9,  125;  abrogation of, as regards wife's  property.  131, 132;  succession 
of  married parties under, 157, 162. 
English  Equity  Rules,  wife's  contractual  power  under, 28,  29;  wife's  separate 
property under, 28, 29, 125-8;  restraint upon anticipation under, 29; gifts 
between  married parties under,41;  wife's equity to a settlement under, 125, 
126. 
Exclusive Rights of  Husband, System of.  See Individual  Property Systems. 
Exempt  Personal  Property, wife's right to hold, 141;  wife's  consent essential  to 
mortgage of, 141;  succession to,  I 75.  I 76. 
Fiction of  Unity, in English Common Law, 27, 40. 
Finland,  gifts  between  married  parties  in,  40;  wife's  capacity  to  sue  and be 
sued  in,  44;  wife's  right  and  duty of  household  administration in,  46; 
marriage  agreements  in, 3-5, 60; post-nuptial  agreements restricted  in, 
54, 55;  statutory  system  in, 57, 59;  establishment  of  system of  separate 
property by contract prohibited in, 60; system of  community in, 59,67,68, 
71, 72, 77, 78, 81-3,  87-9, 92. 93;  dotal property in, 68, 85, 8;;  earnings 
of  wife  in,  71, 72,  135;  separate property  in,  85, 87, 124, 146;  common 
property  in,  67, 68, 72, 77, 81, 82, 93;  obligations  of  married  parties in, 
77,  78;  system  of  separate  property  in,  60, 124,  146,  149;  support  of 
family in, 149. 
France, wife's  general  contractua:  capacity  in,  19-21;  marriage agreements in, 
20,  53-5,  57,  60-2,  66,  67,  100;  post-nuptial  marriage  agreements  re- 
stricted in, 20, 54, 55;  wife's  right  to make deposits in banks m, 21, 73; 
wife's rlght to become  member of  mutual benefit  society in, 21 ; gifts be- 
tween married partles In, 38,40; wife as a trader in, 41,42;  wife's capacity 
to sue and be sued in, 43,44; types of  limited community In, 51; statutory 
and  contractual systems in, 55, 57, 58;  general community  in,  58, 65-7, 
71-7,  81-94;  community of  movables and acquisitions in, 58,67,68, 71-4, 
77,  81-94;  community  of  acquisitions  in,  58, 68-74,  7-4;  system  of 
separate  property in, 58, 93, "3,  124, 135, 142, 143, 146-150;  system  of 
marital adn~inistration  and usufruct in, 58, 99, 100, 103, 106-9,  111, "3; 
system of dowry in, 58, I 14-6, I 18-24;  separate property in, 21,64,67,69, 
85, 87, 100, "6,  124, 142, 143, 146, 147;  dotal propetty in, 64, 66-8,  85, 
87, 99, 100,  103, 106-9, 114-6,  I 18-24;  common  property in, 65, 66, 68- 
71, 73-87,  91-4;  earnings of wife in, 71, 73, 74:  115, 135, 136;  obligations 
of married parties in, 75-80,  107, 108, 153;  support of  family in, 147-50; 
alimony in, 152: intestate  succession  in, 158, 159;  legal portion in, 169, 
170;  provision for support of  survivor in, 174 175. 
General Community of  Property, system of.  See Community Property Systems. 
Geneva, statutory and contractual systems in, 58;  earnings of  wife in, 71,73; see 
also Swiss Cantons. 
German Draft Codes, wife's contracts for personal service in, 25,26;  names given 
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to dotal and separate property in, 64;  husband's  administration of  dotal 
property In, 103-5. 
German Law.  See Teutonic Law. 
Germany,  modification  of matrimonial  property relations  hy  civil  code of, 14; 
wife's  general legal capacit) in, 18; code of, supplants particular  legisla- 
tion~,  25; wife's contractual capacity in, 25,26; w~fe's  contracts for personal 
service in, 25, 42;  gifts between  married parties in, 38,40; wlfe as a trader 
in, 41-3;  wife's capacity to sue and be sued In, 44; wife's right and duty of 
household  administration  in, 46,  47; marriage  agreements  in, 53, 55, 57, 
60-2,  66, 67, 89; statutory and contractual  systems  in, 55-9;  proposal  to 
define  different  matrimonial property systems  in code of, 56; number of 
matrimonial  property  systems  in, before  adoption  of  national  code, 56; 
general community in, 59. 65-7,  71, 75-7,  81-94;  community of  movables 
and acquisitions in, 59, 67-9,  71, 77, 81-94;  community of acquisitions in, 
59, 68-71,  76-94;  system of  separate property in, 59, 93, 124, 135, 142-4, 
148-50;  system  of  marital  administration  and usufruct  in,  59,  99-113; 
matrimon~al  property register  In, 61;  separate  property in, 26, 64, 66, 67, 
69, 85, 87, 100, 101, 107-9,  135. 142-4;  dotal property in, 64-6,  68,69, 85, 
87, 99, 100, 102-13;  common  property  in,  65,68-71,  75-8~~91-4;  earn- 
ings  of  wife  in,  71.  101, 135; obhgations  of  married  parties in,  75-80, 
107-9;  support  of  the family  in, 148-50;  alimony in, 152; intestate  suc- 
cession in, 160, 161; legal portion in, 169-171. 
Gifts  between  married  parties,  restricted  in  Interest  of  ttird  parties,  36-9, 
132, 133; fraud imputed in, 37; not to become separate property of  wife, 
37, 132, 133; of  insurance pohcies, 37, 38, 133, 134; effect of  bankruptcy 
upon, 38; restricted  as  between  the parties, 39-41;  revocation of, 40;  in 
modern  codes, 37, 38, 40;  in English  law, 37, 40, 41;  in Roman law, 39, 
40; in German law, 40. 
Glaris, statutory system in, 58; see also Swiss Cantons. 
Homestezd, exemption of, from  execution,  141; restrictions  upon  d~sposition  of, 
141, 142; w~fe's  right to select a, 141, 142;  succession to,  175-7. 
Househo1.l  Administrat~on,  right  and  duty  of,  46,  47;  demands  of  German 
societies respecting, 47, 48. 
Husband,  effect  of  minority,  or other incapacity of,  20,  22-5,  28,  84, 89, 107, 
r rr, 122, 135; effect of abandonment of  wife  by, 28, 30, 128, 135; right 
and duty of, in  administration  of housel.old, 46;  consent  of, essential  to 
acts of wife, 19-26,  32, 33, 4:,  43. 44, 84, 106, 141, 142, 145, 147; wearing 
apparel of,  excluded  from community, 65;  separate property of, not recog- 
nized  under community of acquisiticns, 69, 70; administrat~on  of common 
property by, 81-5;  restricted in gifts of comnlon property, 82; administra- 
tion  of  dotal  property  by,  85,  IOZ-6;  administration  of  wife's  separate 
property by,  134, 143; right of, to demand dissolution  of  community, 88; 
right  of, to compensation  for  expenditures  for  dotal  property,  112, 113; 
obligation of, to furnish security for administration  of  wife's  property, 86, INDEX  Clgo 
109; obligation of, to support wife and family, 147-49; right of, to support 
from  wife, 149, 150; right  of, to  alimony  from uifc, 152;  curtesy of, see 
Dower and Curtesy;  liability for obligations of, see Obligations of  Married 
Parties. 
Husband and Wife,  contracts between,  20,  22-5,  27-34;  gifts between,  36-41; 
judicial  proceedings  between,  43-5;  agreen~ents  between,  determining 
property  relations,  53-5,  60-2,  89,  I I I, 121;  administration  of  common 
property by, 81-5;  dissolution  of  community by agreement  between, 89; 
termination of marital administration and nsufruct  by  agreement between, 
r I I; return of dowry by agreement between, 122; joindcr of, essential to 
disposition of  homestead,  141, 14';  to bar dower  or curtesy, 140;  to dis- 
position  of  wife's  lea1 property, 145-7;  property relations  of. see AIatri- 
monial  Property  Systems, Community Property Systems, Iildivi~!ual Prop- 
erty Systems, Obligations of  Married Parties;  succession of, see Succession 
of  Married Parties. 
Illness of Ilushand.  See Incapacity of  13usband. 
Immovables, excluded  from community, 67, 68:  disposition of  common, 82;  dis- 
position of  dotal, 103;  disposition  of  separate, 145-7;  particular rules of 
succession to,  161-6. 
Incapacity of  I-Iusband, effect of, 20,  22-5,  28, 84, Sg,  107, 111, 122, 135. 
Individual Yroperty  Systems- 
Systcm of  Exclusive  Rights of  Husband, defined, 51;  husband's  right  to 
wife's  property  under, 95-8,  128;  husband's  liability for  wife's  obliga- 
tions under, 95-7,  153, 154; modification of, in Roman law,g6; in Eng- 
lish and American law,  125, 126, 128-30;  see also, Dower and  Curtesy. 
System  of  Marital Adn~inistration  and Usufruct, defined, 52;  obtains as 
statutory or contractual system, 58, 59;  wife's property subjected to bus- 
band's usufruct  under, 99, 101;  wife's  property excluded from husband's 
usufruct  under,  99-101;  administration  of  wife's  property  under,  see 
Dotal Property, Separate Property;  liability for obligations  of  wife under, 
107-9;  protection  of  wife's  property  under, 109, 110;  termination of, 
by  bankruptcy  of  husband, 110;  upon  demand  of  the  wife,  111;  by 
mntual agreement, I I I; by  dissolution of marriage,  I 12; return of  wiie's 
property under, 112, 1x3; compensation  due husband  for expenditures 
upon wife's  property under, I 12, I 13;  influence of, upon legal portion, 
170, 171. 
System of  Dowry, defined, 52;  obtains as statutory or contractual system 
58, 59;  developnlent of, in Roman law, 95, 96, I 14, I 15;  establishment 
of  dotal  property under, 114, 1  I 5;  right  to demand a dotal settlement 
under, I 15; ownership of  dotal property under,  I 16-8;  donatr.0 propfcr 
nuptias under,  I 16;  paraphernalia  under, I 16;  administration of  dotal 
property  under, I I 6-20;  protection  of  dotal property  under, 1  15, I 17, 
120, 121;  separation  of  property under,  122;  return  of  dotal property 
under, I 14, r 15,  122-4;  influence of, upon legal portion, 170. 
System of  Separate Property, defined, 52;  obtains as statutory or contract- 
ual system, 58,59,124;  frauds upon creditors proni~ted  by, 37;  develop- 
ment of, by Court of  Chancery,  125, 126; by legislatl~~n  in  England and 
United  States, 128-30;  necessity for  statutory  definitiun  of, 127;  con- 
stitutional provisions establishing,  152, 129; different  methods of  statu- 
tory definition  of,  131-4,  175, 179; general character of  wife's property 
under,  131, 132, 134, 135;  gifts  from  husband  to wife  under, 37,  132, 
133;  wife's  interest in insurance policies upon husband's  life under, 37, 
38,  133, 134;  wife's earnings under, 135-7;  husband's administration of 
wife's  property  under,  134, 143;  ~ife's  right  of administration  under, 
142-7;  support of  family under, 147-53;  effects of  divorce under, 150--2; 
liability for obligaticns  under, 153. 154;  attitude  of, tonards legal por- 
tion, 171-3;  see  also, Dower  and Curtesy, Exempt  Personal  Property, 
Homestead.  See also, Succcssion of Karried Partits, Provision for Sup- 
port of  Survivor. 
Inheritance.  See Succcssion ot Married  Parties. 
Insurance  Policies, wife's  power  to effect  and dispcsc of, 33, 34;  limit  of, upon 
husband's  life  for  benefit  of  wife, 37, 38,  133; separate  property  in, 66, 
128, 133;  effect of fraud upon,  134. 
Inventory, of  wife's  property, 87, 109. 
Italy, wife's  general legal capacity in draft code of, 21;  wife's  contractual  capa- 
city  In, 21,  22; contracts between  married  parties  in, 22;  gifts  between 
married parties in, 40; wife's capacity to sue and be sued in, 44; marriage 
agreements  in, 22,  53-5,  57, 60-2;  post-nuptial  marriage  agreements re- 
stricted in, 22, 54, 55;  statutory and contractual systems in, 55,57,58, 60; 
establishment of  community other than of  acquisitions prohibited  in, 60; 
community of acquisitions in, 58, 68-71,  78-83,  85-92;  common property 
in, 68-71,  7843, 91, 92; dotal property in, 68-70,  85, 87, 114-6,  118-24; 
separate property in, 7c, 85, 87,  116, 135, 142-4,  146;  earnings of  wife in, 
71,  116, 135;  obligations of  married  parties in, 78-80;  system of  dowry 
in, 58, I 14-6,  I 18-24;  system of separate property in, 135, 142-4,146,  148- 
50;  support of the family  in,  148-50;  alimony  in, 152;  intestate  succes- 
sion in, 160;  legal  portion  in, 169, 170;  provision  for  support of  widow 
in,  r 74-5. 
Judicial  Authorization,  essential to contracts of  wife, rg, 20,  22-6,  33, 36;  may 
supply husband's  consent,  19,  ZC,  22,  24,  26, 47,  84,  107;  essential  for 
wife  to become a trader, 42;  essential  for marriage agreements, 61;  may 
supply wife's consent, 83, 106. 
Legal Capacity of Married Woman, influenced by matrimonial property relations, 
16,  21,  23,  24;  general,  16-9;  explanation  of  limitations  upon,  18-23; 
general  contractual, 19-34;  to contract with  husband, 20,  22-8,  31-4;  to 
be a trader, 41-3;  to become surety, 34-6;  to sue and be sued, 43-5;  to 
administer household affairs, 46-8. 
Legal Mortgage,  for protection of wife's property, 120, 121. Legal Portion,  marriage  agreements  cannot  modify,  62;  nature  of,  168,  169; 
attitude  of  Roman  law  respectmg,  169;  where  comm-~nity  is  statutory 
system, 169, 170, 173;  where dowry is statutory system, 170;  where mari- 
tal administration and usnfruct is statutory  system, 170, 171; where sepa- 
rate  property  is  statutory  system,  171-3;  tendency  to make,  same  as 
intestate share, 171, 172. 
Limitation of  Actions, exemption of  wife from operation of, 45-46. 
Louisiana, wife's  contractual  capacity in, 22;  wife's  power  to become  surety in, 
35;  wife  as  a  trader  in, 43;  wife's capacity to sue and be sued in, 44; 
marriage agreements in, 53-5,  60-2;  post-nuptial marriage agreements re- 
stricted in, 54;  statutory  and contractual systems  in, 57, 59;  community 
of acquisitions  in, 59, 68, 69, 79-89,91,  93;  conlmon  property in, 68, 69, 
79-87,  91, 93;  dotal property  in, 68, 69, 85, 87, I 14-6,  118-24;  separate 
property in, 63, 85, 87, 116, 124, 135, 142-44,  146, 147;  earnings of  wife 
in, 116;  obligations of  married parties in, 79, So:  system of  dowry in, 59, 
114-6,  I 18-24;  system  of  s-parate  property  in, 124, 135, 142-4,  146-9; 
support of the family in, 148, 149;  intestate succession in, 159, 160;  legal 
port~on  in, 169, 170;  provision for support of  survivor in, 174, 175. 
Lucerne, wife's  right of  household administration in, 47;  statutory system in, 58; 
see also, Swiss Cantons. 
Marital Administration  and Usufruct, system of, see Individual Property Systems. 
Marital  Authorization,  essential  to wife's  contracts, 19-26,  32, 33;  supplied  by 
the court,  19, 22, 24-6,  44, 84, 107;  not  required  for  revocation  of  gifts, 
40;  for acceptance or rejection  of gifts, successions,  etc.,  106, 107;  essen- 
tial for wife to become a trader, 41;  for alienation of  property, 144-7;  for 
civ~l  proceedings by wife, 43, 4;  for wife's  acts affecting  common prop- 
erty,  84;  for  wife's  acts  affecting  dotal  property,  106;  for  wife's  acts 
affecting separate property, 142, 145-7;  for disposition of  homestead, 142. 
Marriage  Agreements,  freedom  to  contract,  53-5;  ante-nuptial, 53,  54;  post- 
nuptial, 54, 55; special  form  for, 60, 61;  publication of, 61;  register  for, 
61;  affecting order of  succession, 61, 62;  affecting  legal portion, 62;  dis 
solution  of  community  by,  89;  establishment  of  dotal  property  by, 66; 
establishment  of  separate property by, 66-68,  100; termmation  of  marital 
administration and usufruct by, I I I ; for return of  dowry,  122. 
Married  Woman.  See Wife. 
Married Women's Property Acts.  See Separate Property, W~fe. 
Matrimonial Property Register, 61. 
Matrimonial  Property  Systems,  affected  by  conceptions  of  personal  status  of 
married  parties, 16;  changes  made  during  nineteenth  century  in, 11-4; 
tendency towards development of  common regulations in, 14;  classifica- 
tion of, 49-52;  table showing territorial  distribution of, 57-9;  determina- 
tion of, by marriage agreement, 53-5,  57-60;  determination of, by statute. 
55-9;  number of, in Germacy before  adoption of  national code, 56;  pro- 
posals  to define different, in  code of  Germany,  56;  see also,  Community 
INDEX 
Minority of Husband.  See Incapacity of  Hushand. 
Mortgage, legal, of  husband's immovables for protection  of  wife's  property, log, 
120, 121. 
Movables, community of, and acquisitions.  See Community Property Systems. 
Mutual Benefit Associations, married woman as a member of, 21,  33, 34. 
Necessaries, wife's contracts for, 46, 47. 
Norway, wife's  general  legal capacity in, 18;  wife's  contractual  capacity in, 27; 
wife's  power to become surety in, ;6;  gifts between married parties in, 40; 
marriage  agreements  in, 53, 55, 57, 60, 61, 66, 67, Sg;  statutory and con- 
tractual  systems in, 55, 57, 59;  comlnon property In, 66, 75, 76, 81-7,  91, 
92;  separate property in, 66,67, 85, 87, 124, 135, 142, 144;  dotal property 
in,  66, 85,  87;  general  conimunlty  in, 59, 66, 67, 71, 75-7,  81-9, 91, 92; 
earrungs of  wife in, 71, 135;  obligations of  marrled  parties in, 75-7;  sys- 
tem of separate property in, 59, 124, 135, 142-4. 
Obligations of  Married  Parties, liability of  community for, 75-80,  91;  individual 
liabihty  for, 76-S,  80, 91-3,  95-7,  107, 108;  arising  from  illegal  acts, 76, 
80, 108, 153, 154;  arising  from  administration  of  separate property,  76; 
liability for ante-nuptial, 79, 153; liability for post-nuptial, 79, 80, 153, 154 
liability of dotal  property for, 108;  liability for, undel  system  of  separate 
property,  I539  '54. 
Paraphernalia.  See  Dowry  and Separate  Property  under  Individual  Property 
Systems. 
Personal Property, wife's  consent essent~al  to mortgage  of  exempt, 141;  succes- 
sion to exempt,  175-7;  part~cular  rules of succession to, 161, 162, 167. 
Personal Service, wife's  contracts for, 24-6,  32-4. 
Presumption  as to Ownership of  Movables,  38, 39;  of  objects intended  for per- 
sonal use of wife, 39;  of  property  under  community systems, 38, 70;  re- 
butte l  by  inventory, 87, 109. 
Products of  Personal Industry of  Wife.  See Earnings of  Wife. 
Protection  of  Wife's  Property, under  community systems, 86, 87;  under  marital 
administration and  usufruct, 109, 110;  under  system  of  dowry,  115, "7, 
I 20,  121 ; right  to demand  security for, 109, 121;  right  to register  mort- 
gage over  husband's  immovables  for,  log,  121;  privileges  in  hushand's 
bankruptcy for, 109, I 10; legal mortgage for, 120, 121. 
Provision  for Support of  Survivor, importance of, 173, 174;  where community is 
the statutory system, 174;  where dowry is the statutory system, 174, 175; 
in United States, 175-7;  restricted  to widow, 175, 176. 
Prussia, wife's contractual capacity in, 24, 25;  marriage agreements in, 25, 53,55, 
57, 60-2,  66, 67, 89, 111;  code of, supplanted by national code, 24;  wife's 
power to become surety in, 36;  gifts between married parties In, 40;  wife 
as a trader in, 41;  wife's  capacity to sue and  be sued in, 4;  wife's  right 
of  household  administration in, 47;  statutory and contractual systems  in. 
55-7,  59;  separate property in  24, 64, 67-9,  85, 87, 100, 101, 107-9,  I%, 
135, 142-4;  dotal property  in, 64-9,  85, 87, 99, 103. 106-9,  111-3;  com- 
Property Systems, Individual Property Systems. INDEX 
mon property in, 65,66,6S-70,  72, 75, 76, 78-87,91-4;  general community 
in, 59,65-7,  72, 75-7,  81-94;  community of  acquisitions in, 59, 68-70,  72, 
78, 94;  marital administration and usufruct in, 59, 99-103,  106-9, 111-3; 
system  of  separate property  in, 59, 124, 135, 142-4;  earnings of  wife in, 
71, 72, 101, 135;  obligations  of  married  parties in, 75-80,  107;  intestate 
succession in, 160, 161 ; legal portion in, 169, 171. 
Real Property.  See Immovables. 
Restraint upon Anticipation, 29, 30. 
Roman Law, wife's general legal capacity in, 16, 17;  wife's contractual  capacity 
in, 26, 27;  contracts between married  parties in, 27;  wife's  power  to be- 
come surety in, 34, 35;  gifts between married parties in, 38, 40;  property 
relations between married  parties in, 12, 13, 95, 96, 114-8,  120, 122,  123; 
resistance  to  reception of,  in family  relations,  49,  55,  56;  succession of 
married  parties in, 155-7;  legal portion in, 169;  provision for support of 
widow in, 156, 169. 
Russia,  wife's  general legal capacity  in, 18;  wife's  contractual  capacity  in, 27; 
wife's  power  to  draw  bills  of  exchange  in,  36;  gifts  between  married 
parties in, 36, 40;  wife as a trader in, 43;  marriage agreements in, 53, 55, 
60, 62;  statutory system in, 56, 57, 59; system of  separate property in, 59, 
124, 135, 142-4;  separate  property in, 124, 127, 135, 142-4;  earnings of 
wife in, 135;  support of  the family in, 150;  intestate  succession in, 161; 
legal portion in, I 69-7 I. 
Savings of  Wife, deposlt of, in banks, 21,  22, 28, 33, 34, 121, 134, 135;  excluded 
from community, 65;  see also, Earnings of  Wife. 
Saxony,  wife's  contractual  capacity  in, 24, 25;  code of,  supplanted  by  national 
code, 24;  wife's  power  to become  surety in, 36;  gifts  betweeo  married 
parties in, 40;  wife as a trader in, 41;  wife's  capacity to sue and be sued 
in, 44;  wife's right  of  household  administration in, 47;  marriage  agree- 
ments in, 53, 55, 57, 60-2,  66, 67, 111;  statutory and contractual  systems 
in,  55,  57, 59;  separate property  in, 24, 64, 67, 85, IW, 101, 107-9,  124, 
135,  142-4;  dotal  property  in,  66,  85,  59-103,  106-9,  111-3;  common 
property  in,  65, 66, 72, 75, 78, 81-5,  87, 91,  93;  community  systems in, 
59, 65-7,  72, 75, 78, 81-5,  87, 89-91,  93;  marital  administration  and usu- 
fruct in, 59, 9g-103,  106-9,  111-3;  system  of  separate  property  in,  59, 
124, 135, 142-4,  150;  earnings of  wife in, 71, 72,  101, 135;  obligations of 
married parties in, 75, 78, 107, 109;  support of  husband by wife in, 150; 
intestate succession in, 160, 161;  legal portion in, 169-71. 
Scandinavian Countries, earnings of  wife in, 71, 72;  see also, Denmark, Norway, 
Sweden, Finland. 
Separate Property, system of, see Individual Property Systems;  terms used to desi- 
gnate, in communit)  sjstems, 63,64;  defined, 63, 64;  under general com- 
munity, 65-7;  under community of  movables and acquisitions, 67,69; under 
community of acquisitions, 68-70; under marital administration and usufruct, 
99-101;  under system of dowry, I I 6; develcpment of, by Court ofchancey 
125,126;  development of, by legislation, 128-30;  in objects of personaluse, 
65,100, 101; in  wife'  savings, 65,  128, 134, 135;  in  wife's  earnings, 66, 
74, 101, I 16, 134-7;  n policies  of  insurance, 37,38,66, 128, 133, 134;  in 
gifts, 37, 66, 69, 100, 132-5;  in  ~uccessions,  66, 69, 100, 134;  estahlished 
by agreement, 66-8,  IW;  of  husband not recognized  under  limited  com- 
munity, 69, 70;  administration  of, 85, 107, 127, 134, 142-7. 
Separation of  Property, under community systems, 87-94;  under  marital  admin- 
istration and usufruct,  110-3;  under system of dowry, 121-4. 
Spain, wife's  contractual  capacity in, 21, 22;  marriage  agreements in, 22, 53-5, 
57, 60-62;  gifts between married parties in, 40;  wife's  capacity to sue and 
be sued in, 44;  wife's  right of household management in, 46;  post-nuptial 
marriage  agreements  restricted  in, 54, 55;  statutory and contractual sys- 
tems in,  55,  57,  58;  common  property  in,  68,  71,  78-87,  91-3;  dotal 
property in, 69, 85, 87, I 15, 116, I 18-24;  separate property in, 85,87, I 16, 
124, 135, 142-4,  146, '$7;  community  of  acquisitions in, 58, 68,  69, 71, 
78-89,  91-3;  system  of  dowry  in, "5,  "6,  118-24;  system  of  separate 
property in, 124, 135, 142-4,  146-50;  earnings of  wife  in, 71, 135;  obli- 
gations  of  married  parties  in, ?S-80;  support  of  the  family in, 147-50; 
alimony in,  152;  intestate  succession in, 159;  legal  portion  in, 169, 170; 
provision for support of  widow in, I 74,  I 75. 
Statutory Property System;,  55-60. 
Succession of  Married Parties, marriage agreements affecting,  61, 62;  relation of 
law  of, to matrimonial  property rights,  15, 155-7;  Roman  law of,  155-7, 
169 : Teutonic law of,  156, 157;  English  common  law of, 157, 162, 163; 
modern principles  of,  157, 158;  in  French Civil Code, 158;  recent statu- 
tory  changes  in, 158-60;  where  community  is statutory system. 158-60, 
169,  170,  174;  where  dowry  is  statutory  system,  160,  170,  174,  175; 
where marital administration and usufruct is statutory system, 160, 161,170, 
171;  where  separate  property  is  statutory  system,  161-7,  171-3,  175-7; 
distinction  between  real  and  personal  property  in, 161,  162, 166, 167; 
distinction between husband and wife in, 162, 163, 166, 167, 171, 173, 175, 
176; affected  by  number  and  degree  of  heirs,  159,  161,  162,  164-6; 
tendency to equalize shares of  husband and wife in, 162, 163, 166, 167,171, 
176, 177;  tendency to make legal portion same as intestate share in, 171, 
172;  see also, Legal Portion, Provision for Support of  Survivor. 
Sue and be Sued, wife's  capacity to, 43-6. 
Support of the Family, failure of  husband  to  provide  for, justifies separation  of 
property, 88, I I I, 122;  by  the  husband,  108, 147;  joint  liab~hty  of  hus- 
band and wife fer, 148, 151;  wife's  duty to contribute to, 148, 149. 
Surety, wife's power to become, 34-6. 
Sweden, statutory system in, 59;  earnings of  wife in, 72. 
Swiss Cantons, wife's contractual capacity in, 23;  guardianship of  women in, 23; 
marriage  agreements in, 23, 53, 54, 60-2;  wife's  power  to become surety 
in, 34;  wife as a trader in, 41, 43;  wife's right of household  management in,  46,  47;  statutory  and  contractual  sjstems  in,  55,  57,  58;  separate 
property in, 23, 66, 73, 85, loo, 101, 107, 124, 135, 142-4;  common prop- 
erty in, 65, 73, 81-3,  86, 91-4;  dotal property  in, 65, 85, 99-103,  106-13; 
community systems in, 58, 65, 66, 71, 73, 81-3,85-g4;  marital administra- 
tion and usufruct  in, 58, 99-103,  106-13;  system of  separate  property in, 
58,  113, 124, 135, 142-4,  148, 149;  earnings of  wife  in, 71, 73, 101, 135; 
obligations of  married parties in, 107, 108;  support of  the fanlily in, 148, 
149;  ahmony in, 152;  intestate  succession  in, 159-61;  legal  portion  in, 
94, 169-71. 
Swiss Draft Code, wife's contractual  capacity in, 23, 24;  wife's  right to carry on 
industry In, 24;  wife's nght of  household  administration in, 47;  marriage 
agreements in, 53, 55, 57,Eo-2,  Dg,  r I I ; statutory and contractual systems 
in,  55,  57, 58;  sel~arate  property in, 24, 64-9,  75, Ss, loo, 101, 107, 124, 
135, 142-4;  dotal property  in, 67-9,  85, 99, loo, 102, 103, 105-13;  con>- 
mon property  in, 65, 68, 69, 76, 78, 87, 91-4;  general  community m, 58, 
65, 66, 75-7,81-94;  comnlunity of  movables and acquisitions in, 58,654 
75,  77, 81-94;  community of acquisitions in, 52, 65,66, 68, 69, 75, 78-94; 
marital  administration  and  usufruct  in,  58,  65,  66, 75, 59-103,  105-13; 
system of  separate property in, 58,93, "3,  124, 135, 142-4,  148;  earnings 
of  wife  in, 65, 66, 75, 101, 135;  obligations of  married parties in, 76-80, 
107, 1c8; support of  the family in, 148;  alimony in, 152. 
Testamentary  D~spositions,  limitations  upon,  affecting  provision  for  support  of 
widow,  156;  see also Legal Portion. 
Teutonic Law, wife's general legal capacity in, 16, 17;  gifts between husband and 
wife in, 40;  property relation between husband  and wife in, 95-7;  succes- 
sion of married parties in,  156, 157. 
Trader, wife's  capacity to be a, 41- 3. 
Undue Influence, protection of wife from, of  husband, I 19. 
United  States,  changes  in  u~atrimonial  property relations in, during nineteenth 
century, 12-4,  30;  inequalities resulting from married women's  acts in, 12, 
13;  tendency to  establish equality in matrimonial property relations in, 14; 
wife's  general  legal  capacity  in,  18;  development of wife's  contractual 
capacity  in, 30-4;  wife's  power  to  bccome  surety  in, 35;  gifts  between 
married partirs in, 37, 38, 40, 41;  wife as a trader in, 42, 43;  wife's capa- 
city  to sue and be  sued  in, 44, 45;  wife's  exemption  from operation  of 
statutes of  l~mitations  in, 45,46;  wife's  contracts for necessaries in, 33,46, 
47;  marriage  agreements  in,  31-3,  53-5,  60-2;  post-nuptial  marriage 
agreements restricted  in, 31-3,  54, 55;  statutory  and contractual systems 
in, 57, 59;  community of  acquisitions in, 59, 68, 69, 74, 75, 78-85,  87, 88, 
91-4;  system of exclusive rights of  husband in, 97-9;  system of  dowry in, 
114-6,  118-24;  system of  separate property in, 59, 124, 125, 127-50,  153, 
154;  separate  property  in,  3c-4,  68, t9, 75, 85, 124, 125, 127-47,  151-3; 
common property in, 68, 69, 74, 75, 78-85,  87, 91-4,  116;  dotal property 
in, 68, 69, 85, 114-6,  118-24;  earnings of  wife in, 69, 71, 74,  75, 116, 136, 
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137;  obligations of  married parties  in, 78-80,  153, 154;  statutory  provi- 
sions establishing separate property  in, 128, 129, 131-3,  Appendix,  notes 
A-E;  dower and curtesy in, 137-41;  homestead  in, 141, 142;  support of 
the family in, 148-50,  153;  alimony in, 151, 152;  intestate  succession  in, 
159-68;  legal portion  in,  94, 169-73;  provision  for support  of  the sur- 
vivor in, I 74-77. 
Wearing Apparel, excluded from community, 65;  excluded  from  husband's  ad- 
ministration,  loo, 101. 
Widow.  See Dower and Curtesy, Intestate  Succession, Legal Portion, Provision 
for Support of Survivor. 
Wife,  general  legal  capacity  of,  16-8;  general  contractual  capacity  of, 19-34; 
effects of  abandonment of, by  husband, 28, 30,  128, 135;  contracts of, re- 
specting separate property, 21, 23, 24, 26, 29, 30, 33, 34;  contracts of, for 
personal  service, 24-6,  32-4;  stock  of, in mutual  benefit associations, 21, 
33, 34, 134, 135;  deposits  of, in  banks, 21,  22, 28, 33, 34, 121, 134, 135; 
insurance policies of, 33, 34,121, 133-5;  as surety, 34-6;  as trader, 41-3; 
capacity of, to sue and be sued, 43-5;  exemption  of, from statutes of lim- 
itations, 45, 46;  right and duty of  household administration, 46-8;  wear- 
ing apparel  of, excluded  from  community, 65;  from  husband's  adminis- 
tration  and  use,  loo,  101;  savings  of,  excluded  from  community,  65; 
earnings  of, excluded  from  community, 65, 66, 73,  75;  from marital  ad- 
ministration and usufruct,  101;  earnings of, not subject to husband's con- 
trol  or debts, 72, 73, 75, 101, "6,  134-7;  earnings of, subject  to her  ex- 
clusive  control, 71-5,  101,  "6,  134-7;  right  of,  to  administer  common 
property, 83-5,  87;  dotal  property,  106,  107;  separate  property, 142-7; 
consent  of, essential  to  administration  cf  common  property, 82, 83;  of 
dotal property,  102-6;  consent  of, essential  to disposition  of  homestead 
and exempt personal property, 141, 142;  protection of property of, 86, 87, 
109, 110, 115, "7,  12c,  121;  right  of, to  demand security for husband's 
administration, 86, 109;  right of, to record  mortgage  over  husband's  im- 
movables, 109, 121;  legal  mortgage  of, for  security  of  dowry,  120, 121; 
right  of,  to  demand  dissolution  of  community,  88,  89;  termination  of 
marital administration and usufruct,  I I I ; return  of  dowry, I 22;  privilege 
of, to renounce  community, 92;  to accept  community with benefit of  in- 
ventory, 92;  privilege  of, in  husband's  bankruptcy, 109, 110; right  of, to 
sue as owner of dowry, 115;  equity of, to a settlement out of  her personal 
property,  125, 126;  effect of  removal of  disabilities of, upon former privi- 
leges,  45,  46,  129;  right  of,  to  claim  homestead and exempt personal 
property, 141, 142;  contribution  of, for  support  of  family,  148, 149;  lia- 
bility of, for  support  of  husband, 149-52;  right  of, to alimony from  hus- 
band, 151, 152;  right  of,  to  support  from  husband,  147,  149;  see  also, 
Obligations of  Married  Parties, Succession of  Married Parties. 
Ziirich, statutory system in, 58;  see also, Swiss Cantons. 